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The ongoing development and ubiquitous spread of technology has brought with it new 
threats and opportunities for online victimisation. Although human factors cyber-security 
research continues to try to mitigate these threats through the application of behavioural 
science, some users, such as older adults, remain at particular risk of cyber-attacks, and yet 
remain heavily under-represented in the extant literature base. This thesis outlines a mixed 
methods approach to understanding older adult cyber-security vulnerability. 
The thesis began by identifying a range of technological changes that take place during the 
transition into retirement. Each of these changes offered avenues for subsequent cyber-
security vulnerability. Through conducting a large-scale online survey in retired older 
adults, these retirement related factors were shown to be associated with engagement in 
risky online cyber-security behaviours. It was identified that the strongest predictor of these was 
an individual’s computer self-doubt. A second qualitative study found that older adults see 
cyber-security as a stressful subject and demonstrated both: the factors that influenced their 
confidence in relation to engaging in cyber-security behaviours, as well as their reasons for 
disengaging from cyber-security behaviours. A scale was developed to further understand 
older adult’s security related stress, which was applied to understand their coping 
behaviours when faced with a cyber-security challenge. This was effective at predicting 
older adults’ engagement in dysfunctional coping, highlighting how security stress might 
promote cyber-security vulnerability. Finally, the research applied the transactional theory of 
stress and coping to older adults’ cyber-security, demonstrating its effectiveness in predicting 
both dysfunctional and problem focussed coping strategies.  
The thesis provides new knowledge as to the factors which promote cyber-security 
vulnerability in older adults and outlines specific avenues as to how this vulnerability 
might manifest. Throughout this thesis, recommendations for policy makers, developers and 
future research are made and discussed in the context of existing literature.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Whilst the development and near-ubiquitous spread of technology has led to a more digitally 
connected and technologically accessible world, new opportunities for vulnerability have emerged 
for users of such technology. The protection of oneself in the online environment, or cybersecurity, 
is therefore more important than ever. Recent widely publicised cyber-attacks and exploits such as 
the NotPetya ransomware attack (Fayi, 2018), the Heartbleed exploit (Carvalho et al., 2014) and the 
recent Wannacry attacks on the UK NHS (Martin et al., 2018) mean that cybersecurity has recently 
gained more attention than ever before. Indeed the UK government recently highlighted the 
importance of cybersecurity by re-asserting that it represents a tier 1 threat, placing it on par with 
terrorism in its risk to the United Kingdom (Department of Communications, 2015). 
Although all users are potential victims of cybersecurity attacks, some users; such as older adults, 
may be particularly vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Older adults represent the fastest growing group of 
users online (Vroman et al., 2015) and use technology for a number of convenience reasons such as 
online shopping (Vroman et al., 2015) and online banking (Van Boekel et al., 2017). Furthermore, 
older adults recognise the benefits that technology provides for staying independent for longer, and 
many are keen to continue using technology well into older age (Betts et al., 2019; Peek et al., 2016). 
Despite this, there remains a ‘digital divide’ between younger users and older adults in online settings. 
This divide reflects a disparity between digital literacy between these user groups, something likely 
to promote negative outcomes in the form of cyber-victimisation in older adult populations (Hill et 
al., 2015). Research by Age-UK (2015a, 2015b) has supported this suggestion, finding that older 
adults are not only actively sought out and targeted by attackers due to perceptions of vulnerability 
and accrued wealth, but also are at increased risk of losing large sums of money to cyber criminals. 
Although older adult’s cybersecurity research is gaining interest from the academic community, there 
remains a scarcity of literature which seeks to understand the online vulnerabilities of older adults, 
how they become vulnerable to cyber-attacks, and their experiences of engaging with cybersecurity. 
Furthermore, given the growing adoption and use of technology by older adult groups (Martínez-
Alcalá et al., 2018), we know that older adults are using technology, yet we know little about how 
they cope with cybersecurity challenges they face. This is likely to be even more pertinent in younger 
‘older adult’ groups, such as those within the ‘Baby Boomer’ generation. 
The “Baby Boomer” generation – those born between 1946 and 1964 (Venter, 2017; Wang et al., 
2017; Young & Tinker, 2017) - are very different to previous generations with regards to their 
technology interaction. This generation are the first retirees to have used technology for a large part 
of their working lives (Durrant et al., 2017b) and are likely to use technology: before, during and well 
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into retirement (Pew, 2017). This generation therefore invites a range of interesting questions, the 
answers to which are currently missing from the extant older adult cybersecurity literature. 
1.1 | Research Question for Thesis: 
The aim of this thesis, therefore, was to further understand the current landscape of older adult 
cybersecurity. To address the gap in the current literature base, the thesis used an exploratory 
approach to investigate the following research questions: 
RQ1: What factors cause older adults to become vulnerable to cybersecurity attacks? 
RQ2: How do older adults feel about engaging in cyber-protective behaviours, and what 
barriers hinder them from doing so? 
RQ3: How do older adults cope with cybersecurity challenges? 
1.2 | Research Objectives 
Given the exploratory nature of the thesis, research objectives were generated throughout the 
generation of the project, typically set out following each study. The research began by investigating 
the retirement transition, a period previously seen as the gateway into older age. The research then 
moved on to understanding more about how cybersecurity is experienced by older adults, focussing 
on: how they feel about engaging in security, what barriers hinder them from doing so, and how they 
cope in relation to cybersecurity. Overall the specific research objectives of the thesis were; 
• To understand technological changes in the retirement transition and the impact of these
changes on older adult’s cyber-security vulnerability (studies 1 and 2)
• To understand older adults’ engagement with cyber-security protective behaviours, including
whether or not they engage with such behaviours, and what factors influence their decision
to protect themselves or not (study 3)
• To understand how emotions associated with cybersecurity, in particular; stress, influences
cybersecurity coping behaviours in older adults (studies 4 and 5)
15 
1.3 | Thesis Approach to Addressing Research Questions and Objectives 
Figure 1 Thesis Approach and Chapter Overview 
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1.4 | Overview of Studies  
Overall, this thesis used a mixed methods approach utilising both qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies to investigate older adult cyber-security vulnerability. To understand older adult 
vulnerability, the research began by targeting the retirement transition. Retirement has previously 
been seen as the normative shift into older age and can be seen as the major difference between 
‘working-age’ and ‘older adults’. The research looked at the changes that take place during the 
transition to retirement in a series of interviews with recently retired older adults, critically evaluating 
how these changes might lead to cyber-security vulnerability in later life (Chapter 4, study 1). The 
thesis then found that many of these factors were significantly associated with engagement in risky 
online cybersecurity behaviours in a large online sample of retired older adults (Chapter 5, study 2). 
Having found that the greatest predictor of engagement in risky online behaviours was the self-doubt 
that older adults had in relation to their technology use, the thesis sought to further understand how 
older adults feel about engaging in protective online behaviours, and what barriers they may face 
when attempting to engage in such behaviours. This was achieved through the development and 
application of a novel card sorting elicitation task (chapter 6, study 3). After identifying that 
cybersecurity is generally seen as a stressful subject for older adults, the research sought to understand 
how this stress impacted upon their cybersecurity behaviour. A security related stress scale was 
developed, based on an existing workplace-based measure, so that the relationship between security 
stress and coping styles could be established in this population (Chapter 8, study 4). Having identified 
that security related stress explained a significant amount of dysfunctional coping, a possible avenue 
of security vulnerability in this population, a model of stress and coping was produced which 
demonstrated the relationships between transactional theory appraisals, security related stress and 
coping strategies (Chapter 9, study 5). The sections below provide overviews and key findings of 
each of the studies investigated within this thesis. 
1.4.1 | Study 1 (Chapter 4) 
Study 1 set out to investigate how retirement, as a major life transition, might lead to changes in 
technology use and promote subsequent cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Twelve recently retired 
individuals were interviewed exploring the changes they experienced during the retirement transition 
and how these changes influenced their technology use. The data was approached using template 
analysis, a form of thematic analysis that allows for a-priori themes. Based on existing retirement 
adjustment literature, six themes reflecting areas that might be associated with both the retirement 
transition and technology were suggested. These consisted of changes to an individual’s: social 
situation, online/technology adoption, identity transitions, psychological/personality wellbeing 
change, technological support structure changes and financial change. Through revising this template 
17 
 
during analysis, six key themes were identified: each theme reflected changes experienced in the 
retirement transition which subsequently impacted upon technology use. Furthermore, each of these 
was seen to have the potential to promote cybersecurity vulnerability. These reflected changes in; 
social interaction, finances, routines, feelings of competence, feelings of purpose and technology 
support structures. Each transition was discussed in relation to existing cybersecurity literature, 
highlighting how each may promote cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Overall, the findings of this study 
suggested that the retirement transition may produce changes which contribute to cybersecurity 
vulnerability in retired older adults. 
1.4.2 | Study 2 (Chapter 5) 
Study 2 built upon the findings of study 1, seeking to understand how the retirement related changes 
identified in study 1 were associated with a measure of cybersecurity vulnerability, namely: 
engagement in risky cybersecurity behaviours.  The study involved developing a survey, comprised 
of the factors identified in study 1 as well as others identified in existing cybersecurity literature. An 
online self-report survey was developed and subsequently completed by a sample of 362 UK-based 
older adults. Using multiple regression analyses, eight significant predictors of risky cybersecurity 
behaviours were found: Social Disconnectedness, Impulsivity, Time on Social Media, Computer Self-
Doubt, Risk Propensity, Perceived Cognitive Decline, Interest in Technology and Self Esteem. 
Together these factors explained 34% of the variance of risky cyber-security behaviours. This study 
was the first to demonstrate an association between retirement related factors and a measure of cyber-
security vulnerability. 
1.4.3 | Study 3 (Chapter 6) 
Study 3 set out to investigate how older adults feel about engaging in protective cyber-security 
behaviours. Furthermore it sought to understand whether or not they engaged in such behaviours, and 
if not, what barriers hindered them from doing so. The previous study had demonstrated that computer 
self-doubt was by far the strongest predictor of engagement in risky cybersecurity behaviours. Despite 
this, very little existing research had sought to understand how older adults feel about engaging in 
cybersecurity behaviours. A novel card sorting task was developed to promote discussion in 
interviews aimed at understanding older adults’ feelings towards security behaviours. A set of cards 
were developed reflecting nine protective behaviours, these reflected jargon-free statements taken 
from two sources; existing literature and a government website aimed at providing cybersecurity 
advice. The card-sorting task involved two key parts: in the first part of the task, the participant was 
asked to sort the protective behaviours based on how effective they saw them to be. Following this, 
participants were asked to rate their confidence in engaging in each behaviour, outline whether or not 
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they engaged in each behaviour, and discuss their reasons behind whether they chose to do so or not. 
The findings were outlined in two thematic maps: the first outlined factors which influence the 
confidence that older adults have when engaging in cyber-security protective behaviours. The second 
outlined reasons for disengagement from cybersecurity behaviours. Within this study it became clear 
that cybersecurity is an emotive subject for older adults. Participants discussed anxiety, fear and stress 
in relation to both engaging in cybersecurity practices, as well as the threats that might target them in 
the online environment. The findings highlighted that existing literature in this area has failed to 
appropriately address the importance of the emotional implications of cybersecurity, and how these 
might influence security behaviour. This study led to the application of an existing emotion-focused 
psychological model, to explain cybersecurity coping behaviours as the result of an emotional 
response, in particular; stress.  
1.4.4 | Study 4 (Chapter 8) 
As no existing scales designed to measure cybersecurity related stress were in circulation outside of 
workplace settings, study 4 aimed to develop a scale which could achieve this. Furthermore, given 
that no existing literature had sought to understand the impact of security related stress on older 
adult’s cybersecurity coping behaviours, this study aimed to fill two gaps in the extant literature base. 
Although one cybersecurity related stress scale (SRS) had been used within occupational settings, no 
such scale existed for non-workplace settings. This study developed and initially validated a new 
scale based on the SRS and applied it to a sample of retired older adults to understand how security 
related stress was associated with different forms of coping. Following scale development, a survey 
was created including both the new scale and items relating to security coping. This was then 
distributed to a large online sample of 873 participants, representative of the UK population, so that 
the produced scale not only allowed for subsequent research in older adult samples, but also within 
other demographic groups.  
For this thesis however, a sub-sample of 264 baby boomers was investigated to understand how 
security related stress was associated with coping in this population. Using multivariate multiple 
regression, study 4 demonstrated that security related stress explained 13.2% of the variance of 
dysfunctional coping in older adults when provided within a threatening security vignette scenario. 
Furthermore, the study outlined a range of regression models demonstrating how the components of 
security related stress: complexity, uncertainty and overload were associated with the different types 
of coping styles (dysfunctional, emotion-focussed and problem-focussed). This study provided initial 
validity to the scale used, as it reflected the anticipated relationship between security stress and 
dysfunctional coping.  
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1.4.5 | Study 5 (Chapter 9) 
Study 5 set out to build upon the findings of study 4 by applying the transactional theory of stress and 
coping (TTSC) in its entirety to demonstrate the associations between not only security related stress 
and coping (as within study 4), but also the factors influencing security related stress based on the 
primary and secondary appraisals identified in the TTSC. As the previous chapter (Chapter 8) had 
developed an appropriate measure of security related stress, and furthermore, since this scale had 
shown effective at explaining dysfunctional coping behaviours, study 5 was able to apply these 
findings into a specific structural equation modelling study. Covariance Based Structural Equation 
Modelling (CB-SEM) was used to investigate the relationships between these constructs following 
exploratory factor analysis. In this study, a model is presented which outlines the relationships 
between factors which promote security related stress, and how this security related stress is 
associated with engagement in both dysfunctional and problem focussed coping behaviours. 
Understanding engagement in these forms of coping provides a greater understanding of one possible 
avenue for older adult cybersecurity vulnerability, i.e. that stress promotes engaging in poorer coping 
strategies which consequently have negative repercussions in the form of cybervictimisation.  
1.5 | Original Contributions  
This thesis contributes in a number of ways to the existing literature base. Chapter 10 discusses the 
overall original contributions of the thesis as:  
• The gaining of new knowledge as to how retirement, as a major life transition, might be 
associated with cyber-security vulnerability as a result of the technological and 
environmental changes experienced during this transition. 
• The gaining of new knowledge with regards to how retirement related factors are associated 
with a measure of cybersecurity vulnerability: i.e. (engagement in risky online behaviours). 
• The production of a novel card sorting task and its application, with the task used to elicit 
older adults’ feelings towards engaging in protective cybersecurity behaviours and the 
barriers that hinder them from doing so.  
• The development of a new short psychometric scale designed to measure security related 
stress; the first non-workplace scale to do so. Furthermore, the drawing of associations 
between general security related stress and dysfunctional, problem focussed, and emotion 
focussed coping styles. 
• The first application of the transactional theory of stress and coping to understand older 




Chapter 2: Literature Review of Human-Centred Cybersecurity Research 
2.1 | Chapter Introduction 
This chapter introduces existing human-centred cyber security research and highlights a need for 
further research in this area. The chapter is split into three main components; the first component 
reviews existing human-centred cybersecurity research, providing an overview of its origin as well 
as its continued importance. Following this, the chapter moves on to look at what research has been 
conducted in this space, as well as how this research has been conducted. Finally, the chapter 
introduces behavioural models which have been used to guide human-factors research, before 
outlining the issues with these models and how some of these issues might be addressed during this 
thesis. 
2.2 | What is Cybersecurity? 
Although we live in a society that reaps the benefits of technological advancements, the rise of such 
technologies generates novel opportunities for cybercrime against citizens (Martens et al., 2019). 
Recent attacks such as ‘WannaCry’ (Martin, Ghafur, Kinross, Hankin, & Darzi, 2018), ‘NotPetya’ 
(Fayi, 2018) and the capitalisation on the ‘HeartBleed’ vulnerability (Carvalho et al., 2014), have 
meant that ‘cybersecurity’ is rapidly drawing attention from the public, and remains one of the 
greatest challenges of the information age. Indeed, the UK government recently re-asserted that 
cyber-attacks represent a tier one threat, placing them on par with terrorism in their risk to the UK 
(HM Government, 2015).  
Despite its current prevalence, there remains a lack of consensus about what cybersecurity actually 
entails, with a range of definitions offered throughout existing literature (for a review see: Craigen, 
Diakun-Thibault, & Purse, 2014). This is predominantly due to the breadth of fields and specialities 
that exist under the ‘cybersecurity’ banner. Most definitions of cybersecurity refer to the technical 
systems involved in security (Craigen et al., 2014), such as the protection of hardware, software and 
networks. However, as this chapter will outline, understanding cybersecurity requires more than 
technological solutions alone. The UK’s National Cyber-Security Centre (NCSC) define 
cybersecurity as: “how individuals and organisations reduce the risk of cyber-attack” (NCSC, 2020), 
a definition which leans towards the inclusion of the individual as an important component within the 
security environment. Throughout this thesis, this NCSC definition will be applied due to its inclusion 
of the human in the ‘security chain’. As such, where cybersecurity is discussed, this thesis will refer 
to the reduction of risk of cyber-attacks. This is important to note, as the use of a human-centric 
definition of cybersecurity, allows for a focus on a component of cybersecurity often suggested to be 
the weakest; the human factor.   
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2.3 | The Human Factor in Cybersecurity 
Cybersecurity is a constantly changing field and has experienced a relatively rapid development. Von 
Solms (2000) outlined how the development of security had taken place over three waves. The first 
wave (or up until the early 1980’s) might be considered the ‘technical wave’ whereby information 
security issues were considered a technical problem requiring only a technical solution. The second 
wave (from the early 1980’s to the mid-1990’s), was classified as the ‘management wave’ whereby 
organisations were forced to acknowledge that information security required management to be 
involved. The third wave of security; the ‘institutional wave’, consisted of the mass rollout of 
information security policies designed to impart ‘best practice’ to employees.  
Despite a growing focus on employee’s security behaviours, security policies were designed to police 
and enforce behaviours, rather than involve employees as proactive members in the security of their 
organisations. The key reason for this is probably that humans are often seen as ‘the weakest link in 
the security chain’ (Sasse, Brostoff, & Weirich, 2001). Adams and Sasse (1999) outlined how 
previously, users were intentionally ‘kept in the dark’, as security was handled based on a militaristic 
‘need-to-know’ principal. They highlight a scarcity of research relating to human factors security 
research and suggest that since security mechanisms are designed, implemented, and consequently 
exploited by human attackers, that users should be integral to understanding cybersecurity 
vulnerability. 
Over two decades have passed since their paper drew attention to the lack of research in human-
centred research, with changes to the technological landscape meaning that we live in an almost 
unrecognisably different world. Throughout this technological boom, researchers have continued to 
focus on understanding human-computer interaction, and the role of the human in cybersecurity. The 
following section will begin by discussing how current human factors research was shaped by issues 
based within the workplace, namely the ‘productive cybersecurity argument’. Following this, it will 
outline how security is a cognitively demanding task, something which influences how users interact 
with technology. Finally it will report how attackers use human fallibility to exploit vulnerable users, 
before demonstrating how security researchers have applied behavioural science and models of 
behaviour in an attempt to understand and promote cybersecurity behaviour. 
2.4 | Human Factors in Cybersecurity: An Overview  
The rise in the use of technology within the workplace brought with it an increase in potential for 
cybersecurity vulnerability. Previously, organisations managed this risk through the implementation 
of technological security solutions set-up by internal IT groups and teams. Despite this, cyber-attacks 
continued and as a result, organisations began to see end users as their main security weakness 
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(Adams & Sasse, 1999). Because of this, organisations set about putting in place policies and 
procedures aimed at mitigating cyber risks and vulnerabilities by outlining security best practices. 
Typically these policies outlined what users were not to do, with technological barriers installed to 
enforce this (Kirlappos et al., 2014).  
However, installing boundaries and punishing individuals has seen to fail to lead to appropriate long-
term behaviour change (Xue et al., 2011). Typically employees find that such policies are either 
unusable, or harmful to their productivity (Cox, 2012; Sasse et al., 2007). Ultimately, the aim of the 
employee is to achieve their end-goal, with security compliance seen as a secondary aim, or at times 
even a barrier (Kirlappos et al., 2015). Employees still need to complete tasks, and as such are forced 
to circumvent these barriers. This is in part likely due to the perception that security has to be a 
difficult topic, surrounded by jargon and confusing technicalities.  
Cybersecurity is often seen to be complex, unusable and cognitively demanding (Haney et al., 2018; 
Nurse et al., 2011). A large scale online survey by Furnell, Bryant and Phippen (2007) identified that 
the difficulty of cybersecurity is a commonly cited reason for disengagement from such practices. A 
quote by a security consultant interviewed within a qualitative study of security advocates, might best 
explain how users typically see cybersecurity: “From the audience’s perspective, security can be 
characterized by three major factors: one, it’s scary; two, it’s confusing; three, it’s dull” (Haney et 
al., 2018). Despite these perceptions, it is vitally important that security is not seen in this way, as 
avoidance, disengagement or refusal to engage in good security practices, is likely to provide 
opportunities for cyber-attacks targeting human fallibility. 
A range of cybersecurity attacks target the human component of the security chain. These attacks rely 
on an individual either knowingly (Nurse et al., 2014) or unknowingly (Von Solms & Niekerk, 2013) 
taking part in the cyber-attack. These attacks are not unique to the workplace and can target any user. 
Because of the difficulty of using technical solutions to counteract cybersecurity attacks, as many 
appear legitimate, cyberattacks targeting the individual remain a consistent threat. More recently, 
human centred security work has focussed on addressing such threats through a range of mechanisms 
such as attempting to make threats appear more obvious, something discussed further below. 
2.5 | Organisational Compliance and the Productive Cybersecurity Problem 
Within workplaces, engaging in cybersecurity practices typically involves a trade-off between what 
is required, what is perceived to be necessary and how much effort is required. Unfortunately 
however, users typically: have low knowledge of threats (and as such have flawed perceptions of 
threats), resist tasks which require too much effort, and do not to follow information security policies 
23 
 
(Adams & Sasse, 1999). Understanding why this relationship exists however, is vital for ensuring 
proper cybersecurity.  
One possible reason for security non-compliance is that security is not seen to be usable (Nurse et al., 
2011). Adams and Sasse (1999) outline that the majority of users are security conscious, but to engage 
in secure behaviours, they have to perceive a need for such behaviours. Typically however users are 
kept ‘in-the-dark’ with regards to threats, which is possibly due to the disconnect between security 
professionals and end users. Adams and Sasse (1999) also highlight a distrust between those who 
implement security controls and end users. I.e. security departments know too little about end users 
to provide effective usable security, and users lack security awareness as their perceived ownership 
of security is low. Users then fall foul of poor security practices which supports the notion that they 
are inherently unsafe and untrustworthy, reinforcing the beliefs of those who design and enforce 
security practices.  
Another possible reason for security non-compliance relates to the impact that compliance might have 
on organisational productivity. When security is seen to be unusable it increases the cognitive 
demands on the end user, and reduces their organisational productivity (Kirlappos et al., 2014). When 
end users become victims of attacks, organisations are likely to punish individuals, or increase the 
restrictedness of systems and tighten policies which makes security even less usable. Conversely, 
organisations might instead use awareness training and other such ‘soft-approaches’ to punish 
security non-compliance (Kirlappos et al., 2014), however these typically add to the perception that 
security is a waste of time (Herley, 2009) and further impacts upon productivity. Furthermore, there 
is an accumulating effect in that when users are repeatedly reprimanded, ‘friction’ is caused, leading 
to frustration and ultimately the rejection of security practices (Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2009).  
When security compliance is seen to be effortful, or even impossible, end users circumvent measures, 
especially when they do not consider their behaviour to be risky. Kirlappos, Parkin and Sasse (2014b) 
outline how when security experts insist of enforcing ‘best practice policies’ or ‘standard’ policies, 
that users are forced to: “procure, deploy and refine their own solutions, outside the control of the 
organization's designated security management”. The authors refer to this as ‘shadow security’. 
Through conducting 118 interviews with a range of employees of varying levels within an 
organisation, Kirlappos et al. (2014b) identified that these practices exist within organisations and 
where they exist, security practices are typically incongruent with productivity goals. However, they 
suggest that the existence of such behaviours highlights that users have a latent capacity to play an 
active part in security practices, if they are empowered to do so, through the implementation of 




2.6 | Cognitive Demands Associated with Cybersecurity Problems 
That security is often seen to be unusable, is not simply confined to workplace settings, however. 
Users often struggle with security for a number of reasons, particularly when security practices are 
cognitively demanding. Existing psychological theory can be particularly useful when considering 
how the cognitive demands of security might influence subsequent behaviour. The theory of ego 
depletion (Baumeister, 2003) stipulates that humans have a limited ‘pool’ of cognitive resources 
which is slowly depleted by engaging in cognitively demanding tasks. When this pool is depleted, 
they are no longer able to engage in cognitively demanding tasks until it has had time to re-charge. 
This can be seen to lead to two avenues of vulnerability when applied in security settings.  
In the first, users become ‘drained’ by security and as a result, they no longer feel motivated to engage 
in safe practices, instead choosing the most cognitively easy route. Furnell and Thomson (2009) 
outline how security is often seen to be a barrier, rather than an enabler, and as such, users see security 
as something which interferes with their ability to work effectively. They refer to the ongoing drain 
of cognitive resources in relation to security, which they title ‘security fatigue’, and explain how when 
users become fatigued with security, a range of negative consequences can take place. Importantly, 
when users develop negative attitudes towards security, returning to security in the future leads users 
to be ‘drained’ from the outset, meaning that they are unlikely to productively engage in security in 
any way (Furnell & Thomson, 2009). These findings appear to be supported by empirical work. For 
example, users are often advised to have many long passwords, often leading to them being forgotten. 
Each time a password is forgotten, the costs associated with needing to engage in this good security 
practice are made clear and the strain associated with security is increased (Duggan et al., 2012), thus 
individuals default to an easier route, re-using passwords and increasing their simplicity to make 
remembering them easier. A further example can be seen in the findings of Harbach, Zezschwitz, 
Fichtner, De Luca and Smith (2014) who identified that 46.8% of smartphone users who use a code 
lock find unlocking their phone “annoying”, despite the fact that 95.5% of these users liked the idea 
that their phones were protected. This suggests that although users see utility in security, i.e. they like 
their devices being secured, the process of repeatedly unlocking their device is seen to be effortful, 
and thus promotes negative attitudes towards security. 
The second avenue by which cognitive demands associated with security might influence 
vulnerability, pertains to the fact that attackers who understand these vulnerabilities are able to exploit 
them, targeting individuals when they are most likely to be vulnerable to such attacks, or with attacks 
designed to increase the likelihood of users making errors. Heuristic theory may be of particular use 
when understanding how users become susceptible to such attacks. Heuristic theory, originally set 
out by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) posits that individuals have two systems of thinking which are 
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utilised depending on a given situation. System 1 thinking is automatic and relies heavily on 
heuristics; mental shortcuts based on past experience of outcomes. System 2 on the other hand is a 
slow, deliberative thinking style where an individual is forced to think more carefully. As system 2 is 
more cognitively demanding, humans prefer to rely on system 1 thinking where available. Because 
of this, humans are susceptible to a range of biases such as the availability heuristic, whereby 
individuals are more likely to make rapid decisions based on available information rather than 
deliberate before making a decision. This is particularly interesting when applied to understanding 
how users respond to social engineering-based attacks as a result of cognitive demands.  
One such heuristic which demonstrates a cognitive bias likely to influence security vulnerability is 
the affect heuristic (King & Slovic, 2014; Slovic et al., 2007). To avoid the required cognitive effort 
of making decisions, particularly in areas of complexity, individuals may rely on their affect, or 
feelings towards a target, to make a decision rather than expend cognitive effort on deliberation. Thus, 
having a ‘good feeling’ about an action or behaviour is likely to decrease the perceived risk of an 
action. Conversely, negative affect is more likely to increase risk perceptions (Pfleeger & Caputo, 
2012). This heuristic has clear implications for a number of cyber-attacks. For example, romance 
scams rely on an individual building a relationship with another over the internet, as the individual 
becomes emotionally attached, their ability to attribute negative events to the attacker declines and 
the attacker is often able to repeatedly attack the victim (Buchanan & Whitty, 2014; Whitty, 2017). 
This heuristic is also applied in situations where an individual is unable to perceive any risk. When 
an individual does not have any previous negative experiences of online victimisation, it is likely that 
clicking a link in an email might be seen to be low risk. As the user repeats this behaviour without 
consequence it is likely that the “it will be ok” mentality is reinforced, leading them to rely on this 
heuristic in future scenarios. 
The reinforcement of these behaviours ties in with another heuristic likely to be used as a result of 
the cognitive demands associated with cybersecurity, that of confirmation bias (Pfleeger & Caputo, 
2012). When an individual has developed a position on an issue they cease collection of any further 
information that might refute or rebut this. This heuristic is useful in situations where uncertainty is 
present as individuals are able to stick to stringent rules, such as those often found in security settings. 
However, this heuristic is also problematic as users are likely to have erred judgements about how 
secure they are, and without an “arsenal of evidence” to refute this, it is unlikely that users are able 
to see that they may be vulnerable (Pfleeger & Caputo, 2012). 
Although in-depth discussion about heuristics and decision making are beyond the remit of this thesis, 
it is important to note that users are likely to fall foul of security attacks as a result of the difficulty 
associated with it, and the cognitive demands placed on those who frequently interact with 
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technology. Because security is an inherently demanding process, users are likely to vary with how 
much cognitive effort they are willing to dedicate to engaging in security practices. A range of 
individual differences are also likely to exist due to the vast array of ways in which people might 
interact with technology. Despite the large variability in user types, recent human factors research has 
aimed at reducing the impact of such social engineering attacks through a variety of methods. 
2.7 | Reducing the Impact of Social Engineering Attacks  
One such attempt to reduce vulnerability to such social engineering attacks, has been through the 
development and implementation of cybersecurity awareness training and campaigns. Although 
cybersecurity awareness, education and training are terms used interchangeably, they should be 
considered differing terms (Sasse et al., 2007). Awareness is simply designed to draw attention to 
security, allowing users to identify that security is an issue of import (Wilson & Hash, 2003). 
Awareness campaigns are widely used by governments in attempts to resolve security problems seen 
at a national level, despite this, often these campaigns fail to have any real impact on changing 
security behaviours (Bada et al., 2019). The main reason why this is the case, is that such campaigns 
often focus too heavily on increasing the fear response in relation to threats. When campaigns put too 
greater emphasis on the fear of a message, people are likely to either deny the threat exists, or reject 
the message that is designed to inform them (Bada et al., 2019).  
Empirical research has also attempted to apply such awareness training to influence security 
behaviours. Mitre et al. (2014) conducted a large-scale experiment in which they sent three waves of 
spear-phishing emails (tailored emails designed to have an individual click a link, download an 
attachment or act in some way), with subsequent embedded training to those who clicked-through, to 
1359 individuals. The aim of the study was to understand the impact of four different training methods 
(a cross between gain framed, loss framed, individually focussed or co-worker focussed) designed to 
reduce subsequent click through and information input on phishing emails. Following the roll-out of 
the emails, 327 of the individuals: some of whom had not clicked any, some of whom had clicked 
one and some of whom had clicked all emails, were interviewed about their experiences. Their most 
important finding was that none of the methods of embedded training they had implemented had any 
impact on subsequent security behaviours. However differences remained among their participants. 
Those who had not clicked an email, subsequently were less likely to click further emails. Conversely 
those who had fallen for one phishing email were more likely to fall for subsequent emails. A number 
of reasons for this are outlined within the Mitre et al. (2004) paper, such as users not reading the 
training information or users not trusting the source of the training information etc. That users might 
had decided not to read the provided training information supports the suggestions made above that 
security training is seen as an unnecessary burden which promotes stress and detracts from an 
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individual’s main goal. The most important finding of this study however is that the numerous 
methods of training failed to have any impact on subsequent security behaviours. This finding is likely 
to be prevalent among many such attempts to train security behaviours, but few are likely to be 
published due to the publication bias which promotes the publication of studies with positive results 
(Joober et al., 2012). 
Due to poor results in attempts to change security behaviours, security researchers have turned to 
social sciences and the use of behavioural models to attempt to understand and subsequently change 
behaviour. Such models have been applied in other areas such as health for decades and as such show 
promise as methods which might aid in the understanding of security behaviour. The following 
section will outline the most popular behavioural models used in security research, how they have 
been applied in existing research and the shortcomings that these models may have.  
2.8 | Popular Behavioural Models Used in Human Factors Cybersecurity Research 
A wealth of behavioural models have been applied within human factors research. Lebek, Uffen, 
Neumann, Hohler and Breitner (2014) conducted a review of models used in information security and 
awareness and identified four key models used frequently in existing literature. Although in total they 
identified 54 theories used in existing literature, four were frequently used: Theory of Planned 
Behaviour (Ajzen, 1991), General Deterrence Theory (Straub & Welke, 1988), Protection Motivation 
Theory (PMT) (Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997) and the Technology 
Acceptance Model (TAM) (Davis, 1989). Although other psychological models have been used in 
existing literature (Sommestad et al., 2014), the remainder of this chapter will focus on three key 
theories; Theory of Planned Behaviour, Technology Acceptance Model and Protection Motivation 
Theory as these models are the most cited and share distinct similarities in their prediction of intention 
and subsequent behaviour. A particular focus however will be given to protection motivation theory 
given its prevalence within the literature (Briggs et al., 2017). 
2.8.1 | Technology Acceptance Model 
The Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) (Davis, 1989) is a framework which explains intention 
to use technology (technology acceptance) and continued use of technology (actual use) as a result of 
an individual’s perceptions of usefulness as well as perceived ease of use (Lebek et al., 2014) (See 
Figure 2 for a graphical representation of the TAM). Although a range of other models have stemmed 
from the TAM, for example, the Unified Theory for the Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTUAT) 
(Venkatesh et al., 2003), the TAM remains widely used due to its parsimony (Shropshire et al., 2015). 
Like the theory of planned behaviour, discussed below, the TAM stems from the theory of reasoned 
action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975).  
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When applied to security context, the model is particularly useful in studies which seek to understand 
the acceptability and usability of security technologies. By understanding perceptions around how 
efficacious security behaviours or technologies are, as well as the perceived ease by which such 
actions might be carried out, researchers are able to understand how to better design and implement 
security software and interventions. In a similar way to the alternative models which will be reviewed 
further below, this model is based upon the assumption that attitudes drive behavioural intention 
which subsequently drives behaviour.  
 
 
A number of studies have applied the TAM in cybersecurity and information security settings. 
Typically studies which are grounded within the TAM focus on its two major components: perceived 
ease of use and perceived usefulness. Perceived usefulness (PU) is defined by Davis (1989) as "the 
degree to which a person believes that using a particular system would enhance his or her job 
performance”. In contrast, perceived ease of use (PEOU) can be defined as "the degree to which a 
person believes that using a particular system would be free of effort” (Davis, 1989). Thus, many of 
the studies applying TAM are grounded in usability research and focus on the workplace. Ultimately 
the aim of the TAM is to make security seem more useful, or easier to engage with, to reduce the 
perceived barriers discussed above, and reduce their resultant poor security behaviours. 
A range of empirical research has applied the TAM in technology-based settings. For example, 
Nayak, Priest and White (2010) applied this model to a large sample of older adults. Through a postal 
survey they found that attitudes towards the internet were significant predictors of the self-reported 
number of hours spent on the internet suggesting a relationship between these attitudinal constructs 
and actual technology use. Similarly, in a comprehensive literature review and subsequent meta-
analysis of 88 studies which had applied the TAM, King and He (2006) outlined that it represents a 
robust and statistically valid model across a range of general technology fields. However, despite its 
Figure 2 Technology Acceptance Model (Davis, 1989) 
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success in some areas, research which has attempted to apply the TAM to security settings has been 
less successful.  
Although Shropshire et al. (2015) identified that PU and PEOU were found to be significant predictors 
of security software adoption, they highlight that the perceptions that individuals have towards 
security software differ from those for general technology acceptance, and are less useful in 
explaining security behaviours than in other more general technology acceptance areas. The findings 
of Jones, Mccarthy and Halawi (2010), who applied the TAM to assess employee adoption of 
information security measures, support this notion. They hypothesised a model which included 
subjective norms alongside other TAM constructs (PU, PEOU) and found that only subjective norms 
were a significant predictor of employee’s intentions to adopt information security measures, with 
the two core components (PU and PEOU) not associated with security behaviour. A further example 
of this can be seen in Warkentin, Davis and Bekkering (2004) who sought to use the TAM when 
designing a new method of authentication (the Check Off Password System (COPS)). They highlight 
that the reality of applying the model differed from its theoretical use in security settings. Namely, 
they outline how in TAM theory, perceived ease of use and perceived usefulness predict behavioural 
intention, however authentication behaviours, especially within organisational settings, are typically 
mandated, meaning that these two predictors of behaviour struggle to influence actual behaviour. 
Furthermore, they highlight the difficulties of measuring actual behaviour, one of the components of 
the TAM, in security-based studies.  
2.8.2 | Theory of Planned Behaviour in Human Factors Research 
Like the TAM, The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) (Ajzen, 1991) stems from the TRA (Fishbein 
& Ajzen, 1975) and states that behavioural intention and subsequent behaviour are derived from 
attitudes and controllability perceptions. However, the theory of planned behaviour goes beyond the 
level of the TAM to outline how specific attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioural 
control interact to promote intention and subsequent behaviour. Figure 3 shows a visual 
representation of the TPB. 
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The theory of planned behaviour states that behavioural intention is derived from three main 
constructs: attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control. Attitudes refer to “the 
degree to which a person has a favorable or unfavorable evaluation or appraisal of the behavior in 
question”, subjective norms refer to “the perceived social pressure to perform or not to perform the 
behavior.” and finally perceived behavioural control refers to “the perceived ease or difficulty of 
performing the behaviour and it is assumed to reflect past experience as well as anticipated 
impediments and obstacles” (Ajzen, 1991). Thus, TPB extends beyond the TAM by including a social 
component (in subjective norms) and outlines more explicitly a self-efficacy judgement through 
perceived behavioural control, above and beyond that of a perceived ease of use. 
TPB has been, and remains, extensively used across a wide range of research. Moreover, it has 
recently been applied in information security settings, predominantly with regards to information 
security policy compliance. Sommestad and Hallberg (2013) conducted a systematic review TPB use 
in information security policy compliance literature aimed at establishing the ability of the model to 
predict behaviour in security settings. The most cited of the papers included within their review, with 
approximately 1600 citations at the time of writing, was that of Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu and Benbasat 
(2010). Bulgurcu et al. (2010), guided by a TPB framework, set out to understand the antecedents of 
employee security compliance with information security policies. They administered a scale 
consisting of items reflecting: perceived costs (of compliance and noncompliance), perceived work 
impediments caused by security in addition to established constructs such as attitudes, normative 
beliefs and security intentions. After administering the survey to over 1000 employees, they used 
structural equation modelling to demonstrate significant associations between TPB constructs and 
security compliance intentions. Although this finding initially shows promise for the use of TPB, a 
number of issues are present within this study. The first major issue relates to the sample used within 
Figure 3 Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) 
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the final survey. Bulgurcu et al. (2010) sampled within organisations and excluded any participant 
who indicated (by scoring 1 or 2 on a 7-point Likert scale) that they had a low awareness of their 
organisations information security policy. This led to the exclusion of 258 participants from their 
initial 1000 sample. They further removed 175 participants due to incomplete responses, something 
common in such survey methodologies. There are clear reasons why they authors might have removed 
such cases, as subsequent answers might have been uninformed or data may not have been appropriate 
for further analysis, however when considering information security compliance, one might expect 
that those who are unaware of their organisations information security policies or who may be unable 
to answer questions in relation to such policies, might be the most interesting to investigate. Likewise, 
those who indicate a high awareness of such policies are likely to be those who are already following 
such policies, thus modelling their behaviour is likely to identify their hypothesised results. Thus, 
studies such as this one might only serve to explain why staff do follow security advice, rather than 
the (perhaps more important) question of why staff might not. A second issue in their sample is the 
heavy skew towards younger populations. Only 8% of their sample was aged over 56, and only 28% 
was aged over 45, thus older members of the workforce are under-represented, something discussed 
further in the following chapter. 
Another well cited study identified within Sommestad’s (2013) review was that of Ifinedo (2012). 
Like Bulgurcu et al. (2010), Ifinedo (2012) identified that components of the TPB were significant 
predictors of information security compliance intentions. They also share a similarity in that Ifinedo 
et al (2012) also used an informed sample, with half of their sample drawn from information security 
professionals. More interestingly however, their study, as well as many others within the Sommestad 
(2013) review (such as: Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Herath & Rao, 2009; Pahnila, Siponen, & Mahmood, 
2007, among others), applied constructs from a range of theories outside of TPB. Typically these 
studies seek to pick items or constructs from each theory to aid in explaining variance of behaviours. 
Although this may help to increase variance explained at the individual study level, this may be 
damaging to subsequent research, in that the true effectiveness of the TPB is hard to ascertain. This 
problem has also been identified in reviews from other fields which have applied TPB in intervention 
based settings (Hardeman et al., 2002). 
Synthesising the 16 studies which had applied TPB, Sommestad (2013) concluded that TPB  
explained information security behaviours as well as it does other behaviours, citing that its ability to 
explain variance in behaviour is in line with those found by Armitage and Connor (2001) and 
McEachan, Conner, Taylor, and Lawton (2011), with approximately 30% variance of information 
security behaviours explained. Although TPB is widely cited and applied within behavioural sciences, 
its use within security settings remains relatively limited compared to its use outside of security 
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settings (Sommestad & Hallberg, 2013). Furthermore, those applying this model often fail to follow 
appropriate guidelines and recommendations in how this model should be used (Sommestad & 
Hallberg, 2013). In what is perhaps a more damning appraisal of the theory of planned behaviour, 
Sniehotta, Scholz and Schwarzer (2005) released a paper entitled “Time to retire the theory of planned 
behaviour”. Within this paper they heavily criticise the theory of planned behaviour and suggest a 
discontinuation of its use.  
Their first criticism of the model relates to its effectiveness when used in the design of interventions. 
Drawing on the above cited systematic review from Hardeman (2002), they highlight that across 24 
interventions guided by TPB, insufficient evidence was found to draw any robust conclusions about 
the effectiveness of the TPB as a theory. They further highlight how the TPB may be effective in 
influencing cognition, but that this change in cognition rarely leads to a subsequent change in 
behaviour. For example, in the first study to use an experimental design to test the TPB, Sniehotta 
(2009) randomised participants into either a behavioural belief condition or a control belief 
intervention in an intervention designed to improve sports participation. Using 579 undergraduate 
students they found that the increasing TPB based constructs such as subjective norms and attitudes 
led to increases in behavioural intention, but not subsequent behaviour. A second criticism raised is 
that TPB ignores the impact of emotions on subsequent behaviour. They outline a study by Conner, 
Godin, Sheeran and Germain (2013) who investigated the impact of TPB constructs whilst including 
‘anticipated affect’ in the context of blood donation behaviours. They found that affective responses, 
affective attitudes and anticipated changes in affect, were important predictors but remained under-
researched when compared to the cognitive components typically covered by models such as TPB.  
Akin to TAM, TPB is based on the assumption that intention and subsequent behaviour are derived 
from an individual’s attitudes towards, and controllability perceptions, of a given situation. However, 
this has been identified as flawed in predicting actual behaviour above and beyond other factors 
(Sniehotta, Presseau, & Araújo-Soares, 2014). Furthermore, TPB may struggle to explain behaviour 
where an individual has very little control. In cybersecurity, and particularly when discussing cyber-
attacks, an individual has very little control over the attack i.e. whether or not they are targeted, they 
do however have an have control with regards to whether or not they protect themselves from threats. 
A popular model which instead seeks to understand protective behaviours is the Protection Motivation 
Theory (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). 
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2.8.3 | Protection Motivation Theory 
Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) (Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1986; 
Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997) has been used extensively in existing cybersecurity literature (Briggs 
et al., 2017; Lebek et al., 2014) and differs from the previously mentioned models in that it focusses 
predominantly on protection behaviours, rather than general behaviour. PMT also substantially differs 
from the other models outlined above in that it represents a coping and threat appraisal, the result of 
which promotes or deters protection motivation. Figure 4 outlines a visual representation of PMT.  
 
2.8.3.1 | Threat Appraisal  
One of the two core components of PMT is the threat appraisal. The threat appraisal is comprised of 
two key constructs; perceived threat severity and perceived threat vulnerability. Perceived threat 
severity is “an individual’s assessment of the severity of the consequences resulting from a 
threatening security event” whereas perceived threat vulnerability relates to: “an individual’s 
assessment of the probability of a threatening security event occurring.” (Crossler, 2010). When 
combined, these two factors produce a threat assessment, which when detracted from perceived 
positive outcomes (or rewards) of a given stressor, provide an overall threat appraisal.  
Threat appraisals can be seen to be particularly important for cybersecurity and as such have gained 
a great deal of attention in existing security research. Ifinedo (2012) found that both threat appraisal 
and threat severity were significantly associated with information security compliance intentions. 
Siponen, Pahnila and Mahmood (2006) also identified that threat appraisal was significantly 
associated with intention to comply to workplace-based security compliance. In a systematic review 
of factors associated with information security compliance, Sommestad et al. (2014) identified that 
Figure 4 Protection Motivation Theory (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997) 
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threat appraisal was one of the best predictors of behavioural intention, supporting these earlier 
findings.  
Despite the number of studies which find that threat appraisal, and its constituent components, might 
be important for cybersecurity, there remains a number of issues with focussing too heavily on threat 
appraisal. Firstly, a large majority of literature which has focussed on the threat appraisal, as with 
most security research in general, has been based within the workplace, and typically relate to policy 
compliance. These findings however are unlikely to effectively translate into non-workplace settings 
given that individuals are unlikely to have such policies and procedures available at home. Presently, 
less is known about how the threat appraisal influences behaviours outside of the workplace. 
Secondly, very little research has focussed on understanding whether people understand security-
based threats, especially outside of workplace settings, and how this understanding influences threat 
perceptions and subsequent protection motivation behaviours. This is particularly important as 
existing research has demonstrated that although users have a general awareness of threats, linking 
threats with appropriate protective behaviours is difficult (Furnell, Tsaganidi, & Phippen, 2008). 
Although a wealth of existing security-based literature has focussed on threat appraisals, far less has 
focussed on the other core component of PMT: the coping appraisal. 
2.8.3.2 | Coping Appraisal 
The other component of the PMT model relates to an individual’s coping appraisal. Within a security 
context, the coping appraisal breaks down into two parts; security self-efficacy or: “an individual’s 
confidence in his/her own ability to perform the recommended behaviour to prevent or mitigate the 
threatening security event.” and response costs; “the opportunity costs – time, cognitive effort, 
financial – of adopting the recommend behaviour to prevent or mitigate the threatening security 
event.” (Crossler, 2010).  
Less security research has focussed on the coping appraisal component of PMT. Tsai et al. (2016) 
conducted a large-scale online survey relating to how PMT factors influenced security intentions. 
They found that coping appraisal factors such as habit strength, response efficacy and personal 
responsibility were the strongest predictors of online safety intentions. Although based within a social 
cognitive theory,  Rhee, Kim and Ryu (2009) identified that security self-efficacy was significantly 
associated with both security practices as well as security intentions, suggesting that this component 
of protection motivation theory is useful in understanding security behaviours, something also 
reflected in the findings of Ifinedo (2012). These findings suggest that the coping appraisal may be 
useful in understanding security behaviours. 
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Emerging research has begun to focus on the coping appraisal, and emerging research suggests that 
it may even be a more important component than the threat appraisal in security research. van Bavel, 
Rodríguez-Priego, Vila and Briggs (2019) highlight how coping messages are more important than 
threat messages when attempting to improve security behaviours. They highlight a need for a greater 
focus on coping over threat, especially since a focus on coping is more appropriate in situations where 
knowledge of threats is likely to be low, such as in security settings (Shillair et al., 2015). Within an 
already complex security setting, it is likely that some populations and groups will struggle more than 
others and as such may be more vulnerable, especially given the extant focus on threat-based appeals 
and the limited focus on coping. Groups such as older adults are therefore at risk of being left behind 
by security research, something which might contribute to their security vulnerability.  
2.9 | Individual Differences in Cybersecurity Research 
All digital technology users are potential victims of cyber-attacks and may even unknowingly 
participate in those attacks (Von Solms & Van Niekerk, 2013). However some individual differences 
might be of particular interest in security-based research. Individual differences within cybersecurity 
is a topic with a broad scope, but remains relatively under-researched in relation to online 
vulnerability (Williams et al., 2017). However, understanding how and why individuals differ with 
regards to their security behaviours is important for informing those who design and implement 
security controls so that they can ensure that they are suitable, useful and effective at increasing 
cybersecurity.  
In their review of individual differences in cybersecurity research, Williams, Beardmore and Joinson 
(2017) highlight a range of individual differences which might be associated with online 
cybersecurity vulnerability. One example is the impact of emotion on cybersecurity behaviours. 
Emotion is likely to influence an individual’s susceptibility to certain types of scams (such as the 
above-mentioned romance scams), and plays an important part in the persuasion process (Dillard & 
Nabi, 2006). Despite this, it has been relatively ignored in the literature. Another example of an 
individual difference highlighted within their review is the amount of expertise an individual has in 
relation to security behaviours. Those with greater levels of expertise have been seen to process cues 
to threats differently. For example, in a usability study conducted by Dhamija, Tygar and Hearst 
(2006), novice users were found to focus on cues such as logos embedded within the web-page, rather 
than more useful cues to threats such as the address shown in the URL.  
Whitty, Doodson, Creese and Hodges (2015) conducted an individual differences-based study 
designed to investigate another possible cause of cybersecurity vulnerability: password sharing 
behaviours. They reviewed a range of factors likely to influence this behaviour such as: age, 
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impulsivity, self-monitoring, locus of control and knowledge of cybersecurity. Applying an online 
survey to a sample of 497 UK residents, they identified that age, self-monitoring and lack of 
perseverance were all significant predictors of password sharing behaviours. Within their sample 
those who were younger, engaged in greater levels of self-monitoring and who lacked perseverance 
were the most likely to share passwords. Although these findings share some insight into some of the 
individual differences relating to this specific security behaviour, it is worth noting that the predictors, 
although significant, were incredibly weak (with beta weights around -.003).  
Gratian, Bandi, Cukier, Dykstra, & Ginther (2018) also set out to understand individual differences 
but instead focussed on the behaviours identified within the SEcurity Behaviour Intention Scale 
(SEBIS) scale (Egelman & Peer, 2015), a popular scale used to measure cybersecurity behaviours. 
The scale spans across four key areas; device securement, password generation, proactive awareness 
and updating behaviours (Egelman & Peer, 2015). Gratian et al. (2018) identified a range of individual 
differences across these behaviours. For example, they identified gender differences across all 
behaviours other than device securement. They identified ‘Big-5’ personality differences in security 
behaviours, in that those who were more conscientious had greater engagement in all security 
behaviours except device securement, with extroverts more likely to engage in this behaviour. They 
also identified that those who score more highly on security behaviours are also more likely to be 
rational decision makers, rather than spontaneous decision makers.  
Despite the large number of individual differences identified within their Gratian et al. (2018), the 
research suffers from the same issues that many other security studies do, in that they sampled entirely 
from the student population. Whilst studies continue to do this their findings will always be 
constrained to student settings, and those populations who may be most at risk of attacks, such as 
older adult populations, will remain under-researched and vulnerable.  
Previous research has demonstrated that older adults generally lag behind younger users in terms of 
awareness and expertise with regards to internet security hazards (Grimes et al., 2010). Similarly, 
Nicholson, Coventry and Briggs (2013b) demonstrated that younger users outperform older users 
when tasked with using face and graphical based authentication systems. These studies show age 
based individual differences between younger and older users and indicate that if security research 
continues to focus on younger populations such as students, the differences that exist between these 
populations will remain, and older users will remain unable to engage in security practices as 
effectively as their younger counterparts. Although far less than the amount conducted in 
occupational and student contexts, some existing research has sought to understand security 
behaviours and practices in older adults. The following chapter will review the current status of 
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cybersecurity research in older adults, highlighting the importance of focussing upon this population, 























Chapter 3: Literature Review 2 – Older Adults and Cybersecurity 
3.1 | Older Adults as a Vulnerable Population to Cyber-Threats 
Older adults are the fastest growing population among computer and internet users (Friemel, 2016; 
Wagner et al., 2010) and use technology for a number of reasons: from convenience activities i.e. 
banking (Van Boekel et al., 2017), shopping (Vroman et al., 2015) and maintaining communication 
(Juárez et al., 2018) through to facilitating self-care and health management (Portz, 2017). In addition, 
recent literature has demonstrated that older adults recognize the benefits that technology provides 
for staying independent for longer, and are keen to continue using technology well into older age 
(Betts et al., 2019; Peek et al., 2016; Seifert & Schelling, 2018). Despite their positive attitudes 
towards technology, the online environment contains a range of threats which target older adults. 
Like all users, older adults are at risk of cyber-attacks, however they may be at particular risk since 
they are specifically sought out by cyber criminals due to perceptions of vulnerability and accrued 
wealth (Age-UK, 2015b, 2015a). Research from Age-UK (2015b) states that “older people” (defined 
in their paper as those 65 and over) are more likely to be targeted by online fraudsters due to 
disposable income and vulnerabilities which can be exploited such as social isolation, bereavement 
and cognitive impairment. In a survey of over 1000 retirees, over half (53%) reported being targeted 
by a fraudster. Within those that had been targeted, 70% stated that they had lost money, with 1 in 12 
having lost over £1000 (Age-UK, 2015b). These figures clearly demonstrate a vulnerability to fraud 
within this population. While much of the existing technology research in older adults has focused on 
adoption of technology (Berkowsky, Sharit, & Czaja, 2018; Chiu & Liu, 2017; Mitzner et al., 2019) 
and attitudes towards technology (König et al., 2018; Mitzner et al., 2010; Vroman et al., 2015), an 
emerging literature base has started to focus on older adult cybersecurity vulnerability. 
As the result of rapid developments in technology, coupled with the boom of technology in the 
workplace during the mid-1980’s, a ‘digital divide’ formed between older and younger populations 
(Gunkel, 2003; Strover, 2003). This divide was initially between those who used technology, such as 
computers in the workplace, and those who had little need to use technology. As schools began to 
introduce computers throughout the 1980’s, this divide grew and became more about age based digital 
literacy divides, whereby younger users were seen as ‘digital natives’ and older adults considered 
‘digital immigrants’ (Prensky, 2001). With the rapid growth of online threats as a mechanism to target 
individuals, understanding how older and younger users differ in their cybersecurity practices 
provides some insight into the vulnerabilities older adults might face online. A range of differences 
are likely to exist between younger and older populations, many as a result of general digital literacy. 
For example, an individual’s digital literacy is likely to influence how they use technology, how they 
39 
 
seek support or help, and how they navigate the complexities of the internet (Sannd & Cook, 2018). 
Furthermore, one might expect that an individual’s understanding of internet hazards might strongly 
be associated with their ability to seek information and overcome such obstacles.  
One study which has sought to understand differences between older and younger adults in relation 
to the knowledge and understanding of internet security hazards was conducted by Grimes et al.  
(2010). They conducted a study, comparing 47 university students with 41 older adult housing 
authority residents. They found that older adults lagged behind younger users in terms of their 
computer knowledge and expertise in relation to security threats, and these differences were 
especially identfiable in relation to scores on the internet security awareness scale, a scale that 
measures behaviours across: privacy, passwords, viruses and scams. This finding is important as these 
areas are commonly identified to be key issues in learning and understanding cybersecurity (Furnell 
et al., 2006). Furnell, Jusoh and Katsabas (2006) conducted a survey with 340 participants seeking to 
understand the challenges that users face when attempting to understand and engage in security 
behaviours. Their survey was predominantly based within participants aged 17-29 and yet substantial 
difficulties with security comprehension were found. Given that older adults lag behind these younger 
users, it is likely that security comprehension among older adults is far lower (Grimes et al., 2010).  
That older adults are possibly more vulnerable to certain types of cyber-attacks has also been 
supported by existing literature. Sarno, Lewis, Bohil and Neider (2019) conducted a study 
investigating the differences in phishing susceptibility between younger and older adults across a 
range of scenarios such as users being under time pressures and with threats framed in various ways. 
Interestingly, they found no differences in classification accuracy between younger and older adults, 
however they did find that older adults took significantly longer to make these classifications, 
although on the surface this study suggests that older adults may be more cautious than younger 
adults, ultimately their ability to identify phishing emails was equally poor. Furthermore, they were 
more liberal with their classification of emails as spam or unsafe, something which might reflect their 
uncertainty around such threats, and a desire to appear more risk averse under experimental 
conditions.  
Olivier et al. (2015) also highlighted possible security vulnerabilities associated with older adults. In 
their small scale qualitative study they suggest that older adults may be at particular risk of certain 
threats such as mass marketing fraud, due to their pscho-social backgrounds and pre-disposing factors 
such as pschological vulnerability. Similarly, Martin and Rice (2013) conducted a qualitative study 
in which they studied a range of individual and organisational stakeholders to understand which 
online threats and potential negative repercussions older adults face online. Furthermore, they sought 
to understand what safeguards were in place to protect older adults from these threats. They identified 
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that the biggest threat to ‘mature users’ was financial and investment fraud. They also identified that 
personal identification theft, and theft from social media profiles, was likely to account for a large 
variance of threats experienced by older users.  
There are also likely to be other differences between older adult groups and younger groups, 
stemming from generational experiences, which subsequently feed into their cybersecurity 
vulnerability. Jiang et al. (2016) conducted a study in which they sought to understand generational 
differences in online safety perceptions, knowledge and practices. Using a range of focus groups they 
compared individuals from the ‘silent generation’ (born prior to 1945), older baby boomers (born 
between 1946 and 1954) and millennials (which they classify as born between 1977 and 1992). They 
found that although all groups showed concerns around online security, older baby boomers and silent 
generation had less confidence in their ability, were more suspicious of the internet as a possible 
source of threats, and yet engaged in less protective behaviours than millennials. Furthermore, the 
older adult groups were more likely to require support from others.  
Older adults reliance on others, and choice of support structures, has also been implicated as a possible 
source of online vulnerability in other existing research. Nicholson et al. (2019) conducted a range of 
semi-structured interviews with community dwelling older adults to understand their security 
information seeking behaviours. They found that users typically prioritise their resources based on 
their availability, rather than their security expertise. That older adults rely on sources of support 
based on their availability is interesting, especially when considering who is most likely to be 
available to these users. Portz et al. (2019) sought to understand older adults’ behaviours in relation 
to their engagement with new health information technology. Although not explicitly referring to 
cyber-security, they identified that older adults heavily rely on family as a major source of 
technological social support, in particular, older adults rely on their grandchildren to support them in 
their use of technology. However, family members are themselves likely to experience similar 
difficulties with technology, but attempt to provide assistance in an effort to be helpful (Portz et al., 
2019). These findings have been supported in other technology settings and suggest an avenue of 
potential security vulnerability for older adults. Lüders and Brandtzæg (2017) outline how family, 
and maintaining contact with family, motivates older users to adopt social media. However, they 
outline that regularly older adults feel unable to engage in such practices without direct support from 
children and grandchildren. When these family members are not available, older adults are left 
attempting to navigate a complex interaction with technology unaided. This is troublesome, as 
research suggests that social media is one of the fastest growing emerging threats in the security 
landscape (Jang-Jaccard & Nepal, 2014). Likewise, Furnell, Tsaganidi and Phippen (2008) conducted 
a range of qualitative interviews with baby boomers and found that they turned to family members 
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and friends to resolve security issues, rather than seeking expert help or seeking information for 
themselves.  
The use of family members for support extends beyond resolving an initial problem and can also be 
seen to be impactful upon older adults’ ability to learn how to engage with future problems. Although 
older adults appreciate the support provided by younger members of the family, at times this support 
involves the child or grandchild taking the device from the older adult, fixing an issue etc. and handing 
the device back. Often younger users can engage with technology in a way that is too fast for older 
adults to follow, and as a result users are unable to learn for themselves how to fix the issue in future 
(Sandhu et al., 2013). Forget et al. (2016) interviewed 15 participants, most of whom fell within the 
baby boomer age range and found that security problems are often caused by disconnects between 
what users see as their computer security ‘role’, and what is expected of them by others. Despite the 
emerging knowledge base around older adult security behaviours, there still remains a range of issues 
and gaps within the literature in this area.  
3.2 | Issues with Existing Older Adult Security Research  
One challenge in this research area is the tendency to focus on chronological age as a defining 
characteristic of an individual. Researchers tend to classify users into arbitrary age groups such as 
young children (Guan & Huck, 2012), teenagers (Rahman et al., 2017; Wittes et al., 2016), late-
midlife (Salovaara et al., 2010) and older adults (Chakraborty et al., 2013; Hill et al., 2015), where 
chronological age determines group selection, sometimes to the detriment of other socio-economic 
or psychological variables. A wealth of existing security research has used a number of different 
categories, classifications and boundaries to refer to ‘older adult’ groups.   
This issue of what it means to be an ‘older adult’ is not central to cybersecurity literature, however. 
The World Health Organisation (WHO) outline a range of issues relating to the use of chronological 
age in general, with many western countries choosing to use a chronological age of 65 as an arbitrary 
cut-off of older age (WHO, 2001). They outline how the UN typically uses 60+ as a suggested age 
range for older adults but highlight how the use of such chronological age categories is flawed, 
especially when considering demographics outside of western civilisation, where average life 
expectancy is markedly lower. To further complicate this matter, the inclusion of technology muddies 
an already complex issue, with a wide variety of experiences, usage and abilities, leading to a diverse 
population of older technology users.  
In a review of human computer interaction (HCI) literature focussed on the design of digital 
technologies for older adults, Righi, Sayago and Blat (2017) defined older adults as fitting within the 
65-75 age range, but highlighted that these participants did not identify as ‘older people’. Based on 
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the large scale Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), König, Seifert and Doh 
(2018) investigated internet use in ‘older Europeans’, during which they used an arbitrary cut-off of 
50 years old to be included as such. Wash and Rader (2015) also used 50+ as a criteria when looking 
at older adult’s protective security beliefs in older US citizens. Despite the variability of age criteria 
used to define older adults, age is not a reliable marker for any particular user attribute, thus observing 
individuals based on chronological age not only risks research ageism (Vines et al., 2015), but risks 
underestimating the effect of substantive life events (Shultz & Wang, 2011) and the impact that they 
may have on cybersecurity vulnerability.  
Sackmann and Winkler (2013) highlight an alternative to chronological age when considering the 
impact of ageing on technology use. In Sackmann et al. (2013) the authors posit that technology use 
might better be considered as a reflection of ‘technology socialization’ whereby technology use and 
ability is reflected by age groupings which share experiences depending on their home life and 
interaction with workplace-based technology etc. For example they classify those aged 80 and over 
as the ‘mechanical generation’ and those aged between 50 and 65 as ‘the generation of technology 
spread’. Although this provides an alternative suggestion to studies which use arbitrary age groups, 
it suffers from the same issues of those which do, in that such classification ignores the variability of 
experiences, literacy and interaction with technology and assumes a baseline level of digital literacy 
based on age groupings. Furthermore, such classifications are typically used as a means to ring-fence 
groups so that they might be subsequently compared, something which represents another problem 
area within security research.  
A large proportion of the finite amount of cybersecurity research which involves older adults tends 
to focus on drawing comparisons between groups classified as younger and older. For example, Jiang 
et al. (2016) found that older Baby Boomers (those born between 1946 and 1954) had less knowledge 
and lower confidence in performing protective behaviours when compared to other generational 
groups such as millennials. Although on the surface such research seems telling, older adults are 
likely to experience a range of age related difficulties such as low digital literacy (Schreurs et al., 
2017) and low computer self-efficacy (Hunsaker & Hargittai, 2018; Marquié et al., 2002) meaning 
that such comparisons are likely to illustrate age-related differences, rather than help to provide a 
literature base which might allow researchers to understand and combat the difficulties that such 
groups might face. Understanding the differences between younger and older adults is important, but 
only if the underlying reasons behind these differences is made clear. Understanding how groups 
differ, beyond arbitrary age classification, is likely to provide insight into the differences seen in 
security behaviours and vulnerability.  
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In a recent review of older adults fraud susceptibility literature, Shao et al. (2019) highlight that most 
research which has sought to understand older adults susceptibility to attacks has focussed on factors 
of vulnerability, rather than understanding the causal components of how this vulnerability might 
arise. They outline three key paradigms through which older adult security research is currently 
investigated: Cognitive, emotion regulation and motivation, and comprehensive paradigms. Although 
their review refers to fraud susceptibility, rather than cybersecurity per se, understanding how older 
adults become susceptible to social engineering attacks in other settings is likely to be informative 
for understanding older adult cybersecurity research, an associated but far less researched area.  
The first of three paradigms is the ‘cognitive paradigm’. Here, research seeks to explain older adult’s 
security vulnerability as a result age related declines in cognitive functioning. For example, James, 
Boyle and Bennett (2014) conducted a large scale study with 600 older adults in which they sought 
to understand the correlates of susceptibility to fraud among older adults with and without dementia. 
They identified four key areas likely to increase susceptibility to scams: age, with the oldest old being 
more vulnerable, poorer health, lower financial literacy and those with lower psychological 
wellbeing. It is however worth noting that this study measured self-reported susceptibility to scams, 
rather than actual history of victimisation. Importantly, the cognitive paradigm highlights the issue of 
categorising groups by age. Although the paradigm is based on the notion that cognitions decline as 
we age, there is likely to be a wide variability in how individuals cognitively age, and a wide variety 
of lifestyle factors which influence these such as diet, exercise and working status.  
The emotion regulation and motivation paradigm is based within socio-emotional selectivity theory 
(Carstensen, 1992). This theory posits that as people age, they are unable to maintain large social 
groups and as such strategically cultivate and adapt their relationships to maximise social and 
emotional gains whilst minimising emotional or social risks. Because of this shift, as adults age, they 
tend to move away from focussing on knowledge related goals and towards emotion focussed goals. 
It has been argued that older adults are more susceptible to certain types of fraud due to having an 
increased focus on positive information over negative information, something which leads to poor 
decision making (Carstensen & Mikels, 2005). This skewed information processing leads to an 
increased susceptibility for a number of reasons, one of which is that they are more likely to ignore 
the implausible aspects of a given fraud scenario, given their positive outlook (Shao et al., 2019).  
The last paradigm used in fraud susceptibility research in older adults are the ‘comprehensive’ 
paradigms. These paradigms attempt to incorporate all components of an individual’s social, 
contextual and individual landscape. These paradigms suggest that aging in itself does not necessarily 
lead to vulnerability, but that a wealth of changes that take place throughout the aging process 
combined may lead to vulnerability (Shao et al., 2019). An example of research within this paradigm 
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can be seen within Pinsker, McFarland and Pachana (2010). This research presented an overarching 
framework for conceptualising older adults’ vulnerability and assessment of said vulnerability 
through the consideration of a range of factors such as: intelligence, cognitive functioning, social 
intelligence, personality traits etc. They suggest that research which focusses on older adults should 
be multi-faceted and holistic, focussing on more than individual traits.  
The above-mentioned paradigms, which seek to understand the pre-cursors to vulnerabilities, are 
based outside of cybersecurity, i.e. they are based more generally within an older adult exploitation 
literature. Yet security research can learn from these concepts. Although emerging research (as 
discussed above) has begun to focus on older adult’s cybersecurity behaviour, it focusses too heavily 
on repeating existing research which demonstrates differences between populations, rather than 
seeking to understanding the precursors and antecedents of these vulnerabilities. Such research is also 
likely to quickly become dated, given that the generation that is currently bridging the normative gap 
into ‘older adult’ status is the baby boomer population. Baby boomers differ greatly from those 
generations who preceded them, especially when considering their interaction with technology.  
3.3 | Baby Boomers as the Next Older Adult Generation: Who are the Baby Boomers? 
The “Baby Boomer” generation – those born between 1946 and 1964 (Young & Tinker, 2017) - are 
very different to previous generations of ‘older adults’ with regards to their technology interaction. 
This generation has lived through a digital revolution and are likely the first retirees to have used 
technology for a large part of their working lives (Durrant et al., 2017b). Their engagement with 
technology makes them the first generation who are likely to use technology: before, during and well 
into retirement (Pew, 2017). Technology use by this generation has steadily increased over time. For 
example, around 50% of this age group in the UK own a smartphone and those who say they never 
use the internet has dropped from 49% to  29% in the last 5 years (Ofcom, 2018). Furthermore, 
approximately 87.5% of baby boomers now use the internet (Ready for Ageing Alliance, 2015). 
Early research into technology use in older adults (for example: Gregor, Newell, & Zajicek, 2002) 
was based on the premise that those in retirement were not active technology users. The concept and 
associated language, metaphors and behaviours were unfamiliar to them, and they did not necessarily 
perceive the benefits of technology use. Baby boomers on the other hand demonstrate a normative 
shift towards technology, with many eager to adopt new technology (Mitzner et al., 2010; Vaportzis 
et al., 2017) recognising its utility for maintaining independence for longer into older age (Lindley et 
al., 2008; Seifert & Schelling, 2018). Many now engage with online technologies to counteract 
loneliness and isolation (Chopik, 2016), remain socially connected (Hutto & Bell, 2014), interact with 
family and enjoy a healthier retirement (Juárez et al., 2018; Khvorostianov et al., 2012). Furthermore, 
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this population will often use digital technology at home or for healthcare (Mitzner et al., 2010) and 
are keen to adopt new technologies when they see utility in them, and when concerns such as feelings 
of inadequacy are quelled (Heinz et al., 2013).  
The baby boomer population is of particular interest to those seeking to oppose the use of arbitrary 
chronological age groups as discussed above, instead seeking to understand how shared experiences 
thorough experiences such as major life transitions might instead be the cause of vulnerabilities 
experienced by older adults. This is because they are the generation who are likely to be: either 
approaching retirement, currently retiring or very recently retired.  
3.4 | Retirement as a Major life Transition and a Gateway to Older Age  
Retirement is a major life transition in which nearly all aspects of life change (Salovaara et al., 2010) 
and has previously been seen as “the psychosocial marker for entry into old age” (Kloep & Hendry, 
2006). Retirement, or permanent departure from the workplace, is a major life event and can be 
considered a ‘life disruption’ (Massimi et al., 2012, 2014). This transition can be seen as a period of 
loss, reconstruction and renegotiation of many aspects of life (Mao et al., 2017; Price, 2003; Salovaara 
et al., 2010) where those who depart from the workplace are forced on a journey towards a ‘new 
normal’ (Massimi et al., 2012). When considering the above-mentioned research which focuses on 
arbitrary age groups, this transition also represents a key delineating factor which separates ‘working 
age’ and ‘older’ adults, and as such might be considered as the impetus of causal differences observed 
between these groups. 
Despite this, there is a lack of research which ties together the retirement transition with technology 
use and online vulnerabilities. There are likely to be a number of reasons for this. Firstly, it may be 
that stereotypes exist which mean that older adults are seen to be technology aversive and resist 
modern technology, meaning that research in this area is seen to be futile (Hauk et al., 2018). This 
may be the case for some older adults, as some research suggests that ‘elderly people’ have more 
negative views towards technology use than younger individuals (Chiu et al., 2001). However, 
statements such as this highlight a key problem rife through older adult literature and which is 
highlighted above; that of the lack of demarcation between the various groups of older adults, and 
ignorance of the nuances that these groups have. Salovaara (2010) highlight that most research which 
has fo cused on ICT use in older adults has focussed on those at the older end of the age spectrum, 
ignoring those of the ‘younger old’ group (aged less than 65). Typically research has focussed on age 
related declines in physiological ability such as cognitive and motor skills and how these influence 
technology usage. Importantly however, those considered to be part of the “younger-old” are unlikely 
to be affected by such age-related declines and have been relatively ignored in existing literature. 
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Interestingly, this group is the most likely to be heavily impacted by the transition to retirement, and 
as such the vulnerability seen in later life may begin around the time of the retirement transition. 
Very little research has sought to understand the influence of the retirement transition on technology 
use (Salovaara et al., 2010) and even less has viewed this from a security perspective. A wealth of 
existing literature has however investigated the retirement transition itself, with most research 
focussing on how people adjust to post-retirement life. Barbosa et al. (2016) conducted a systemic 
review through which they derived 26 key areas which can be seen to influence how well an 
individual can adjust to retirement (See Table 1). They demonstrated that many studies show a range 
of positive, negative and neutral effects when considering the impact of various lifestyle factors on 
retirement adjustment. For example, they outline that most literature has demonstrated that 
engagement in physical activity is a positive factor when considering retirement adjustment. 
Conversely, social integration is a far more complex picture, with a range of studies demonstrating 
mixed results as to whether social integration is beneficial or not for retirement adjustment. Despite 
the large variety of literature outlining how retirement can influence post-retirement adjustment, little 
research has sought to understand the impact that retirement has on engagement in specific 
behaviours, with even less investigating how retirement influences technology behaviours.  
Table 1 Factors of Retirement Adjustment (Barbosa et al., 2016) 
Factors of Retirement Adjustment  
Physical health Parenting 
Finances Education 
Psychological health and personality-related attributes Goals 
Leisure Voluntary work 
Retirement voluntariness Community resources 
Social integration Family 
Retirement preparation Professional identity 
Marital relationship Physical activity 
Post-retirement work Age 
Pre-retirement work conditions Sex 
Spirituality Living arrangements 
Retirement length Retirement timing 
Parenting Ethnicity 
 
Despite this, the factors outlined by Barbosa et al. (2016) might provide useful as a ‘road-map’ to 
factors which might also impact on technology use and how this might go on to influence security 
vulnerability. Some factors, such as physical activity, whilst important for a range of age-related 
issues, are unlikely to influence technology use. However, other factors are likely to influence the 
differences we see in older and working age adults with regards to technology use and support.  
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One such example is finances. According to Barbosa et al. (2016) Those who have a strong financial 
position during the retirement transition are also likely to adjust more easily to retirement. This is 
probably because they can afford to facilitate activities and interactions that those in a poorer financial 
position cannot. However, an individual’s financial position during the retirement transition is also 
likely to influence how they engage online, and thus may contribute to the cyber vulnerabilities we 
see in older adults. For example, Lee and Soberon-Ferrer (1997) indicated that those most likely to 
be victims of consumer fraud were also more likely to be those with poorer financial strength. 
Anecdotally, there are a number of reasons why changes in one’s financial position associated with 
retirement might lead to subsequent online vulnerability. For example, if one’s income drops 
significantly at the point of retirement, security software or support which was previously paid for, 
may be seen to be too expensive, as individuals attempt to cut costs seen to be unnecessary. 
Conversely, it may be that scams which promise large amounts of money, tax refunds, or promising 
investments might be particularly appealing to those who believe that they will struggle financially 
at the end of their retirement transition. More research is needed to determine whether these 
suggestions are valid however as very little research exists within this domain.  
Another factor identified within the Barbosa et al. (2016) review, which might also influence online 
vulnerability through influencing technology change is the change in an individual’s social interaction 
and the changing nature of their support circles. Within most workplaces, people are surrounded by 
others, acting as their main source of social interaction. Following retirement, their social setting can 
change rapidly over the course of a single weekend, with more time spent with family, friends or 
alone. This provides a range of avenues for possible vulnerability. For example, if people do not have 
family, or have limited social connections, they may be likely to seek out new relationships using the 
internet, especially in those who begin to experience loneliness in retirement (Lawson & Leck, 2006). 
In an online survey with over 500 respondents, McKenna, Green and  Gleason (2002) demonstrated 
that those who feel they are able to disclose their ‘true self’ online, and especially those who are 
lonely, are likely to form strong attachments to people they meet over the internet. This may have 
benefits for many, but may also provide an opportunity to scams which aim at manipulating an 
individual’s emotions, such as the romance scams (Whitty, 2017) discussed within the previous 
chapter. Another avenue by which retirement related changes to social interaction might lead to 
increased online vulnerability may manifest through changes to an individual’s security support 
structures. Within the workplace, individuals may rely on younger members of staff to provide 
support with technology or may rely on an organisation’s support staff to help them when they meet 
a security related obstacle. Furthermore, users are likely to receive security updates in the workplace, 
and may be protected from many threats by their organisation, whether they are aware of it or not 
(Furnell, 2005). Following departure from the workplace, these supports, as well as unseen 
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background supports such as spam filters are gone, and users may find themselves having to navigate 
security challenges by themselves. Older adults may find themselves relying on legacy knowledge 
gathered in the workplace to try and keep themselves safe online (Nicholson et al., 2019), rather than 
risk embarrassment by asking those who are accessible in retirement (Betts et al., 2019; Damodaran 
& Sandhu, 2016), or rely on those who are available, regardless of their ability (Nicholson et al., 
2019). 
Some aspects of the retirement transition, such as changes to one’s socio-economic environment and 
choosing how to spend newly acquired free time, have been consistent for generations of existing 
retirees. However, the rapid development and growth of technology provides a range of novel 
challenges and opportunities for those currently transitioning into retirement, and for those who will 
retire in the future. Technology may also provide benefits to retiring adults, offering a solution to 
difficulties in navigating the transition to retirement (Xie et al., 2013). Durrant et al. (2017) 
investigated technology use in six recently retired older adults. They identified that older adult’s 
adoption and use of internet-enabled devices had a significant presence in aiding with the transition 
into retirement. Although their participants identified the benefits of technology use in aiding the 
transition to retirement, some of their participants highlighted security concerns. This research 
supports the notion that technology changes during the transition to retirement might provide 
increased opportunities to online victimisation. 
3.5 | Chapter Summary 
This chapter has overviewed existing literature relating to older adult’s online cybersecurity 
vulnerability and highlighted a gap in the literature in that the antecedents of older adult’s online 
vulnerability remain under-researched. This chapter outlines that retirement may be the start of where 
older adult online security vulnerability begins as this major life transition results in significant 
changes to an individual’s online environment, including: how technology is likely to be used, how 
technology is used to facilitate the change to retirement and how the changing support structures 
associated with departure from the workplace influence cyber behaviours. Despite this, very little 
research has focused on the retirement transition and its possible impact on post-retirement security 
vulnerability. Retirement as a process may not be the sole cause of the differences we see between 
working age and older adults, however understanding how this transition influences security and 
online behavior is likely to highlight differences between these groups, which is likely to illuminate 
some of the potential causes of older adult cybersecurity vulnerability. The following chapter outlines 
the first study of this thesis, a study which sought to investigate how changes associated with the 
retirement transition might also be associated with increased vulnerability to cybersecurity threats.  
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Chapter 4: (Study 1): Investigating Changes in Technology Use During the 
Retirement Transition and The Possible Implications for Cybersecurity Vulnerability 
4.1 | Chapter Introduction 
Chapter 3 outlined that older adults may be at particular risk of cybersecurity vulnerability yet remain 
under-represented in existing cybersecurity literature. Furthermore, the underlying reasons behind 
why they might be at increased risk, and the point at which older adults become different from those 
in working age populations remains unclear. This study set out to investigate how the retirement 
transition, as a major life transition, might lead to changes in technology use and subsequently result 
in vulnerabilities which might be exploited by attackers. The chapter begins by briefly re-stating the 
most relevant literature from the previous chapter before outlining the aims of the study. 
4.2 | Background 
‘Older adults’ are the fastest growing population among computer and internet users (Friemel, 2016), 
and as discussed in the previous chapter, use the internet for a number of reasons such as convenience 
through to maintaining independence for longer in later life. Although existing research by Age-UK 
(2015b, 2015a) has demonstrated that older adults may be at particular risk of cyber-security attacks, 
little research has sought to understand how older adults become vulnerable to such attacks. 
Understanding the antecedents of older adults’ vulnerability to such attacks is vital and is likely to 
provide useful for informing targeted campaigns and interventions which aim to reduce vulnerability 
within these groups. 
There are however key issues which inhibit older adult’s cyber security research. One such issue is 
the there is a lack of consensus across all fields of research in what is means to be an ‘older adult’. 
For example, the world health organisation uses 65 years of age (and older) as their definition of older 
age, whereas the United Nations use 60+ (WHO, 2001). Conversely, Righi, Sayago and Blat (2017) 
define older adults as those aged 65-75 within a HCI context, but explain that these individuals did 
not identify as being ‘older adults’. Using arbitrary age groups such as these can cause an array of 
issues as discussed within Chapter 3. Using such classifications is also likely to ignore the wealth of 
individual differences, trajectories and experiences that contribute to an individual’s aging 
experience, leading to comparisons across widely heterogenous groups. For example: a wealthy, 
retired older adult surrounded by supportive family members is likely to have a very technology 
experience to one of the same age who struggles financially, is socially isolated, and is therefore 
forced to navigate potentially dangerous interactions with technology alone, if wanting to achieve the 
same end goals. 
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Understanding the impact of shared events, rather than classifying individuals into groups may be 
more useful when seeking to understanding the differences in cybersecurity vulnerability between 
older adults and other groups. Major life transitions bring with them a wealth of changes across a 
wide array of life factors (Orzech et al., 2018). Retirement; or permanent departure from the 
workplace, is a major life transition which leads to a vast array of changes to an individual’s day-to-
day life (Salovaara et al., 2010) and has previously been seen as the point at which people enter ‘old 
age’ (Kloep & Hendry, 2006).  
When one considers that retirement can take place at any time in an individual’s life, the use of 
arbitrary groups can be seen to be problematic. Two older adults of the same age (for example, 63) 
are likely to be considered different based on their employment status, with one considered an ‘older 
adult’ and the other considered ‘working age’. However this comparison ignores the vast wealth of 
changes that take place in the retired individual’s life during their transition into retirement. Although 
much of the existing research might seek to make comparisons between such older adults, a scarcity 
of research has sought to understand the impact of major life events, such as when an individual 
departs the workplace, and how the changes that take place during these transitions might influence 
technology use.  
In the previous chapter, a systemic review of retirement adjustment literature conducted by Barbosa 
et al. (2016) was outlined, with the suggestion made that many of the factors associated with 
retirement adjustment (the process of settling into retirement) might also relate to changes in 
technology use during the retirement transition. For example, Barbosa et al. (2016) highlight that 
those in a strong financial position prior to retirement might be more able to afford activities and 
interactions than those in a poorer financial position. Thus, an individual’s financial position during 
the retirement transition is likely to divide groups, causing a range of retirement trajectories. 
Anecdotally, a change in one’s financial position might also have consequences for an individual’s 
cybersecurity during the retirement transition for a number of reasons. For example, an individual 
may be forced to rely on used or older devices if they cannot afford newer more secure devices. 
Similarly, those in a stronger financial position might seek out paid professional help to support them 
or buy newer devices to facilitate their retirement transition.  
The previous chapter outlines several ways in which the retirement transition might lead to major 
changes in an individual’s day to day life and might consequently lead to the differences we see 
between working age and retired older adults. Within a matter of days, the entire socio-economic and 
technological landscape surrounding an individual can change drastically, and these changes are 
likely to have far reaching consequences across a range of domains. To date however, no literature 
has sought to understand how this change influences upon an older adult’s technology environment, 
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and how these changes might subsequently lead to increased cybersecurity vulnerability. In seeking 
to address this gap, the following research questions were derived: 
RQ1: How does the retirement transition influence the day to day use of technology? 
RQ2: How might the technological changes associated with the retirement transition lead 
to cybersecurity vulnerability?  
 
4.3 | Method 
4.3.1 | Qualitative Research Design 
This study implemented a qualitative research design using one to one semi-structured interviews. 
Thematic Analysis was chosen as the data analysis technique to define themes identified in the data. 
Braun and Clarke's (2006) six stages of thematic analysis were used to ensure best practice due to its 
prominence as a guideline within qualitative research. Furthermore, Braun and Clarke’s approach 
incorporates flexibility of epistemological and ontological position, which in the case of this study 
stem from a blended contextualist approach (Braun & Clarke, 2006) allowing us to explore a wide 
range of realist factors such as finance, alongside social constructions such as identity. As thematic 
analysis is a flexible approach which allows for a range of methods (Braun and Clarke, 2006), apriori 
themes were implemented, something typically used within template analysis (King, 1998). Template 
analysis is a sub-type of thematic analysis that promotes the use of pre-defined apriori themes. 
Implementing such themes allows researchers to acknowledge factors which are anticipated to have 
a strong impact on the findings. Whilst using such an iterative form of template analysis (Brooks et 
al., 2015), It is important however that these themes be acknowledged by the researcher in advance, 
and revised, rejected or added to, as soon as it becomes clear that they should be (King, 1998). In the 
case of this study, it is clear that a wealth of existing literature points to a range of factors which 
influence retirement adjustment, and many of these factors are also likely to influence technology 
use. Thus, the initial interview schedule was based upon six apriori themes taken from retirement 
adjustment literature. More information is provided with regards to this in the materials section below.  
4.3.2 | Participants 
Face to face and online sampling methods were used to search for eligible participants. A post was 
placed on Facebook in January 2018, which asked directly for participants, but also requested that 
people snowball on the recruitment information to anyone who might be eligible to take part. Once 
potential participants had contacted the research team, an interview was arranged at the participant’s 
home. A total of 12 participants from the North East of England, UK, seven females (aged 59-74) 
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and five males (aged 53-68) (see Table 2) met the inclusion criteria. Inclusion criteria were broad and 
only required participants to have used, or have had some experience in using, technology (that they 
engaged with in any way with technology). The second inclusion criteria stipulated that participants 
must have retired within the past 5 years (since January 2013). This criterion was implemented to 
ensure that participants could still remember their experiences from around the time that they retired. 
Table 2 provides a descriptive overview of the participants who took part in study 1. 
Table 2 Study 1 Participant Demographics 
Ppt Age Retired 
Length 
Sex Pre-Retirement Work 
P1 59 3-4 
months 
Female Worked as a nurse for most of her career before moving 
into a role as a manager. She is married and is living with 
a chronic health condition. 
P2 60 2 ½ years Male Project manager who worked for BT is married to P6 
P3 68 3 years Male Worked as an Engineer for 30 years before spending 15 
years in project management at BT,  
P4 60 4.5 years Male Worked in a ministerial role relating to schools’ funding. 
P5 59 6 months Female Worked as a technical support operator giving IT support 
and building IT systems.  
P6 67 2 ½ years Female Retail shop assistant. Is married to P2 
P7 66 5 years Female Worked as team leader in a café on a university campus.  
P8 63 2 years Female Worked as a nurse for most of her career but ended career 
being a manager to other nurses. Is married to P9 
P9 65 1 month Male Worked as a security engineer fitting and maintaining 
ATMs, is married to P8 
P10 62 18 
months 
Female Retired 4 years ago but following a three month break this 
ppt returned to work as a FE school vice-principal. Retired 
again 18 months ago. 
P11 74 3 years Female Worked as a GP practice manager. 
P12 53 2 years Male Worked as a self-employed charity worker. 
 
4.3.3 | Materials 
An interview schedule was created based on a comprehensive systematic review of factors 
influencing adjustment to retirement (Barbosa et al., 2016). The 26 factors of retirement adjustment 
identified in Barbosa et al.’s (2016) review were individually considered by the researcher to 
determine whether or not they would a) change at the point of the retirement transition and b) have a 
likely impact on technology use and as such have a possible impact on subsequent cybersecurity 
vulnerability. The aim of this task was to identify the major areas of change that take place during the 
retirement transition to guide the interview schedule. For example, ‘Finances’ whether positively or 
negatively, are very likely to change during the retirement transition, and may impact post-retirement 
online behaviour in one way or another for example. Other factors such as physical activity levels, a 
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factor identified in the original Barbosa review, can be seen to be less likely to lead to online 
behaviour change. Of the 26 factors associated with retirement adjustment, 6 factors were identified 
as likely to have some influence on technology usage: (i) social situation, (ii) online/technology 
adoption, (iii) identity transitions, (iv) psychological wellbeing/personality change, (v) support 
structures and (vi) financial change. These factors formed an initial ‘soft template’ (King, 1998) 
which were to be revised through the iterative thematic analysis process. Aside from factors relating 
only to the process of the retirement transition, prompts around technology use were also included 
such as a discussion around online behaviours, such as whether or not their online interactions had 
changed during or following retirement, and if so, how these changes manifested themselves. The 
interview schedule (see Appendix A) started by asking the participant to discuss the biggest changes 
that they experienced across their retirement transition. Adherence to the schedule was flexible, with 
the interviewer allowing the interviewee to lead the interview based on what they had elected to 
report.  
4.3.4 | Procedure 
As with all studies presented within this thesis, ethical approval was obtained from the psychology 
ethics board within the University of Northumbria at Newcastle. The researcher met participants 
within their own homes and reviewed the information sheet before obtaining written informed 
consent. Conducting interviews within the participants homes allowed for the use of prompts in the 
immediate environment, such as identifying devices and using these to stimulate conversation. 
Participants were questioned using the pre-made semi-structured interview schedule (see Appendix 
A). Interviews took approximately 1 hour and were structured around 3 main topics: 1) what 
participants experienced in the lead up to, and during, their retirement transition 2) what the 
participant saw as the biggest changes to their life over this period and the reasons behind this and 3) 
how their interaction with technology had changed during their transition into retirement. Following 
the interviews, the interviewer personally transcribed the interviews to aid in the familiarisation of 
the data, as recommended by Braun and Clarke (2006). Interviews took place across 5 months 
between February 2018 and June 2018. 
4.4 | Findings and Discussion 
4.4.1 | Analysis Procedure 
Data was imported and coded within NVivo 11. Braun and Clarke’s (2006) thematic analysis 
guidelines were followed at each stage of the thematic analysis. The stages outlined by Braun and 
Clarke’s (2006) consist of; familiarisation with the data, generating initial codes, searching for 
themes, reviewing themes, defining and producing themes and finally producing a report. NVivo 11 
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software was used throughout the above six stages to collate, code, organise and analyse the collected 
interview data. Within NVivo transcripts were read with margin notes (codes) assigned to summarise 
the content of the text. These codes were then subsequently grouped into second tier (larger groups) 
before being pulled together into Themes: overarching constructs representing codes. Examples of 
these stages can be found in Appendices E, F and G. 
4.4.2 | Themes  
Halfway through coding, the six apriori themes applied within the soft template were revised, 
resulting in a final set of six themes outlined below. These themes reflect changes associated with the 
retirement transition, that subsequently impacted technology use. Retirement related changes, 
particularly in areas where there were feelings of loss, were typically accompanied by compensatory 
behaviours, which in some cases, may have promoted cybersecurity vulnerabilities. The reasons 
behind how these vulnerabilities might have arisen as a result of these changes is discussed in relation 
to each change below. Each area of change also brought with it emotional implications, often 
negative, which may have been the driving force behind attempts to remedy these losses.  
4.4.2.1 | Changes in Social Interaction  
Upon leaving the workplace, an individual’s social infrastructure changes and in most cases, the social 
and emotional support from workplace colleagues is lost. Participants had typically made the 
transition from working full-time (around 37.5 hours per week) to being fully retired and this drop-
off in working hours led to rapid social change. For some, the loss of colleague interaction occurred 
immediately, as they had actively chosen not to maintain contact with colleagues. Others described 
their attempts to keep in touch with colleagues, although this too gradually deteriorated over a period 
of time. 
P6: I did socialise with people from work. Not a lot, but once I had retired, that got less and 
less, and it was sort of once a month I would speak to the girls from work, then it sort of got 
to once every couple of months and people kept in touch with me once I retired, but then as 
the months went on it got less and less and now… well two and a half years now since I 
retired, I virtually don’t see anybody from work at all. 
Nearly all participants described a vacuum in their social infrastructure. For many, social interaction 
had revolved almost entirely around work colleagues, and this meant that rebuilding social interaction 
post-retirement was difficult. 
P1: A lot of nursey people do hang about with nurses, so when you stop doing that you find 
that trying to spread your group of friends a bit wider is a bit tricky 
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This loss led to increased feelings of isolation and loneliness in many participants. This was especially 
apparent when the loss of social interaction felt like a slow process of neglect. 
P6: When you are at work there is lots going on “oh we’re planning a night out on Friday, 
are you going to come?” Once you are out of the picture, I think you are soon forgotten. 
Generally, social loss was seen as highly negative. This finding is not surprising and is entirely 
consistent with the observations of Kloep and Hendry (2006), who demonstrated that people who 
become attached to colleagues are unhappy at losing them as part of their social infrastructure. 
Similarly, Dorfman (1992) argued that the loss of colleague interaction was rated as the most negative 
aspect of retirement. Nahum-Shani and Bamberger (2009) found that in those with a large number of 
working hours, retirement not only led to a loss of colleagues, but also led to a decrease in emotional 
support overall, i.e. work friends who were previously strong emotional support structures were no 
longer available to the retired individual. It may be that people look to renew this social loss not only 
for the purpose of social interaction, but also for the emotional support it provided.  
4.4.2.1.1 | Renewing Social Interaction  
In compensation, participants sought out new social opportunities via taking on new hobbies, joining 
groups, volunteering and providing support for the family. 
P5: One of the purposes behind me deciding to do some volunteering, I picked the library 
specifically so that I could meet people in the Low Fell area, because I have never had 
children, I have never done the school gate business, I don’t really know anyone, apart 
from immediate neighbours. 
For those who were married, a renegotiation of the marital relationship was required to establish 
whether this loss of colleague interaction would be replaced by more time spent together.  
P8: Now he is retired, we are kind of like sorting out how we can get on with life as two 
people again, instead of one working and one not working 
Participants described turning to technology to facilitate social interaction with those outside of their 
immediate home. Participants described how their use of such social technologies, such as 
‘WhatsApp’ had increased since their retirement. 
P8: …That has definitely increased since I have retired, the texting and the emailing and 
the WhatsApp. 
P4: …because the children are growing up there is a lot more sending photos, because my 
nephews and nieces, most of them have got kids now, so again its photos of the kids, a LOT 
more texting, a lot more texting actually because I have a lot more time to do it. 
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Some participants described how their social interaction now revolved around family life and 
explained how their family members had bought them devices or encouraged them to use online social 
networks.  
P8: She gave me this phone so that I could receive photographs and so that she could Skype 
me. Not my Skype her, but her Skype me. And… FaceTime? Is it FaceTime? So that kind of 
thing. 
In line with these findings; Peek et al., (2016) found that it was common for families to buy devices 
for their older relatives and in general those who acted as sources of support for older adults, also 
promoted their use of technology. However, within this sample, not everyone felt competent or 
confident in the use of such devices and some reported emotional implications associated with using 
these devices, such as general fear and anxiety around unfamiliar device usage. 
4.4.2.1.2 | Vulnerabilities Arising from Changes to Social Interaction  
As retirees seek to build a new social life, they may turn to technology and social networking 
platforms to facilitate communication with family, find new people with common interests, or new 
ways to express themselves (Tosun, 2012). However, online social networks are recognised as one of 
the biggest emerging threats to cybersecurity and privacy (Jang-Jaccard & Nepal, 2014). Increasingly, 
these outlets are being used to spread malware, gain information for identity theft or to seed romance 
scams. As retirees take to online social networks, they may increase their vulnerability to attack, 
particularly if they are not competent or confident with the technologies they are using. Retirees must 
ensure that they have anti-malware up to date and active if using such sites to ensure that they avoid 
becoming prone to attacks such as phishing attacks and romance scams (Age-UK, 2015b; Alves & 
Wilson, 2008).  
4.4.2.2 | Changes in Finances  
Most participants experienced an immediate loss in income upon leaving the workplace. Some were 
financially prepared, meaning that their salary was substituted by a good pension and reduced 
outgoings, e.g. being mortgage free. Finances varied among the participants with a few reporting that 
they were financially better off overall since retiring. More commonly however, people experienced 
a large drop in their income, which resulted in changes to their financial behaviour and attitudes. 
P11: one of the biggest transitions and the worst part for me is the lack of money. Um, 
suddenly going down from having a salary to a pension that worked out to be much less 
than I believed I would have received. 
Participants had to change their lifestyle in order to live within their means. Participants reported 
managing their spending more carefully; being careful not to overspend and seeking value for money.  
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P5: Oh god yeah, my pension is about a 1/3 of what I used to get paid and although I have 
a decent amount of savings, I am finding it very interesting having to actually watch what I 
spend on a month by month basis. 
P8: I am more careful with my money because I don’t have the disposable income I used to 
have, and it’s fun in a way hunting for a bargain and when you go out you get concessions 
because of our age. It just makes you look at money in a different way. 
Financial loss had an impact on multiple aspects of life and had consequences for other retirement 
related losses. For example, the need to limit expenditure further, amplified the social interaction 
losses as social events and club memberships were perceived as too expensive 
P7: I definitely don’t socialise like I used to, because I was out every week, every single 
week, I was out every weekend.  Q: Why don’t you do that anymore? … I think of the 
money, do you know what I mean? Because when I worked […] you would probably spend 
£70 on a night out and that is a lot of money when you are on your pension, that is nearly 
your week’s shopping. 
P11: until I left work I was a member of xxxx cricket club, but I can't afford that any longer, 
so I always went to matches as much as I could at xxxx, but I don't do that anymore, I just 
can't afford it. 
For those without a car, reliance on public transport (often perceived as inaccessible or inflexible) led 
to further forms of isolation.  
P11: it means I can't afford to run a car any longer so that is a big change. I have had a 
car for many, many years um, certainly since my late 20s I’ve always had a car that I've 
run, even when I was really hard up, then it was still easier to do it than it would be now, so 
yeah that's one of the real big disadvantages. 
These findings resonate with those of Davey (2007) and Luiu, Tight and Burrow (2017), who reported 
a range of negative outcomes associated with the loss of a car in older adults, including difficulties in 
carrying out day to day tasks, going to see friends or shopping without assistance.  
Emotional implications also stemmed from financial loss, with some participants understandably 
frightened by loss of income. 
P9: So that has gone down just to my two pensions. It’s a bit - that's what frightens you at 
first and you think bloody hell, where is it, before I had the money if I wanted to go for a 
day out 
Post-retirement satisfaction and happiness have both been found to relate to financial status (Choi, 
2001; Kim & Moen, 2001; van Solinge & Henkens, 2008). Burr, Santo and Pushkar (2011) found a 
strong association, in that a good, stable income led to positive affect whereas poor financial status 
led to negative affect. It is likely that finance has further reaching implications than affect when 
considering online vulnerabilities, however. 
58 
 
4.4.2.2.1 | Vulnerabilities Arising from Financial Changes 
Participants who were financially comfortable post-retirement reported very little in the way of 
associated behaviour change. However, those who had experienced financial loss reported being 
much more attentive towards finances, with a number of new reported behaviours, including greater 
interest in online banking as a means to manage finances:  
P4: Online banking is something I have always done but I am much tighter on, but before I 
retired, and I didn’t really need to worry much there was always kind of enough money for 
what I wanted, now I have to be very careful. 
Interestingly, this suggests that financial loss during retirement can be protective in a cybersecurity 
context, as the individual’s attention may become more focussed on protecting their limited resources. 
This is supported by existing literature which indicates that those with a higher income are less risk 
and loss averse (Hjorth & Fosgerau, 2009; Sheehy-skeffington & Rea, 2017). Grable (2000) also 
found that those with a higher income and higher education level had a greater risk-taking propensity. 
However, while those with stretched finances may engage in more protective checking behaviours, 
financial loss could lead to other cyber vulnerabilities, e.g. through the use of second-hand 
technology, something which is especially problematic if such behaviours are not perceived to be 
risky at the time. One participant (P4) reported how he experienced a large financial loss following 
retirement and had bought an old used laptop for £80 as well as purchasing anti-virus software from 
local paid IT help. He described this as his “clunky laptop”. It had an outdated operating system but 
was his main portal for accessing information, exchanging emails and downloading information from 
the Internet.  
Financial loss could, thus, lead to unsafe behaviours such as purchasing of used, outdated or 
inherently unsafe devices. Some who are struggling financially may rely on hand-me-down devices 
from friends or relatives in an attempt to avoid spending precious financial resources on new 
technology. A lack of financial stability may also hinder people from buying security software, paying 
for IT help when required, and relying on those available to the individual (Dimond et al., 2010; 
Nicholson et al., 2019) regardless of their ability to provide good technical support. 
4.4.2.3 | Changes to One’s Sense of Purpose  
The workplace can provide people with a sense of purpose or strong professional identity. Participants 
described feelings of loss around their former role, with some saying they no longer felt that they had 
a place in society, while others described feelings of guilt at no longer being in useful employment.  
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Some participants had worked in specific job roles for their entire working lives and their working 
role had become a large part of their self-identity. Upon retirement, they were forced to re-assess their 
identity, something which was challenging for those participants. 
P1: It does kind of dominate your life, it sounds pathetic really, you are even a nurse when 
you are not at work, and you know... […] It’s not being a nurse anymore, I find that quite 
odd. 
P5: I have always really defined myself in a large part by what I do, and I suppose work 
was always very important to me because it took a lot of my life and now I don’t do that 
anymore I am JUST retired… I am JUST… 
Conversely, retirement had relatively little identity impact for those who were unhappy in their pre-
retirement roles. 
P4: I think the difference is because I didn’t like my job for the last few years, I didn’t 
proudly identify myself with the role, it was “this is what I am doing to earn enough 
money” and that’s how it felt. And so, I didn’t… it wasn’t like losing an element of my 
identity, or the element of my identity that I lost didn’t like anyway. 
Role theory is a transitional theory that relates to specific roles gained and lost across the life course 
and may be particularly helpful when investigating the loss of a sense of purpose in recent retirees 
(M. Wang et al., 2011). Retirement acts as a role-transition (M. Wang, 2007) which may lead to a 
losses in feelings of purpose. Kim and Moen (2002) outline how, from a ‘role-enhancement’ 
perspective, the loss of a career leads to feelings of ‘role loss’ which in turn drive feelings of 
psychological distress and loss of morale. Alternatively, leaving a role that an individual is unhappy 
with, can lead to a reduction in ‘role strain’ (Kim & Moen, 2002).  
The loss of a workplace role can damage one’s self-identity (Osborne, 2012) and one’s self-esteem 
(Bleidorn & Schwaba, 2018) although this can depend upon the way the exit from the organisation is 
handled (Damman et al., 2015). Participants in this study used emotive language when discussing 
role loss following retirement, using terms such as “feeling useless”, experiencing “crises” or likening 
the experience to “jumping off a cliff”.  
P5: I am having a bit of a very low-key crisis of wondering where I fit in the world, but… I 
don’t think it is anything I won’t get over. 
P6: I think the biggest change is that I felt… It’s difficult to describe… not that I was 
useless, but I felt like I wasn’t… that I didn’t have any valuable contribution to make 
Such distress can act as an impetus to re-fill this role loss. Participants took on a variety of new roles 
in retirement. If they had grandchildren living nearby, they generally reported taking on more active 
roles as grandparents.  
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P10: …the other thing that takes over when you retire, when you're a grandparent, is 
visiting the little ones 
Others took on roles such as volunteering, turning to part time work or increasing the amount of time 
spent doing hobbies and activities. One recent retiree said he did not yet know what to do with his 
spare time, likening the experience to an earlier life transition, that of leaving school; 
P9: I'm at the point now, like just before I left school not knowing what I want to do - it’s 
like, when you leave - where are you gonna go? I'm sitting here scratching my head 
thinking I don't know - how long that will take I don't know.  
Thoits (2012) describes the ways that taking on a new role (e.g. volunteering) can lead to increased 
feelings of self-worth, renewed feelings in a sense of purpose and better physical and mental health. 
Volunteer roles are popular post-retirement, as they are relatively easy to obtain, are likely to involve 
low stress, and are typically easy to exit (Thoits, 2012). However, these roles may bring new 
challenges and vulnerabilities. 
4.4.2.3.1 | Vulnerabilities Arising from Changes to One’s Sense of Purpose 
Participants taking on new roles were sometimes given technology responsibilities, regardless of their 
actual ability. As noted earlier, this is predominantly a group of ‘baby boomers’, the first group of 
retirees to have had technology experience during their working lives. At times, this responsibility 
was accepted and at other times refused.  
P5: well, I have started looking after the website which is not…a particularly difficult job it 
is on a contact management system, but I do the updates on it and… and I look after their 
Facebook page as well, and I make use of my laptop a lot more than I used to. 
P2: The art group has asked me to manage their Facebook page for them, one of my 
neighbours has asked me to get involved in the Elders group in XXXX and help them with 
their web development and I’m afraid I have said no to all of them, I have spent 40 years in 
technology and I hate it.  
Even for those without a strong knowledge of technology, new roles often led to an increase in 
technology use associated with communication.  
P4: I am in constant contact with the people who run it, the chief executive if you like I am 
his line manager who I see once a fortnight, we exchange a LOT of texts and emails on that 
This can be problematic for those people who are given access to systems they are ill equipped to 
protect. A large increase in the amount of emails that an individual handles is likely to increase an 
individual’s exposure to email related threats such as phishing attacks. Parsons, Butavicius, Delfabbro 
and Lillie (2019) suggest that those with more technology experience will outperform those with less 
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in terms of avoiding phishing threats, but the vulnerabilities of a new ‘volunteer’ might not be made 
explicit to a recruiting organisation. 
4.4.2.4 | Changes to One’s Day-to-Day Routine  
Following retirement, participants found themselves without a day-to-day routine, which was 
sometimes associated with feelings of guilt about having so much free time. 
P6: I think the biggest change is that you are suddenly in an environment where you aren't 
busy, you go to work, I went to work 5 days a week, then all of a sudden you haven’t got 
that.  
P5: I find it still very hard to just not have something planned to do because I feel like I am 
wasting time, I feel a bit guilty. 
Osborne (2012) describes the “choice dilemmas” that can lead to feelings of angst or anxiety in 
retirees. Siegenthaler and Vaughan (1998) found that retired women often reported feeling guilty 
about engaging in recreation during retirement. Again, these changes drove changes in behaviour. 
P5: I had gone from having a very structured life to suddenly having no structure and all of 
this spare time to do things, so I immediately set about putting structure in place, I 
volunteered at various things… 
Having more free time was a reason cited for participants taking up a range of activities: re-
discovering previous hobbies, dedicating more time to existing hobbies and adopting new hobbies or 
activities. Again, for participants this was accompanied by an increased use of technology, as they 
now had more time to engage with digital devices. 
P5: Facebook I didn’t do when I worked I do a bit more of now, I watch more things on 
television and Chromecast, I have Netflix which I didn’t have when I worked… I just 
needed more time. I didn’t have time for anything like that. It really was precisely that.  
One participant outlined how boredom led to an increase in online social network participation.  
P4: Oh yes, I didn’t use it [Facebook] at all, I think it is completely new since I retired, I 
have more time as well, sometimes I look at Facebook because I am a bit bored.  
Tosun (2012) found that a common reason for Facebook use was to curb boredom and participants 
within this study also suggested this, driven by a need to fill the retirement hours.  
P8: I text and WhatsApp friends as well, quite... I guess daily really, I will sort of text 
people and ask, how is your mum and when are we meeting up and they will WhatsApp me 
back and things. That has definitely increased since I have retired, the texting and the 
emailing and the WhatsApp. Because I have the time to do it now. 
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Barnett, Guell and Ogilvie (2012) outline how retirees need to replace their working routine with new 
routines in retirement for the purpose of maintaining a feeling of control and a sense of purpose over 
their lives. Ekerdt and Koss (2016) found that routines were seen as vital by retirees for a number of 
reasons, one of which is to address the open-endedness of retirement and to instil a sense of purpose 
and meaning to one’s post-retirement life. For those unable to fill their routine with other meaningful 
offline activities, there may be a range of vulnerabilities which may arise as a result of turning to the 
internet to fill spare time. 
4.4.2.4.1 | Vulnerabilities Arising from a Loss of Day-to-Day Routine 
Having more free time in retirement almost inevitably meant that participants spent more time using 
technology. Choi (2008) suggests that one’s online routines and the way in which these routines are 
managed, provide opportunities for victimisation in an online environment. Social media use is one 
of the biggest emerging threats for cybersecurity (Jang-Jaccard & Nepal, 2014),  but boredom can 
also lead to increases in things like online play which brings a number of cybersecurity concerns, 
particularly when that play is associated with apps downloaded onto smartphones and tablets 
(Ahvanooey et al., 2017; Lu et al., 2012). 
4.4.2.5 | Changes in One’s Perceived Competence 
One major change that occurs following departure from the workplace is the immediate reduction in 
work-based cognitive demands. Within this sample, participants discussed how they felt less 
‘mentally fit’ after retiring. Additionally, they reported a decline in their computer self-efficacy 
related to these perceptions of declining competence. Participants described feeling cognitively 
‘slower’ and attributed these losses to their retirement transition.  
P1: You find yourself reading the same thing over and over again and not taking anything 
in. I used to find that after a fortnight off […] if I went back after a fortnights holidays I 
wouldn’t be as sharp as when I went off until I had revved back up. And of course, I haven’t 
revved up since September.  
P2: I’m sure that would have taken me an hour or so if I was… you know, before I retired. 
This time, I kept making mistakes and it wouldn’t sort, or it wouldn’t go quite how I thought 
it would, so I must have spent 5 hours doing 3 sheets of A4. 
It may be that time spent in the workplace acts as cognitive protection, allowing people to “flex their 
mental muscles” with regard to carrying out a broad range of tasks. Evidence by Finkel, Andel, Gatz 
and Pedersen (2009) demonstrated that pre-retirement job roles that involve highly complex work, 
resulted in better cognitive functioning following the retirement transition. We know that, regardless 
of chronological age, adults may show more rapid cognitive decline following departure from certain 
workplaces and that this is linked to the complexity of the work previously undertaken (Finkel et al., 
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2009; Meng et al., 2017). Gordon et al. (2019) also found that older adults, regardless of chronological 
age, could be divided into ‘cognitively young’ and ‘cognitively old’ individuals and that this was 
reflected in their technology usage, with ‘cognitively older’ adults using fewer apps for longer 
periods. These declines may not necessarily be reflective of actual cognitive decline, however. 
There is no doubt that actual cognitive and physical decline occurs for many and often begins before 
the age of 60 (Salthouse, 2009) which may in turn, be linked to problems in mastering new 
technologies or even in the everyday ease-of-use of existing technologies (Hauk et al., 2018).  
However, people also show a number of negative self-perceptions about ageing (Robertson & Kenny, 
2016; Sargent-Cox et al., 2012) which in turn can lead to doubts about competence beliefs. The 
perceptions of declining competence that retirees report following departure from the workplace, may 
instead be related to declines in self-efficacy rather than actual cognitive decline. Self-esteem 
gradually rises across the life course, starts to decline around the age of 50-60, and continues to reduce 
into older age (Orth & Robins, 2014). Retirement, through losses of roles, purpose and perceived 
competence, especially in the oldest retirees, may intensify age related declines in self-efficacy 
beliefs. This may be particularly problematic as declines in self-efficacy have been associated with 
increased cybersecurity vulnerabilities. 
4.4.2.5.1 | Vulnerabilities Arising from Changes in Perceived Competence 
In a technology context, Vaportzis, Clausen, and Gow (2017) found that older adults (aged between 
65 and 76) had feelings of inadequacy when comparing their computer literacy with those of their 
younger peers. Marquié, Jourdan-Boddaert and Huet (2002) supported this in the context of general 
computer knowledge and demonstrated that older adults underestimated their computer knowledge 
when comparing themselves to a younger sample. They found that older adults were both less 
confident and felt less knowledgeable, regardless of the fact that their scores were in line with their 
younger counterparts. Although older adults may be capable, a perception of low self-efficacy may 
be damaging nonetheless. Workman, Bommer and Straub (2008) suggest that an individual’s ability 
to cope with an online threat is partly based upon their self-efficacy, finding that those with lower 
self-esteem are more likely to engage in omissive behaviours around information security. Thus, 
lowered self-esteem may result in avoidance behaviours, rather than attempting to deal with threats 
directly.  
These findings are important in the interpretation of the findings presented here. There were incidents 
where low perceived computer self-efficacy and the fear and anxiety around ‘doing the wrong thing’ 
drove participants to seek sources of support, which may not always have been appropriate or safe.  
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P8: …my granddaughter will point me in the right direction, if I get really stuck I will say 
“help, I’m stuck” because I am afraid that I might do something wrong and lose 
everything. And I don’t know how to get it all back, I am very naïve when it comes to things 
like that. 
Nicholson et al. (2019) has shown that older adults will often behave in just this way – showing 
reluctance to master new procedures and turning instead to close relatives or readily available others 
to fix things, without necessarily checking their credentials for undertaking the task at hand. Barnard, 
Bradley, Hodgson and Lloyd (2013) noted that having access to a particularly knowledgeable child 
or grandchild, may backfire, reinforcing feelings of incompetence when they see the third party 
confidently and competently handling technology. If older adults become reliant on others for 
cybersecurity support, especially if these sources are inappropriate, there is a clear risk in terms of 
cybersecurity vulnerability.   
4.4.2.6 | Changes to Technical Support Structures  
Many workplaces provide technical training and support to staff members and most have appropriate 
policies and procedures in place. Alongside formal IT support, knowledgeable colleagues provide 
technical information and advice through socially constructed “shadow security” networks (Kirlappos 
et al., 2014). These are all lost upon retirement (Dimond et al., 2010) and participants recognised this 
as an issue. They described how the workplace had provided support in the form of bulletins, updates 
and dedicated IT staff and described their reliance upon workplace friends and colleagues for 
technical support. 
P2: Yeah. At work they are all very technical people, […] so I would go to them. If I had a 
problem I could just phone a help desk at work. But if you phone a helpdesk when you are 
at home then it costs money doesn’t it? 
P1: Yeah. I don’t know who else I would ask actually [for IT help]. At work I could find 
anyone with an iPhone and say here this has happened, what do you think? 
Participants also described a reliance on workplace support structures to keep them updated with 
cybersecurity threats and to act as reminders of safe practices. 
P1: You don’t realise how much you rely on it for, there were banners going across the 
computer screen homepage all of the time telling you about them [threats] and to update. 
Nahum-Shani and Bamberger (2009) found that working hours were positively associated with the 
depth of colleague instrumental support received (support with devices) but showed how this was lost 
upon retirement. Instead this was replaced by advice and support from those close (non-work) friends 
who tended to be immediately and easily accessible - findings similar to those reported for 
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cybersecurity advice by Nicholson et al. (2019). It appears that the options for retirees become limited, 
and they have to rely upon those who would have been their second or third choices for support. 
P11: my youngest daughter is probably the principal person who would have helped me, 
but now I'm living here, and she lives in London, or just on the outskirts of London so she 
isn't around as much, whereas [granddaughter] lives down the road 
Some participants reported employing paid help for IT support, as they no longer had any available 
IT support structures at all. 
P4: you see when you are working… […] there are always people around to ask questions, 
that is one change, there aren’t anymore. I suppose that is why I take the machine to him 
[local paid help] every now and then to get it cleaned up… 
Older adults may not want to admit incompetence to family members due to feelings of 
embarrassment about their inability to deal with threats (Selwyn, 2004). It is clear however that the 
choice of support structure in retirement may result in an increase in vulnerability to cyberattack in 
retirement, depending on their trustworthiness, knowledge and ability. 
4.4.2.6.1 | Vulnerabilities Arising from Changing Support Structures  
Nicholson et al. (2019) may help to clarify the mechanisms by which a loss of support structures in 
older adults may lead to cybersecurity vulnerability. They posit a framework in which cybersecurity 
information is a result of an interplay between cyber-literacy and resource availability. For a retired 
individual, the legacy knowledge they acquired in the workplace is often used to guide their 
cybersecurity behaviour, but as this information becomes more dated, they turn to other resources for 
support and the acquisition of new knowledge and skills.  Yet as we’ve seen, the post-retirement 
resource landscape is very variable. Some people have a wide and knowledgeable social network. 
Others, with more financial stability, have bought new devices and therefore have ready access to 
professional IT support. This pattern has been noted by Barnard et al. (2013), who notes that retirees 
place themselves “at risk of being left behind” which sometimes leads them to make risky decisions 
or rely on outdated or inappropriate advice. This finding was reflected in the collected data. For 
example, when asked about what to do if no support was immediately available, one participant 
explained how she might engage in behaviour outside of her comfort zone to achieve her end-goal; 
P1: If I was confident about the website. So, if it was it was iTunes. Like the computer died 
[…] and iTunes had disappeared. I downloaded that again but with clammy hands because 
it had to be updated, and I am a heart in the mouth kind of IT person really. 
Surprisingly, there is relatively little in the research literature about how such challenges, and more 
specifically about how changes in post-retirement support structures can leave people open to attack. 
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4.5 | Overall Discussion 
A number of losses associated with retirement have been outlined with links made to how these might 
make older adults more vulnerable to cyberattacks. The findings here support the notion that 
retirement acts as a major life disruption and one which leads people to seek out a ‘new normal’  
(Massimi et al., 2012) i.e. a new lifestyle in which previous technological and social infrastructures 
are lost and are subsequently replaced with tenuous new structures, which can sometimes lead to 
additional cyber vulnerabilities.   
The findings presented here show that the social, economic and competence losses triggered upon 
retirement can interact in the construction of a ‘new normal’.  For some well-resourced older adults, 
with good social networks, financial stability and a range of post-retirement interests, the 
vulnerabilities are not so much tied to a paucity of resources but may be associated with taking up 
new challenges.  The retired doctor who lives alone and downloads the best-selling apps on a new 
smartphone has a different risk profile to the retired salesclerk who lives in close proximity to children 
and grandchildren and who is reliant on their second-hand devices and background knowledge. 
Clearly there remains a range of possible pathways which might be attributed to the retirement 
transition with various outcomes, something which is likely to have a great wealth of intra-individual 
variability.   
The findings of this study have clear real-world applications, particularly in developing policy and 
lifelong learning strategies. It is important to recognise that the workplace legacy knowledge for 
individuals will vary enormously. For those in manual labour, for example, the technology skills they 
possess upon retirement are unlikely to derive from workplace experience.  But for those who do use 
technology in work, one policy recommendation which could derive from this work is to consider the 
extent to which, as a retirement offer, they could be given access to appropriate technical and 
cybersecurity expertise. On the approach to retirement, cybersecurity training packages could 
accompany existing retirement planning packages that are offered by some organisations. Naturally, 
this relies on the production of an effective cybersecurity training package that teaches the individual 
safe practices and where to find appropriate information. This provides challenges not only for policy 
makers, but also for researchers attempting to implement cybersecurity interventions targeted at older 
adults.   
Secondly, additional support should be provided for those currently in retirement, provided in an 
accessible format way that empowers older adults to act safely online and promotes efficacy in 
engaging in safety behaviours. This is likely to begin with the promotion of government backed 
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websites such as “Cyber Aware” in the UK but should extend to provide an age appropriate source 
of information, which considers those with poorer computer literacy.  
Finally, to addresses changes in day to day routine, social interaction and feelings of sense of purpose, 
which may inadvertently lead to increased vulnerability, support should be provided to promote social 
groups for older adults that are empowered to provide cyber support, advice and guidance as well as 
provide a forum for support in which older adults can support each other. In this regard, recent work 
on the role of Cyber-Guardians  within a support network provides interesting avenues (Nicholson, 
2020). 
4.6 | Limitations and Future Work 
One limitation of this study is that post-retirement changes are discussed without fully considering 
the interactions between these, noting that the interplay between these factors may intensify their 
effect on cybersecurity vulnerability. For example, an individual with limited financial and social 
resources may have to fall back on their own legacy knowledge – but what if they previously worked 
in a non-technical role with limited access to training? How does such an individual understand where 
to go to access good quality advice and support?  Understanding the interplay of retirement factors is 
important in knowing how to target resources to support older adults. Naturally, understanding such 
an interplay requires a research paradigm more suited to such research.  
In addition, further work is required to understand the ways in which cyberattacks map onto the 
retirement transition. Oliveira et al. (2017) found that older adults are at particular risk of cyber-
attacks associated with health, finances and legal ideologies. Furthermore, attacks which involved 
reciprocation (an award was given, and the email asked for recompense in the form of positive 
feedback) and social proofing (the incentive to join a holiday club with other similar adults) led to a 
significantly greater frequency of phishing link clicks. It is likely that retirees are particularly 
vulnerable to targeted attacks in domains that relate to their own particular retirement losses. For 
example, an individual in financial difficulties may be more likely to fall foul of financial phishing 
emails, and an individual who has lost a social network may be more likely to fall for holiday or 
romance scams that promise interaction with similar others. Preparing those approaching the 
retirement transition for the challenges they are likely to face, and the associated threats may provide 
an interesting avenue for future cybersecurity interventions. 
Finally, a further limitation of this study is that the sample of participants is not properly 
representative of our wider society, thus a larger, more representative study is required to support the 
findings of this study. Participants in this study were in relatively good health, many were 
homeowners, and most were married or with partners. All of these factors are influential – but to take 
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the last point as an example: the marital relationship influences inter alia post-retirement wellbeing 
(Szinovacz & Davey, 2003), leisure satisfaction (Losier et al., 1993) and decision as to when to retire 
(Smith & Moen, 1998). Additionally, it has also been implicated in specific cybersecurity risks such 
as an increased risk in consumer fraud victimisation in single older adults (Lee & Soberon-Ferrer, 
1997).  
4.7 | Conclusion 
This study sought to investigate how the retirement transition might lead to increased cyber 
vulnerability in older adulthood. Through the use of one to one qualitative interviews with recently 
retired UK older adults, six areas of change were identified which, as a result of retirement, might 
lead to cybersecurity vulnerability. Losses in social support structures, financial stability and 
perceptions of declining competence can lead to changes in the way that technology is perceived and 
used. The changes to a retiree’s technological landscape, in terms of both personal and external 
resources may lead to increases in vulnerability to cyber threats.   
4.8 | Chapter Summary 
This chapter set out to understand the influence of the retirement transition on technology use in 
retired older adults, as a possible antecedent to the cybersecurity vulnerability often discussed in 
relation to older adult populations. Through the identification of the six themes outlined in the chapter, 
this study is able to provide a meaningful contribution to existing literature in that it is the first to 
draw a direct association between retirement as a major life transition, and older adult cybersecurity 
vulnerability. The study is not without weaknesses however, one of which is that no real measure of 
cybersecurity vulnerability was applied within this research. Thus, this chapter has a clear successor 
in a study that seeks to determine whether these factors are indeed prevalent across a wider sample 










Chapter 5: (Study 2): Which Retirement Factors Are Associated with Cybersecurity 
Vulnerability in Retired Older Adults? 
5.1 | Chapter Introduction 
The previous chapter sought to understand how the retirement transition, and the technological 
changes associated with this transition, might lead to opportunities for cybersecurity vulnerabilities 
in older adults. Six key themes were identified relating to losses that participants reported 
experiencing during their transition to retirement with suggestions made as to how these losses might 
subsequently influence security vulnerability. However, although suggestions are made as to how 
these losses might be associated with cybersecurity vulnerability, no such measure of vulnerability 
was used. This study seeks to build upon the foundations laid out by the previous study, scaling the 
study up to a larger sample. Furthermore, it attempts to determine associations between the previously 
identified retirement factors, other factors identified in existing literature, and an objective measure 
which might reflect cybersecurity vulnerability, introduced below. 
5.2 | Background 
In the previous study, six key themes were identified relating to changes experienced during the 
retirement transition in areas of: social interaction, finances, day-to-day routine, feelings of 
competence, sense of purpose and technology support structures. It was suggested that each of these 
areas might in some way be associated with increased cybersecurity vulnerability in older adults 
following the retirement transition. However a key issue in establishing whether these factors are 
associated with online vulnerability, relates to their association with actual cybersecurity 
vulnerability. Here is it important to recall the definition of cybersecurity used by NCSC, that of: 
“how individuals and organisations reduce the risk of cyber-attack”. Using this definition we might 
expect that any behaviour which increases the risk of a cyber-attack might be considered a behaviour 
which in-turn increases cybersecurity vulnerability. Although there are many behaviours which might 
increase the risk of a cyber-attack, some are more obvious than others in their ability to expose an 
individual to online threats.  
One such example is an relates to an individual’s engagement in behaviours which might be 
considered ‘risky’ within a cybersecurity context. Partially based on the security behaviour intention 
scale (SEBIS) (Egelman & Peer, 2015), Hadlington (2017) developed a scale designed to measure a 
range of risky cybersecurity behaviours which, through work with law enforcement and digital 
forensic investigators, were identified as behaviours which had led to organisations being attacked as 
a result of poor security practices. 
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Measuring human factors cybersecurity vulnerability is difficult, especially when one considers the 
wide range of attacks that might target an individual, and the range of behaviours that may dictate the 
outcomes of such an attack (Bowen et al., 2011). Although engagement in risky online behaviours 
does not guarantee that an individual will be attacked, as many more factors are likely to influence 
online victimisation, engagement in such behaviours might be considered likely to increase the risk 
of susceptibility to some online threats. As such, this chapter set out to test the strength of the links 
identified in Chapter 3 by applying the factors identified in Chapter 4 to a larger group of retired older 
adults. 
5.2.1 | Research Hypotheses and Relevant Literature 
In Chapter 4 it was suggested that the loss of social interaction might bring with it avenues for possible 
cybersecurity vulnerability in post-retirement life.  As older adults enter retirement they may seek out 
new social connections, using social media based technology to facilitate such relationships, 
especially when encouraged by family and friends (Tosun, 2012). Some older adults, i.e. those who 
find it difficult to replace lost workplace based relationships, may be at particular risk of certain 
threats. Alves and Wilson (2008) identified that loneliness was a key factor in older adult 
telemarketing fraud victimisation. Although their study was not based in online settings, instead 
focussing on telemarketing phone calls, it demonstrates that loneliness is likely to cause a desire for 
social interaction which produces vulnerabilities that might be exploited. Jang-Jaccard and Nepal 
(2014) outlined that social media presented one of the greatest emerging threats for cybersecurity. 
They explained how frequent users of social media were more likely to be exposed to attacks which 
proliferate through these platforms, such as the ‘Koobface Worm’. This attack was based on a botnet 
which automatically created new accounts on social media sites, befriending unknowing users and 
targeting them with social engineering based spamming attacks, designed to redirect users to 
malware. Typically however, the interaction with these threats is based upon the individual acting in 
response to the attacker’s ‘bait’. Exactly what might be considered the ‘wrong’ behaviour in any such 
attack situation is not always clear, partly because of the attack may be sophisticated, meaning that 
the victim does not know that they are actively partaking within the attack, and partly because some 
behaviours may be considered riskier than others.  Many of the risky behaviours outlined in the 
Hadlington (2017) risky cybersecurity behaviour scale (RScB) might be seen to relate to an 
individual’s social situation and their use of online social networks. For example, one item reflects 
how likely an individual is to accept friend requests on social media based on the profile picture alone. 
Another refers to sharing one’s location on social media, something which could possibly lead to real-
world attacks. Given the suggestions of how a decline in social interaction might relate with a desire 
to foster more online social connections, the following hypothesis was made.  
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Hy1: Lower scores on social interaction measures will be positively associated with 
increased risky cybersecurity behaviours (RScB). 
Financial change was also identified in the previous study as a factor of the retirement transition. 
Being in a strong financial position is likely to allow for a ‘softer’ transition into retirement, with the 
ability to maintain interactions and activities that might not be possible to those who are less 
financially stable. It was suggested in the previous chapter that those who struggle financially, i.e. 
those that have the greatest financial concern, might become more vulnerable to certain types of 
cyber-attacks. However, the way in which financial concerns might influence cybersecurity 
vulnerability can be seen to have two possible avenues: In the first, having greater levels of financial 
concern might act in a protective way, in that losing money is seen as too damaging to those who 
have very little to start off with. From this perspective we would expect that those with greater levels 
of financial concern might act with greater suspicion of threats and take less risks online. Conversely, 
it may be that those who have greater levels of financial concern are more likely to fall foul of scams 
which promise financial incentives. Similarly, those who have greater financial concerns may find 
themselves relying on older, less secure devices, given their affordability, another possible source of 
vulnerability. A lack of finances might also affect the amount and types of cybersecurity support 
available, with some forced to rely upon those who are available, since paying for professional 
support becomes unaffordable (Massimi et al., 2012; Nicholson et al., 2019). Financial concerns may 
also be associated with some of the risky cybersecurity behaviours outlined in the RScB scale. For 
example, one item refers to the likelihood of an individual attempting to download media from 
unlicensed sources. Similarly, another refers to downloading anti-virus software from an unknown 
source, a possible avenue for those who desire security, but do not wish to pay for packages more 
readily available to those who can easily afford them. As a result, the following hypothesis was 
derived:  
Hy2: financial concern will impact RScB scores  
The previous chapter outlined that a loss in an individual’s day to day routine might cause an increase 
in engagement with technology as a result of having more free time. Tosun (2012) set out to 
understand motives for using Facebook use and found that Facebook served a number of purposes. 
Users were motivated by the site’s ability to foster long distance relationships, organise social 
activities, establish new friendships and curb boredom. Their study was however conducted solely in 
undergraduate students, meaning that its applicability to older adults is limited. Far less research has 
sought to understand older adult’s primary uses for social media sites. However it is likely that many 
of the reasons for using such sites extends into other age groups and may be particularly relevant 
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following the retirement transition, when newly retired individuals find themselves looking for 
activities to fill their spare time.  
Bell et al. (2013) sought to understand the reasons behind social media use among older adults. 
Following a survey of 142 American older adults, they suggested that when entering ‘older 
adulthood’, older adults adopt or increase their use of social media to maintain social connectedness, 
something which is seen to be easier than maintaining connections in the real world due to increased 
difficulty with mobility, chronic diseases and age-related issues. These issues are likely to apply more 
to those who are at the older end of the age spectrum but are likely to differ from the youngest older 
adults. For those approaching retirement, or for those who have recently retired, the (younger) older 
adults, are likely to seek out technology use for a number of reasons beyond simply maintaining social 
interaction. Genoe, Liechty, Marston and Sutherland (2016) outline how baby boomers use the 
internet for a range of reasons such as playing games and sharing stories. They conducted a study in 
which they had baby boomers engage in an online blogging community and found that their 
participants enjoyed partaking with their blogs and used them to support each other during their 
transitions into retirement.  
Drawing a direct association between a loss in ones day to day routine and engagement in risky online 
behaviours is likely to be tenuous, however it is plausible that if losing one’s day to day routine means 
engaging in more avenues which pose threats, such as social media (Jang-Jaccard & Nepal, 2014), 
that a loss in day to day routine may offer opportunities for increased vulnerability depending on how 
newly acquired free time is spent. Given the findings of the earlier study which suggest that older 
adults increase their use of social media sites during their transition to retirement, as well as the 
existing literature base which supports this, it follows that older adults will increase their engagement 
in behaviours which might be considered risky in relation to these sites. Furthermore, as day to day 
routine is in itself is unlikely to be an appropriate measure of such increases in technology use, 
increased time spent on the internet and social media (as a proxy measure) may be more likely to 
reflect how this day to day routine is replaced. Given this, the following hypothesis was suggested: 
 Hy3: Time spent using social media will be positively associated with increased RScB 
Although feelings of competence generally decline with age (Salthouse, 2009), the older adults 
interviewed within study 1 outlined that the loss of their workplace-based cognitively demanding 
tasks had meant that they had become increasingly aware of this trend, and attributed their perceived 
cognitive declines to their departure from the workplace. Based on the “use it or lose it” principal, 
previous literature has supported these findings suggesting that retirement leads to increased 
perceptions of subjective cognitive decline (Fleischmann et al., 2017). Although there is some 
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research that supports the impact of retirement on cognitive decline, a recent review by Meng et al. 
(2017) has suggested that literature is conflicting, suggesting only a weak association between the 
loss of fluid crystallized intelligence and the retirement transition.  This, tied to the fact that older 
adults generally see themselves as less competent using technology than younger people (Vaportzis 
et al., 2017), means that older adults may engage in some risky behaviours due to a lack of confidence 
in their own abilities. For example, the item which refers to relying on others for information security 
advice may become particularly relevant to those who lack confidence in their own ability to identify 
threats or overcome security obstacles. This is problematic as older adults typically underestimate 
their ability when compared to younger groups (Marquié et al., 2002), and may in-fact be more 
vulnerable by seeking others’ support, than by attempting to resolve the situation by themselves.  
Similarly, they may feel unable to engage in behaviours such as checking to see whether or not 
software is up to date, leading to subsequent avoidance of these behaviours. Because of this, the 
following hypothesis was made: 
Hy4: higher perceived cognitive decline will be positively associated with increased RScB.  
Within the preceding study, a loss in a sense of purpose was identified as one of the consequences of 
leaving a long-term workplace role. Thoits (2012) outlined that those who have a number of salient 
roles, or who can identify strongly with a specific role, have a stronger sense of purpose, something 
which promotes life satisfaction. When individuals leave the workplace it is likely that they will take 
damage to their sense of self as they lose their professional identity. For those roles which are seen to 
be of high status, individuals departing the workplace are likely to be at even greater risk of ‘role 
damage’. Teuscher (2010) conducted a study in which they asked 792 older adults (aged 58-70) to 
rate the importance of the importance of their role, and to rate the importance of self-descriptive terms 
(based around professional roles, family roles, personal values etc.). Consistent with social identity 
theory, they found that self-description of professional roles into retirement was rated as particularly 
important by those who came from high status occupations. Retirees within their study rated a more 
diverse pool of roles as important for self-description than those older adults still in work. Thus, 
retirees see the importance of establishing and maintaining a range of roles to promote a strong sense 
of purpose in retirement. 
It was suggested in the previous chapter that this role disruption might lead newly retired individuals 
to seek out new roles and activities to replace roles they previously had. Some participants had already 
established roles not based solely on the internet i.e. that of becoming an active grandparent or being 
a member of a group or organisation. Some participants, who had taken on roles such as becoming a 
more active grandparent used technology to mediate this relationship, adopted technology to facilitate 
photo sharing and communication. For some, seeking out new roles within local groups and 
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organisations generally lead to using technology in new and unfamiliar ways, as they were typically 
the youngest users and as such seen to be the most competent with technology. It may be that those 
who are more settled into established roles, i.e. those who have a greater sense of purpose, are less 
likely to engage in risky behaviours to attempt to establish these new roles, thus it can be hypothesised 
that: 
Hy5: higher ratings of sense of purpose will be negatively associated with RScB.  
Possibly the clearest association between workplace losses and cybersecurity vulnerability identified 
in study 1 came from the loss of workplace based technological support structures. For some, the loss 
of these support structures meant seeking out new, paid, IT support. For others who could not afford 
such help, the loss of support structures meant relying on those who were available, or in the event 
that no support was available, being forced to overcome issues themselves. Recent work by Nicholson 
et al. (2019) suggests that older adults are opportunistic when seeking cybersecurity support and 
prioritise those who are immediately available over those who might be considered more qualified to 
help. They suggest a range of sources that older adults use to inform themselves of cybersecurity 
information. These range from authoritative threat-based media such as TV and Radio through to 
coping based unauthoritative sources such as friends, community and peers. If older adults have 
effective, appropriate support then it may be that these older adults are buffered from engaging in 
some of the risky behaviours or have the ability to check whether their behaviours are considered 
risky. For those with more tenuous support structures, or those who only have access to unsupportive 
others, seeking assistance may become difficult. Schreurs, Quan-Haase and Martin (2017) conducted 
a series of interviews with older adults seeking to understand the digital literacy in the context of 
older adult’s ICT use. During their interviews they found that older adults were embarrassed to admit 
that they had low levels of digital literacy, something which is likely to be a barrier to seeking help 
from anyone other than the most supportive of contacts. Given how we might expect the accessibility 
of support structures to be related to engagement in risky online behaviours, the following hypothesis 
was suggested: 
Hy6: Higher scores relating to access to technology support structures will be negatively 
associated with RScB 
In addition to those factors identified in the previous study. Other factors have been identified as 
likely to increase engagement in risky cybersecurity behaviours. For example, Hadlington (2017) 
found that increased scores on impulsivity measures were also significantly associated with increased 
engagement in risky cybersecurity behaviours. In a replication of the original paper by Hadlington 
(2017), Aivazpour and Rao (2018) supported the findings of the original study, suggesting 
correlational relationships between trait impulsivity and engagement in risky online cybersecurity 
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behaviours. Similarly, in the generation of the widely used SEBIS scale,  Egelman and Peer (2015) 
identified that impulsivity was negatively associated with several measures of security, suggesting 
that engagement in security requires foresight, a trait generally found to be lacking in those who are 
most impulsive. More recently, Parsons, Butavicius, Delfabbro and Lillie (2019) conducted a large 
scale study with 985 participants across a variety of age groups and also found that both dispositional 
and situational impulsivity were associated with an increased susceptibility to online social influence, 
suggesting that this trait is likely to be important in understanding security vulnerability. Because of 
this previous work, it can be hypothesised that: 
Hy7: High scores on impulsivity measures will be positively associated with increased 
RScB 
Other traits aside from impulsivity are also likely to be associated with increased engagement in risky 
cybersecurity behaviours. Risk propensity for example, or the trait which determines how motivated 
an individual is to take risks is likely to also influence an individual’s online risk taking, as well as 
the negative repercussions that such behaviour brings. In a study investigating multi-site use of social 
media sites such as Facebook and Google+, Saridakis, Benson, Ezingeard and Tennakoon (2016) 
found that those who had higher scores of risk taking propensity also had higher levels of online 
victimisation. Similar findings were identified by Chen, Wang, Herath and Rao (2011) who used 
structural equation modelling to posit a model of email processing. They identified that an 
individual’s risk propensity was associated with perceptions of emails, in that higher risk propensity 
was associated with a more positive perceptions of emails. Thus, those who are more inclined towards 
risk taking may be at more risk of phishing-based attacks and other such online threats. Their study 
was however limited to a younger sample with an overall mean age of 21.3 years. Whether risk 
propensity is associated with negative online outcomes in older adult samples remains under-
researched, however it can be hypothesised that: 
Hy8: High scores on risk propensity will be positively associated with RScB 
Given that perceptions of cognitive decline were identified as a theme within the previous study, 
related constructs of self-worth, such as self-esteem and self-efficacy, also become interesting when 
considering the impact of the retirement transition. A range of studies have investigated self-worth 
factors (self-efficacy and self-esteem) and how they might be associated with security behaviours. 
Kim and Davis (2009a) conducted a study in which they investigated problematic internet use 
(namely increased addiction to using the internet) in a sample of 279 students. Using structural 
equation modelling with an online survey, they found that those with low self-esteem and increased 
levels of anxiety were more likely to become susceptible to problematic internet use. In a review 
conducted by the centre for protection of national infrastructure (CPNI, 2013), self-esteem was also 
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identified as one of the personality factors associated with increased risk of insider threat, suggesting 
that those with low self-esteem have an increased propensity to engage in inherently risky behaviours.  
As was identified in the previous chapter, it may be that the changes associated with retirement 
exacerbate feelings of low self-worth, driven down by feelings of no longer having a valuable 
contribution to make. If traits such as self-esteem and self-efficacy are likely to influence how an 
individual acts online, there may be avenues of vulnerability which stem from the retirement 
transition in relation to this. It might be expected that feelings of low self-worth would likely lead 
individuals to avoid some behaviours such as searching for updates or proactively engaging with 
security, two components of the RScB scale. Furthermore, some risky behaviours such as using the 
same password for multiple sites might also reflect an individual’s concern, rather than their actual 
ability, to remember passwords (Cook et al., 2011). Although self-efficacy is a recognised construct 
in the extant literature, participants in the earlier study discussed not only a lack of belief in their 
ability, but also beliefs around the negative repercussions they thought might occur as a result of their 
engagement with technology. As a result it may in fact be an individual’s ‘computer self-doubt’ that 
is; their belief that engagement in technology will lead to negative repercussions, that might be of 
particular interest when seeking to understand how retirement losses might lead to increased online 
vulnerability, rather than their general self-efficacy. As a result of the above, the following two 
hypotheses were suggested:  
Hy9: Higher levels of self-esteem will be negatively associated with RScB 
Hy10: Higher levels of computer self-doubt will be positively associated with RScB.  
Finally, another factor which may influence an individual’s engagement in risky behaviours is an 
individual’s general interest in technology. Although this factor is not necessarily tied directly to 
retirement, the free time that retirement brings is likely to allow those who have a passing interest in 
technology to spend more time engaging in and learning to use technology, a sentiment shared by a 
number of participants within the previous study. In a study of 591 older adults, Chopik (2016) 
identified that older adults had generally positive views towards technology, saw utility in its use, but 
suggested that it takes too much time to learn. For those with an interest in technology, retirement 
offers an opportunity to dedicate more time to learning how to use technology. However if this interest 
in technology also leads to users learning through exploration, rather than learning in a supported 
environment, users may unknowingly expose themselves to risks. Furthermore, if those interested in 
technology over-estimate their ability to handle situations, they may become susceptible to the over-
confidence biases demonstrated by the Dunning-Kruger curve. Through 23 interviews with 
employees within a financial institution, Ament and Jaeger (2017) found that those who were 
unconscious of their lack of security knowledge overrated their information systems awareness. 
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Although making generalisations from a small-scale qualitative study is unwise, these findings 
support a wealth of existing literature which highlights that “a little knowledge can be a dangerous 
thing” (Sanchez & Dunning, 2018). As such, those who see themselves as more technology literate 
as a result of their interest in technology may become susceptible to overconfidence, engaging in 
risky behaviours as a result of an underestimation of possible threats that they may become victims 
of. Given this research the following hypothesis was posited: 
Hy11: Higher levels of Interest in technology will be positively associated with RScB 
5.3 | Method 
5.3.1 | Survey Development 
Although items were required for this study, due to the novel nature of investigating the retirement 
transition, few appropriate constructs were in circulation which could be applied. Thus, the first part 
of this study involved the production of a survey and the generation of new items for use within the 
survey. The following section outlines how items were generated and outlines the original sources of 
scales where appropriate. An overview of all items, their sources, and the constructs they were 
designed to reflect, can be seen in Table 3.  
5.3.1.1 | Overview of Items and Constructs Used Within the Survey Instrument 
5.3.1.1.1 | Perception of Cognitive Decline Items 
As is discussed within the introduction and previous chapter, participants in study 1 discussed how 
following departure from the workplace they felt that their cognitive ability was declining, and that 
over time they were becoming less and less competent. Items were created to capture the essence of 
this construct; examples include: “My memory is not what it used to be”, “It takes me longer to learn 
new things” and “Doing complicated tasks takes longer than it used to”.  
5.3.1.1.2 | Day-to-Day Routine Items 
This theme relates to how the loss of one’s day to day routine led to spending more time online. 
Participants discussed how having more free time led to an increase in time spent using the internet 
as they now had time to engage in these pursuits, in addition participants spent a great deal more time 
using social networks. Items were created directly relating to a loss in day to day routine such as “I 
have lots of free time on my hands” and “I am very busy on a day to day basis”. 
Although having more free time due to losing one’s structured routine is unlikely to lead directly to 
vulnerability, there may be added cybersecurity risk simply due to spending more time online (and/or 
interactions with social networks) potentially resulting in increased exposure to threats (Jang-Jaccard 
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& Nepal, 2014). There are a range of behaviours that might be measured to determine the amount of 
time spent online, i.e. Rosen, Whaling, Carrier, Cheever and Rokkum (2013) investigated usage 
across a range of behaviours such as emailing, texting, smartphone, TV etc. As discussed within the 
introduction, it was decided that in this study a social media component would be added as a proxy 
measure of the behaviours likely to increase due to a loss of day to day routine, namely; increased 
time spent on social media and time spent communicating with social media. These were worded to 
reflect to types of social media use as some participants referred to communicating frequently using 
social media, but not scrolling through newsfeeds etc. and vice versa. Thus, a construct for “time 
spent on the internet” was produced with three items; “I spend a lot of time browsing social media 
such as Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, and Twitter etc.” “I spend a lot of time communicating with 
social media such as WhatsApp, Messenger, Facebook” and “I spent a lot of time on the internet”.  
5.3.1.1.3 | Sense of Purpose Items 
In study 1, interviewees discussed how leaving their work role led to damage to their identity and in 
particular, a loss in their sense of purpose. It was suggested that this might lead to the uptake of roles 
which may lead to increases in computer use. In addition, it was suggested that retirees may use the 
internet to facilitate the seeking of new roles, possibly exposing them to online risks during a period 
of uncertainty. Items were created designed to capture the essence of feeling a need for a sense of 
purpose. Items such as “The things I do give me a sense of purpose” and “I want to contribute more” 
were seen to be indicators of current role satisfaction of sense of purpose fulfilment. The questions 
selected in this construct were adapted from existing sense of purpose scales such as the Life Regard 
Index (Battista & Almond, 1973) (see Bronk (2014) for a review).  
5.3.1.1.4 | Support Structure Items 
This construct refers to the loss of technical support structures that were previously relied upon for 
technological support before the transition into retirement. It was suggested that when individuals are 
forced to make decisions on their own, or rely on less knowledgeable support structures, they may 
become at greater risk and may engage in riskier behaviour. Questions such as “I know people who 
could help me if I had a problem with my computer or phone” and “Other people encourage me to 
use technology” were designed to gather data on the availability of technological support options. 
Items were adapted from questions within the Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support 
(Zimet et al., 1988). 
79 
 
5.3.1.1.5 | Financial Concern Items 
For those who experienced greater levels of financial loss following retirement, financial concern led 
to uncertainty and may have provoked a range of cybersecurity related outcomes such as using older 
outdated devices as a result of the lack of affordability of more secure, newer devices; or costly 
professional IT help. It was therefore suggested that having greater financial concern would lead to 
greater engagement in risky behaviours and thus items such as “I worry about money” and “I have 
concerns about my financial situation” were addressed to gather data relating to financial comfort in 
retirement.  
5.3.1.1.6 | Social Interaction Items 
The social interaction theme highlighted ways in which social interaction changed following 
retirement. Social circles became smaller with less opportunities to socialize as friends remained in 
work. This reduction of social options may lead to feelings of loneliness and isolation. Furthermore, 
an increase in loneliness may lead to increases in internet use older adults using to facilitate social 
interaction and replace face to face interaction. Thus, items were produced relating to loneliness and 
isolation “I often feel left out” and “I spend the majority of my time alone”. These items were adapted 
from items used in the Hughes et al. (2004) 3-item loneliness scale.  
5.3.1.1.7 | Other Construct Items 
Aside from those identified from the thematic analysis in chapter 3, other constructs were included 
as discussed within the introduction: Interest in Technology, Computer self-doubt, and Impulsivity. 
These constructs were identified from previous literature on the retirement transition as well as some 
aspects of cybersecurity vulnerability. Interest in technology items and computer self-doubt both 
required the creation of new items. For interest in technology 3 items were included based on the 
Technology Affinity items used by Edison and Geissler (2003) and the MTAUS (Rosen et al., 2013). 
These items provided a general overview of the individuals attitude towards using technology. Items 
were also produced to reflect ‘Computer Self-Doubt’. Items such as “I am likely to make a mistake 
on my computer that will lead to me losing my data/photos” and “I am likely to make a mistake on 
my computer that will lead to me losing money” were designed to reflect findings of chapter 4 
whereby older adults discussed how they believed that their actions were likely to lead to online 
negative consequences. Further discussion as to the difference between CSD as a construct and how 
it differs from similar constructs such as computer self-efficacy are provided in section 5.5.1.1 of the 
discussion. The items which reflect these constructs, as well as a full overview of the items created 
to reflect the constructs above can be seen in Table 3 below, 
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Content validity of the items was established through discussion with the research supervisors and 
using existing scales where possible. Each item was examined and discussed in relation to its 
construct as well as its overall contribution to the scale. In this way, a much larger pool of items was 
condensed into a shorter, more appropriate survey. Likert scale lengths were adapted to ensure that 
the scale fit more closely together (i.e. Likert scales that were previously 3 points long were adapted 
to be 8 points long to fit with other questions). No assertions of the validity of the newly adapted 
scales can be made and because of this, prior to analysis, the constructs were subjected to exploratory 

























Table 3 Survey Items for Use in Study 2 and Original Sources 
Item Source Construct 
I am happy with my financial position (reversed) 
Newly Created Financial Concern I have concerns about my financial situation I worry about money 
I often feel left out Hughes et al (3 item loneliness 
scale, 2004) Loneliness  I often feel isolated from others 
I spend the majority of my time alone 
Newly Created Isolation I live in an isolated location 
In times of need there are people I can turn to 
I know people who could help me if I had a 
problem with my computer or phone Zimet (1988) MSPSS Support Structures Other people encourage me to use technology 
I don't have a role to play 
Bronk, 2014 (review of sense of 
purpose scales) Items inspired by 
scales such as Life Regard Index 
(Battista & Almond, 1973) 
Sense of 
Purpose 
The things I do give me a sense of purpose 
I feel like I don't have anything to contribute 
I am looking for something to give me a sense of 
purpose 
I want to contribute more 
Losing my job was like losing a part of myself 
I have lots of free time on my hands Newly Created Day to Day Routine I am very busy on a day to day basis 





I find it harder to learn new things 
My memory is not what it used to be 
It takes me longer to learn new things 
Doing complicated tasks takes longer than it used 
to 
I spend a lot of time browsing social media such 
as Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, Twitter etc. 




I spend a lot of time communicating with social 
media such as WhatsApp, Messenger, Facebook 
etc. 
I spend a lot of time on the internet 
I enjoy using technology Rosen et al. (2013) - MTAUS 
Edison and Geissler (2003) 




I like to keep up to date with developments in 
technology 
I am comfortable learning new technology 
I think I am likely to be a victim of a cyber-attack 
Newly Created Computer Self Doubt 
I am likely to make a mistake on my computer 
that will lead to me losing my data/photos 
I am likely to make a mistake on my computer 
that will lead to me losing money 
I am a very impulsive person 
ABIS (Coutlee et al 2014) (Motor 
sub scale) Impulsivity I tend to act without thinking 
I become fidgety if I have to wait 
82 
 
5.3.1.2 | Existing Scales Added to the Survey 
Alongside the scale developed based on the constructs identified within the existing interviews, 
discussed above, some existing validated short scales were also included. These are detailed below. 
5.3.1.2.1 | Risky Cyber Security Behaviours Scale (RScB) 
The scale used as a dependent variable was a modified version of the 20-item Risky Cyber Security 
Behaviours Scale (RScB) (Hadlington, 2017). Item wording was kept as consistent as possible 
however changes were made to occupational based items to reflect the fact that participants were no 
longer in a workplace setting. In addition, instead of items reflecting the number of behaviours 
exhibited in a pre-defined timescale (such as the past 3,6 or 12 months), items were placed on a 9-
point Likert scale (0 – Strongly Disagree – 8 – Strongly Agree) with questions modified slightly to 
reflect this scaleAlthough a lack of psychometric instruments is a current issue in the human factors 
cybersecurity research landscape, there are some notable scales such as the HAIS-Q (McCormac et 
al., 2017) and SEBIS (Egelman et al., 2016) which do aim to measure cybersecurity behaviours and 
as such which could have been used within this study. Despite this, many items included in these 
scales either are based too heavily in the workplace (such as the HAIS-Q) or may be too jargon-filled 
(SEBIS) to be understood appropriately by older adult samples. The RScB was chosen for use in this 
study as it includes a wide range of behaviours (downloading, clicking links, storing information etc.), 
Moreover this scale provides this wide range of behaviours in a relatively jargon free, easy to 
understand format. This was seen to be particularly important considering that older adults typically 
struggle when faced with security jargon (Cook et al., 2011). The full list of RScB items can be seen 











Table 4 Risky Cybersecurity Behaviour Scale (RScB) - (Hadlington, 2017) 
 
5.3.1.2.2 | Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSE) 
 A short version (10 items) of the original 40 item (Rosenberg, 1965) was used to measure self-
esteem. This widely used scale is considered a valid and reliable tool for measuring self-esteem (Gray-
Little et al., 1997; Tomaka et al., 1993). Self-esteem was included as it reflects a measure of self-
worth likely to decline alongside the retirement transition as a result of declining feelings of 
competence and identity outlined in study 1. A full of the Rosenberg (1965) items can be seen in table 
5 below. Items were measured on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from Strongly Agree (1) to Strongly 





Num Items  
1 I share passwords with people close to me, for some things (Netflix, Spotify etc.)  
2 My passwords are not very complicated (e.g. family, name, date of birth etc.)  
3 I use the same password for multiple websites  
4 I use online storage systems such as Dropbox to exchange and keep personal or sensitive information  
5 I enter payment information on websites that have no clear security information/certification  
6 I use free-to-access public Wi-Fi  
7 I rely on a trusted friend or colleague to advise me on aspects of online security  
8 I download free antivirus software from unknown sources  
9 I disable the anti-virus on my computer so that I can download things from websites  
10 I used to bring my own USB device into work in order to transfer data onto it  
11 I check that software for my smartphone/tablet/laptop/pc is up to date.  
12 I download digital media (music, films, games from unlicensed sources)  
13 I share my current location on social media  
14 I accept friend requests on social media if I recognize the photo  
15 I click on links contained within unsolicited emails from unknown sources  
16 I send personal information to strangers over the internet  
17 I click on links contained in emails from trusted friends or old work colleagues  
18 I check for updates to any antivirus software I have installed  
19 I used to download data and material from websites on my work computer without checking the authenticity  
20 I have stored company information on my personal electronic devices (smartphone, tablet, laptop etc.)  
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Table 5 Rosenberg (1965) 10-item Self-Esteem Scale 
Items 
On the whole, I am satisfied with myself 
At times, I think I am no good at all 
I take a positive attitude toward myself 
I am able to do things as well as most other people 
I feel I do not have much to be proud of 
I certainly feel useless at times 
I feel that I’m a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others 
I wish I could have more respect for myself 
All in all I am inclined to feel that I am a failure 
I will be able to achieve most of the goals that I have set for myself. 
 
5.3.1.2.3 | Risk Propensity Scale (RPS) 
The Risk Propensity Scale (Meertens & Lion, 2008) was used as a short (7-item) measure of 
propensity to take risks. This was also included to determine the impact of trait risk propensity as a 
predictive factor of risky online cybersecurity behaviour. The risk propensity items used within this 
study can be seen in Table 6 below. Items on the RPS were measured on a 9 point Likert scale where 
1 represented ‘totally disagree’ and 9 represented ‘totally agree’. 
Table 6 The 7-Item Risk Propensity Scale (Meertens & Lion, 2008) 
Items 
Safety First 
I do not take risks with my health 
I prefer to avoid risks 
I am nervous about what the future holds for me 
I really dislike not knowing what is going to happen 
I usually view risks as a challenge 
I view myself as a ‘risk seeker’ 
 
5.3.1.3 | Piloting of Items 
5.3.1.3.1 | Online Sample Piloting 
Prior to full study rollout, a small-scale pilot study was conducted with 4 Male and 2 Female older 
adults who had previously taken part in study 1. This ensured that the questions were clear, easy to 
understand and reflected the content of the earlier interviews. Items were slightly modified following 
this phase, based on their suggestions. Participants in this sample were sent an email link to the survey 
and were asked to complete it. This also allowed for a feasibility and acceptability check of the online 
survey distribution software. 
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5.3.1.3.2 | Walkthrough Interview 
Following the email piloting of items, a final survey was drafted. One participant who had previously 
taken part in study 1 was invited to take part in a ‘think-aloud’ walkthrough of the final scale. This 
involved the participant vocalizing their thoughts as they completed the questionnaire. As well as 
probing into these vocalizations, questions were asked about readability and clarity of questions. This 
led to a range of minor changes including item order, wording and item length, which aided in the 
clarity of the survey. 
5.3.1.3.3 | Participants and Online Survey Distribution  
The final instrument was distributed online using an online survey data collection company 
(CriticalMix) in December 2018. Only UK participants were included within the distribution with the 
only other inclusion criteria being that participants were required to be retired. Participants were paid 
a small amount (less than £2) by CriticalMix to thank them for taking part in the study. In total, 663 
respondents accessed the survey; however, a large number of responses were removed for various 
reasons such as unfinished surveys. Following data cleansing, a total of 362 responses were taken 
through to analysis. An overview of participant demographics can be seen in Table 7 and an overview 
of the specific reasons for response removal can be seen in Figure 5.  
 
Table 7 Study 2 Participant Demographics 
 
 
Sex n % Age: Min Max Mean (SD) 
Male 154 42.5 56 87 70.16 (4.61) 
Female 208 57.5 63 84 70.06 (4.48) 
   Overall: 70.10 (4.53) 
Education Level n % Relationship 
Status 
n % 
Master’s Degree or Equivalent 10 2.8 Married 206 56.9 
Postgraduate Diploma or 
equivalent 
12 3.3 Widowed 54 14.9 
Undergraduate degree or 
equivalent 
55 15.2 Divorced 50 13.8 
A-Level or equivalent 83 22.9 Single 16 4.4 
GCSE/O-Level or Equivalent 116 32.0 Separated 7 1.9 
No Formal Qualifications 86 23.8 Living with 
Partner 
27 7.5 
   Other 2 .6 
663 Initial 
 Responses 













5.4 | Results 
5.4.1 | Treatment of Data 
Data was screened to determine levels of missing data. Levels of missing data were low across most 
items of the dependent variable (MMissing=1.23%), however there was a spike in missing data for both 
items 11 (73/362 - 20.2%) and 18 (39/362 - 10.8%). These items were semantically linked, referring 
to updating behaviours. Missing data within these items is discussed further within the discussion 
section, however for the purpose of the analysis these two items were dropped from the regression 
analysis to avoid bias from substantive imputation. This decision was made as the scale was 
previously un-validated and thus its use in this study remains exploratory. Due to the low missing 
values for the rest of the items in relation to the sample size, the rest of the items used mean 
substitution to replace any missing values.  
5.4.2 | Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) 
As a first step, EFA was conducted to ensure that items loaded onto their appropriate factors with 
appropriate loading strength. Prior to factor analysis, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy (KMO) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity were investigated to determine the factorability and 
thus suitability of the data for factor analysis. Initial KMO was .832 and Bartlett’s test was significant 
(p<.001). These values are greater than the recommended cut off values of KMO>.60 and Bartlett’s 
87 
 
significance (p<.05) indicating that the data was appropriate for further factor analysis (Carpenter, 
2018). 
5.4.2.1 | Extraction and Rotation 
Principal Axis Factoring with Varimax Rotation were used as the preferred method of factor 
extraction and rotation. Multiple extraction techniques were used to decide on the number of factors 
extracted, namely, theoretical underpinning, investigation of the scree plot, and eigenvalues greater 
than one (in accordance with published guidance (e.g. Williams et al., 2010).  
5.4.2.2 | Item Removal and Final Factor Structure 
Item removal was conducted after considering a range of factors. Firstly, the pattern matrix was 
assessed for non-loadings, cross-loadings and weak loadings (<.40). Secondly, the communalities 
table was assessed to determine which factors shared the least variance with the other factor items 
(As recommended by Worthington and Whittaker (2006)), lastly, before any removal decision was 
made, items were considered in relation to their theoretical background and construct structure. 
5.4.2.3 | Initial Factor Model 
The initial extracted model consisted of 7 factors. The 7-factor solution explained 65.68% of the 
variance. The amount of variance explained by each factor can be seen in Table 8. The rotated factor 
pattern matrix, its items, and their associated loadings can be seen in Table 9. The final model had 
KMO of .802 and Bartlett’s significance (p<.001).  
The factor analysis loaded as expected for of the pre-defined constructs. There was one exception to 
this, however. Items from three factors (isolation, sense of purpose and loneliness) loaded together 
suggesting a shared relationship between these items. On closer inspection, these items were seen to 
reflect a sense of social disconnectedness. Cornwell and Waite (2009) define social disconnectedness 
as a “lack of social relationships and low levels of participation in social activities”. Although this 
definition does not include a sense of purpose, it may be that participation in social activities 
contributes towards feelings of purpose. Indeed Prager (1996) reviewed evidence relating to meaning 
in life and found that leisure activities formed part of older adult’s sense of meaning. Thus, the pre-
defined constructs were combined, and social disconnectedness was used as a factor in further 
analysis. Given this, the three hypotheses relating to the factors that were combined were revised in 
to one hypothesis. Figure 6 shows a visual representation of this grouping.  
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  Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 







1  5.715 23.813 23.813 3.549 14.786 14.786 
2  3.024 12.599 36.412 3.153 13.137 27.923 
3  2.040 8.498 44.910 2.269 9.455 37.377 
4  1.454 6.058 50.968 2.034 8.476 45.854 
5  1.401 5.839 56.807 1.808 7.532 53.385 
6  1.113 4.635 61.443 1.583 6.597 59.982 
7  1.017 4.239 65.682 1.368 5.700 65.682 
H1: Lower scores on Social Interaction measures will 
be positively associated with increased risky 
cybersecurity behaviours (RScB). 
Hy5: higher ratings of a sense of purpose will 
be negatively associated with RScB.  
H12: Higher Scores on measures 
of social disconnectedness will be 
positively associated with RScB + 




Table 9 Rotated Factor Matrix with Final 7 Factor Structure 
 
 Factor 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
22. It takes me longer to learn new things 0.868       
21. My memory is not what it used to be 0.839       
20. I find it harder to learn new things 0.809       
23. Doing complicated tasks takes longer than it used to 0.809       
19. I don't feel as mentally sharp anymore 0.700       
6. I often feel isolated from others  0.880      
5. I often feel left out  0.770      
12. I feel like I don't have anything to contribute  0.687      
13. I am looking for something to give me a sense of purpose  0.607      
10. I don't have a role to play  0.587      
7. I spend the majority of my time alone  0.499      
30. I am comfortable learning new technology   0.861     
29. I like to keep up to date with developments in technology   0.838     
28. I enjoy using technology   0.816     
3. I have concerns about my financial situation    0.929    
4. I worry about money    0.776    
2**. I am happy with my financial position (reversed)    0.672    
34. I am likely to make a mistake on my computer that will lead to me losing my data/photos     0.820   
35. I am likely to make a mistake on my computer that will lead to me losing money     0.746   
33. I think I am likely to be a victim of a cyber-attack     0.543   
25. I spend a lot of time communicating with social media such as WhatsApp, Messenger, 
Facebook etc.      0.861  
24. I spend a lot of time browsing social media such as Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, 
Twitter etc.      0.859  
38. I am a very impulsive person       0.826 
39. I tend to act without thinking       0.788 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 





5.4.2.4 | Internal Consistency / Reliability 
Since modifications were made to the RScB scale, internal consistency was measured using 
Cronbach’s Alpha (CA) (Cronbach, 1951). Following removal of items 11 and 18 due to high 
levels of missing data, the scale showed high levels of internal consistency (CA=.82). Internal 
consistency checks were then conducted on the constructs resulting from the above-reported EFA. 
For most construct scales, Cronbach’s Alpha was used as a measure of internal consistency, 
however some sub-scales of the questionnaire had only two items, something which has been 
argued to make Cronbach’s alpha meaningless in determining internal consistency (see Eisinga 
et al. (2013) for a review). Thus, for these items Spearman-Brown Split Half Statistics were also 
reported as a more acceptable measure of consistency. Spearman Brown statistics work in a 
similar way to Cronbach’s alpha in that a value of closer to one represent higher internal 
consistency. The Spearman Brown and Cronbach’s Alpha statistics can also be seen in Table 10 
below.  






5.4.3 | Regression Analysis 
5.4.3.1 | Assumptions of Multiple Regression and Outliers 
Prior to running multiple regression, the assumptions of regression were tested to ensure that the 
analysis was a valid methodology. Tests were conducted investigating normality, linearity, 
homoscedasticity, multicollinearity and finally independence of errors. In addition to these tests 
screening for outliers was conducted using Mahalanobis distance as well as visual inspection of 
partial plots. 
Mahalanobis Distance and partial plots were observed to check for multivariate outliers. 
Assessment of the plots as well as significant chi square values (p<.001) led to the removal of 4 
outliers which were otherwise likely to leverage the regression model. Inspection of scatter plots 
indicated no issues with linearity. P-P plots were examined to check normality within the data. 
The points within the P-P plot did not demonstrate any significant deviation from the normality 
line and thus normality was assumed. The highest VIF value was 2.180, indicating no issues with 
collinearity in the data. Visual inspection of the scatterplot suggested some heteroscedasticity in 
Sub-Scale (Factor number) Items Cronbach’s Alpha or Split Half 
Computer Self-Doubt (1) 33, 34, 35 .77 
Time on Social Media (2) 24, 25 .88* 
Impulsivity (3) 38, 39 .81* 
Social Disconnectedness (4) 5, 6, 7, 10, 12, 13 .85 
Perceived Cognitive Decline (5) 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 .92 
Interest in Technology (6) 28, 29, 30 .89 
Financial Concerns (7) 2*, 3, 4 .85 
*= Spearman’s split half statistic used due to 2 item scale 
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the data and thus standard error corrections were used to account for this using the RLM procedure 
SPSS plugin method HC3, as recommended by Hayes and Cai (2007).  
5.4.3.2 | Regression Model 
A multiple regression analysis was carried out to determine which of the identified factors, if any, 
significantly predicted total risky cybersecurity behaviour score. Saved factor regression 
coefficients from the earlier factor analysis were entered into a multiple regression model using 
the Enter method in SPSS V25.0.0. Saved factor regressions were used over raw scores as items 
were measured on Likert scales of varying length, and standardising these through the use of 
factor regression scores removes any issues that this may have caused. 
The result of the regression model (Table 11) suggests a significant regression model 
(F(9,357)=11.24, p<.001, R2=.34). The following 8 factors were found to be significant predictors 
of risky cybersecurity behaviours together explaining 34% of the variance: social 
disconnectedness, impulsivity, time on social media, computer self-doubt, self-esteem, risk 
propensity, perceived cognitive decline and technology interest. The remaining factor, financial 
concern, was not found to be a significant predictor of risky cybersecurity behaviours.  
Table 11 Regression Model with HC3 SE Correction 
Given the outcome of the regression model, Table 12 demonstrates the outcomes of the 
hypothesised relationships outlined within the introduction.  
 
 
Coefficient B SE (HC3) t p 
constant 38.76 0.68 57.40 .000** 
Computer self-doubt 6.70 1.18 5.68 .000** 
Time on social media 4.78 0.77 6.19 .000** 
Impulsivity 2.87 0.94 3.07 .002* 
Social disconnectedness 2.74 0.86 3.17 .002* 
Perceived cognitive decline 2.39 0.76 3.16 .002* 
Self-esteem (z) 2.07 0.96 2.16 .032* 
Interest in technology 1.62 0.68 2.39 .017* 
Risk propensity (z) 1.58 0.69 2.27 .024* 
Financial concern 0.46 0.71 0.65 .518 
R2 = .34, R2Adjusted = .32 (p<.001) *=p<.05 **=p<.001 
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Table 12 Study 2 Table of Hypotheses 
 
Given the findings of the regression analysis, hypotheses 3, 4, 7, 8, 10 and 11 can be accepted. 
Factors reflecting losses in day to day routine, perceptions of cognitive decline, impulsivity, risk 
propensity, computer self-doubt and interest in technology were all found to be significantly 
positively associated with risky cybersecurity behaviours, suggesting that as each of these factors 
increases, so does engagement in such behaviours.  
Given the loadings of loneliness, isolation and sense of purpose items into one factor (social 
disconnectedness), hypotheses 1 and 5 can only be partially accepted. Although they did not 
independently load into factors of their own, it can be argued that the essence of loneliness, 
isolation and a loss in a sense of purpose, and the hypothesised reasons as to why these constructs 
might go on to promote engagement in risky behaviours might still be reflected within social 
disconnectedness, however future research is required here. Further discussion around this newly 
created construct is included within the discussion section below.  
Finally, financial concern was the only predictor not found to be significant within the regression 
model, thus for this construct the null hypothesis must be accepted and the suggested hypothesis 
rejected. This finding suggests that no those who have increased financial concerns do not 





H Hypothesised Constructs (IV’s) Hypothesised 





1 Loss of Social Interaction + Removed P 
2 Financial Concern ~ n.s. N 
3 Time on Social Media + + Y 
4 Perceived Cognitive Decline + + Y 
5 Sense of purpose - Removed P 
6 Access to technology support 
structure 
- FTL N 
7 Impulsivity + + Y 
8 Risk Propensity + + Y 
9 Self Esteem - + N 
10 Computer Self Doubt + + Y 
11 Interest in Technology + + Y 
12 Social Disconnectedness** + + Y 
n.s.= non-significant regression coefficient. ~=non directional hyp P = as factors did not emerge from factor 
analysis, instead grouping together into social disconnectedness, the related hypotheses can only be partially 
accepted. **=hypothesis added after FA grouping. Removed = Hypotheses no longer valid following FA. 
FTL: construct failed to load during factor analysis. 
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5.5 | Discussion 
The aim of this study was to investigate how certain factors resulting from the retirement 
transition might be associated with engagement in online risky behaviours. Eight factors were 
found to be significant predictors of risky cybersecurity behaviours and each of these 8 factors is 
addressed below. Financial concern was the only predictor not found to be a significant predictor 
of risky cybersecurity behaviours. 
5.5.1 | Factors Associated with Retirement and Risky Cybersecurity Behaviours 
5.5.1.1 | Computer Self-Doubt 
Computer Self-Doubt (CSD) predicted risky cybersecurity behaviours (RScB), thus those who 
doubted their ability to use the internet without negative repercussions, engaged in risky online 
behaviour more often than those who did not. CSD was also the strongest predictor in the 
regression model suggesting a stronger relationship between these two factors than other 
predictors. Previous research in HCI has often focused on computer self-efficacy or digital 
literacy in general when considering the emotional link to computer use behaviour. Digital 
literacy refers to one’s ability to use a computer, and previous research which has investigated 
this in the context of older adults has found it to be a significant obstacle in older adults’ 
engagement with technology. This especially the case in those lacking social or institutional 
support (Schreurs et al., 2017). Computer Self-Efficacy on the other hand refers “an individual's 
perceptions of his or her ability to use computers in the accomplishment of a task” (Compeau & 
Higgins, 1995). Although no previous literature has used the terminology “Computer Self-
Doubt”, it was decided that these questions derived for use in this study differed semantically 
from standard measures of self-efficacy and digital literacy; the items address the perceived 
likelihood of negative outcomes as a result of one’s behaviours, rather than a lack of efficacy in 
general. This negative focus may contribute to understanding the negative affect that older adults 
are often reported to have with regards to technology. 
It may be that older adults who engage in risky behaviours are aware of their poor technological 
ability and thus can report doubt in their ability to interact with technology safely, especially if 
they have experienced negative repercussions of their actions in the past. Alternatively, it may be 
that older adults are engaging in risky behaviours and simply doubt their ability, although both 
factors are related, it may be that that this relationship simply reflects the overly-pessimistic 
perceptions of low technological ability in older adults (Marquié et al., 2002) and thus this 
relationship may be illusory regardless. There is also some crossover between this factor and 
one’s perception of cognitive decline, as both are underlined by perceived declines in one’s 
ability, this may therefore have direct implications for cybersecurity behaviours, something 
discussed further below.  
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5.5.1.2 | Time on Social Media  
Time spent on social media was a significant predictor of RScB score. This suggests that higher 
amounts of time spent on social media are associated with higher engagement in risky online 
behaviours. The limited research conducted in this area suggests that spending more time online 
results in more risky behaviours in adolescents (Gebremeskel et al., 2014) and those who spend 
more time online are more likely to act more riskily both offline (Branley & Covey, 2017) and 
online (Fogel & Nehmad, 2009). In addition, Jang-Jaccard and Nepal (2014) suggest that social 
media is a growing source of cybersecurity threats, something outlined within study 1. Increasing 
amounts of time spent on social media are likely to lead to greater opportunities to be exposed to 
online threats. Future research should investigate if and how older adults might influence each 
other in terms of misinformation and promoting risky cybersecurity behaviours as well as 
investigating the factors associated with both increased cybersecurity risk taking as well as time 
on social media to determine how these two factors are related. In addition, future research should 
attempt to investigate how objective measures of time spent online relate to increased 
vulnerability to cyber risks. 
5.5.1.3 | Impulsivity 
Impulsivity was found to be a significant predictor of RScB, i.e. those who reported higher scores 
of impulsivity also reported higher likelihood of engaging in risky behaviours online. This result 
is in line with existing research on factors predicting risky online behaviour (Briggs et al., 2017). 
The original paper which developed the RScB (Hadlington, 2017) also found that impulsivity 
predicted risky online behaviour when using the unmodified version of the scale. Both Hadlington 
(2017) and a replication study conducted by Aivazpour and Rao (Aivazpour & Rao, 2018) found 
that motor and attentional impulsivity predicted risky cybersecurity behaviours. It has previously 
been suggested that impulsivity should not be viewed as a single construct however and thus 
future research should attempt to parse out the intricacies of how different forms of impulsivity 
(attentional, motor or non-planning) influence cybersecurity. Contrary to earlier research by 
Egelman et al., (2016), Hadlington (2017) found that the non-planning element of impulsivity led 
to a negative influence on cybersecurity behaviours. This was not mirrored in the replication study 
by Aivazpour aand Rao (2018) however and suggests that some forms of impulsivity (especially 
motor) are more likely to be implicated in increasing cybersecurity vulnerability than others. 
Future research should aim to elucidate the extent to which impulsivity influences negative 
cybersecurity outcomes, and how motor impulsivity specifically might impact other forms of 
cybersecurity vulnerability, other than engagement in risky behaviours.  
5.5.1.4 | Social Disconnectedness 
Social disconnectedness was a significant predictor of risky cybersecurity behaviours, suggesting 
that those who are more socially disconnected are more likely to engage in risky cybersecurity 
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behaviours. It is possible that being socially connected allows retirees more opportunities to seek 
advice when needed (Nicholson et al., 2019), may lead to greater levels of external support, and 
may act as a source of knowledge that older adults can use to update themselves on what 
constitutes risky cybersecurity behaviours (Das et al., 2018). Although research explicitly linking 
social disconnectedness and technology is scarce, recent findings by Sinclair and Grieve (Sinclair 
& Grieve, 2017) suggest that Facebook use can act as a source of social capital in older adults, 
facilitating social connectedness. Further research should investigate cybersecurity vulnerability 
in those who are socially isolated or socially disconnected to determine what vulnerabilities may 
be unique to this population. 
5.5.1.5 | Perceived Cognitive Decline 
A relationship was found between perceptions of cognitive decline and RScB, with greater levels 
of perceived cognitive decline leading to higher likelihood to engage in risky online behaviours. 
Meng et al. (2017) reviewed literature in this area and found conflicting evidence in the domain 
of the retirement transition and how this influences cognitive decline. Previous research has 
indicated that older adults are likely to worry unnecessarily about cognitive decline, with 
perceptions of cognitive decline (or memory worries) being poor predictors of actual cognitive 
decline (Jorm et al., 1994, 1997). They did however find that increased levels of memory 
complaints were related to symptoms of anxiety, depression and personality traits such as 
neuroticism (Jorm et al., 1994, 1997). Mol et al. (2006) found that neither forgetfulness, nor taking 
steps to remain cognitively active, influenced performance on cognitive tasks over a 6 year follow 
up period. They also suggest that depression and anxiety may underlie forgetfulness. It may then 
be that retirement leads to feelings of anxiety and uncertainty based on the life changes 
experienced during the retirement transition and these feelings, combined with the social 
normative perception of “use it or lose it” may go on to drive feelings of perceived cognitive 
decline, rather than lead to actual cognitive decline. The overarching point of the inclusion of 
perceived cognitive decline into this chapter however was to determine the influence of perceived 
cognitive decline on engagement with risky online behaviour and thus cybersecurity vulnerability.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, Protection Motivation Theory (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997) is a 
psychological model of behaviour which stipulates that behaviour is driven by a balance of a 
threat appraisal and a coping appraisal. A decision to act is made when ones coping appraisal is 
perceived as stronger than a perceived threat. This model may be useful when considering how 
perceived cognitive decline influences cybersecurity behaviour. It is likely that the appraisal of 
threats (perceived vulnerability vs perceived severity) in older adults is influenced by one’s 
sources of information regarding cybersecurity threats such as radio or television advertising 
(Nicholson et al., 2019) as well as extant beliefs that responsibility for security is diffused to other 
sources (Blythe et al., 2015), particularly in those newly retired. Likewise, if the workplace acts 
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as an up-to-date source of information about threats (Briggs et al., 2017), then departure from the 
workplace may result in changing threat perceptions of what constitutes risky behaviours, 
especially considering the changeability of the online environment. Older adults may rely on 
knowledge provided to them during their time in the workplace, possibly leading to them engage 
in outdated security behaviours. Perceived cognitive decline may influence one’s threat appraisal, 
however it is more likely to influence one’s coping appraisal.  
Coping appraisal consists of a balance between one’s response efficacy, or appraisal of one’s 
ability to cope and response costs, and the perception of resources required to put forward a 
response behaviour (i.e. time, effort etc.). If following retirement, an individual perceives 
themselves to be declining cognitively, they may be particularly at risk of poorly appraising their 
response efficacy. Previous research has shown relationships between low self-efficacy and 
engagement in a range of cybersecurity behaviours (see Briggs et al. (2016) for a review), thus 
such a change may directly influence engagement in protective security behaviours. 
5.5.1.6 | Self-Esteem  
Self-esteem was found to positively predict RScB, i.e. those who had higher levels of self-esteem 
engaged in riskier online behaviours. Very few previous studies have explored how self-esteem 
influences cybersecurity vulnerability, however previous literature has investigated how self-
esteem influences problematic internet use (PIU) (Kim & Davis, 2009). The findings of Kim and 
Davis (2009) suggest that greater levels of self-esteem are related to positive outcomes such as 
lower PIU scores. The findings presented here suggest a relationship to the contrary when 
considering risky online behaviours, for which there may be a number of reasons.  
Firstly, participants may not see their behaviour as risky, and thus their ability and confidence in 
themselves does not influence their behavioural decisions. Secondly these results may reflect the 
result of unrealistic optimism i.e. participants with high self-esteem may demonstrate 
overconfidence in their ability to deal with threats and thus engage in risky behaviours regardless 
of the consequences. Future research should aim to investigate how self-esteem may lead to other 
forms of cybersecurity vulnerability outside of risky online behaviours.  
5.5.1.7 | Interest in Technology 
Limited existing research has investigated how perceptions and attitudes towards technology 
influence cybersecurity vulnerability, particularly in older adults. The results of this study suggest 
that older adults that have more positive attitudes towards technology are more likely to engage 
in RScB. It may simply be that those who have more positive attitudes towards technology are 
more likely to engage with technology and thus have greater exposure to various forms of risky 
behaviour. Previous research has demonstrated that older adults are eager to use technology for a 
range of purposes (Vaportzis et al., 2017) however the relationship between interest in technology 
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and risky cybersecurity behaviours suggests that although older adults are keen to engage in 
technology, without support this may be a risky endeavour. 
5.5.1.8 | Risk Propensity 
Alongside the other predictors mentioned above, propensity to take risks was a significant 
predictor of RScB. This suggests that those who have a higher propensity to take risks in general 
are more likely to engage in RScB. This result is perhaps unsurprising; however it does provide 
interesting insight that risk taking propensity in general may extend into an online environment. 
This result supports similar findings that demonstrate that propensity to take risks is associated 
with poorer information security awareness, another likely predictor of cybersecurity 
vulnerability (McCormac et al., 2017).  It may be that offline risk taking, depending on the 
strength of the relationship between online and offline, may be useful for predicting online risk-
taking behaviours in future. Some existing literature has indeed demonstrated that online and 
offline risk taking are associated (Branley & Covey, 2017) and as such those who take dangerous 
risks in an offline environment e.g. excessive gambling, may become particularly vulnerable to 
similar threats in a much more accessible online environment. Clearly however there are issues 
with establishing cause and effect, but this relationship offers an interesting avenue for future 
research.   
5.5.1.9 | Use of the RScB scale 
This study specifically looked risky cybersecurity behaviours and viewed this as a proxy measure 
of cybersecurity vulnerability. This is based on the premise that increasing amounts of risky 
behaviours are likely to provide more opportunities for data loss or targeted victimization. This 
premise is supported by the findings of Saridakis, Benson, Ezingeard and Tennakoon (2016) who 
found that those with higher propensity to take risks in an online environment, were also more 
likely to experience cyber-victimization. Despite this, the use of the RScB scale raises interesting 
considerations and carries both positive and negative connotations to its use.  
The scale is useful in that it offers a range of behaviours that are not unique to a workplace (with 
very slight modification such as was conducted here), which technology users are likely to engage 
in, something which very few scales in this area provide. Items 11 and 18 generated a large 
amount of missing data however and thus were excluded from the regression analysis. Further 
investigation of these items raises further questions, however. Firstly, both of these items were 
related to updating behaviours. For example, Item 11 states “I check that software for my 
smartphone/tablet/laptop/pc is up to date” and Item 18 states “I check for updates to any antivirus 
software I have installed). It may be that the wording of these items was confusing, with the term 
updating used to refer to both downloading software updates, but also the purchasing of new 
devices to replace older ones. Alternatively, some confusion may come from many programs 
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having automatic updating features, and thus participants may have been confused by the amount 
of agency that “updating” requires. In addition, items 11 and 18 were the only two items which 
were reversed scored. It may be that participants spotted the trend in items measuring risky 
behaviours and rather than answer correctly, assuming that their answer was indicative of risky 
behaviours, would opt out of answering assuming that they somehow misunderstood the question. 
Alternatively, they may have changed their answer based on what they perceived to be socially 
desirable.  
In addition to significant missing data on two items, the scale has issues surrounding the context 
of security behaviours, and thus in certain contexts the behaviours themselves may be much less, 
if at all, risky. An example of this can be seen in item 7 “I rely on a trusted friend or colleague to 
advise me on aspects of online security”. This behaviour may be considered risky if the person in 
question is a risky source of information, however it could be argued that if the individual who is 
being approached is an expert in security, or simply more knowledgeable than relying on oneself, 
that this behaviour may be risk aversive.  
Another consideration with the RScB scale used in this study relates to modifications for the 
purpose of use in this study. The original RScB scale proposed by Hadlington (Hadlington, 2017) 
asks respondents to reflect on the amount of their engagement in the proposed behaviours over a 
given period and suggest an amount of engagement in the given behaviours. The scale was 
adapted for use in this study in two ways. Firstly, any items which referred to the workplace were 
changed in terms of their tense to refer to past behaviours, this allowed the items to be retained 
and still provide some useful information. In addition, a Likert scale was implemented with 
wording of questions changed to reflect agreement with engagement in the behaviours in general. 
Prior to regression analysis the internal consistency of the scale remained high as can be seen in 
the results section and thus this was considered acceptable.  
A further limitation of the RScB scale is that although it contains a number of security related 
behaviours, it does not encompass a number of other security behaviours which are currently 
considered best practice in accordance with current NCSC guidance. Behaviours such as multi-
factor authentication and backing up are both excluded from this scale, as such the associations 
between retirement related changes and security behaviours may under or over-estimate 
depending on how older adults engage in these other security behaviours. To date, we know little 
about how older adults engage in such practices, their knowledge of security behaviours and what 
factors influence their confidence in relation to engaging in such behaviours. This is an interesting 
area for future research as is discussed further below.  
The RScB scale is a newly developed tool for measuring cybersecurity behaviours and thus lacks 
reported validity and reliability. Aivazpour and Rao (Aivazpour & Rao, 2018) conducted a 
replication of the original RScB scale and found promising results for the continued use of the 
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scale. However, they suggest that the construct of risky cybersecurity behaviours needs more 
research to root into cybersecurity, this study supports a modified version for this scale, however 
further research should be conducted to determine how risky behaviours reported on this scale 
reflect true vulnerability in terms of exposure to threats as well as likelihood of suffering a 
negative outcome.  
5.5.2 | Connecting Vulnerabilities to Specific Threats 
Although this study has demonstrated a relationship between factors associated with the 
retirement transition and an increase in risky online behaviours, the study fails to address other 
types of online cybersecurity vulnerabilities. It may be that certain facets of the retirement 
transition lead to vulnerability in different domains. For example, it may be that those who are 
socially disconnected and have individual characteristics such as being divorced or widowed may 
be more likely to fall foul of romance scams. Likewise, those who have greater financial concerns 
may not engage in risky online behaviours, as suggested by the regression model presented here, 
but may instead be more likely to fall for phishing scams which promise opportunities of financial 
gain. Thus, it is important for future research to investigate whether certain facets of the retirement 
transition or ageing in general open specific opportunities to cybersecurity vulnerability across 
the broad range of threats currently impacting older adults. 
5.5.3 | Limitations 
Although this paper serves to draw associations between the factors identified as changing during 
the retirement transition and risky cybersecurity behaviours, the study suffers in that it cannot 
make direct assertions of direct increases in vulnerability as a result of the retirement transition. 
I.e. without an experimental study which studies in a pre-post format, the changes in cybersecurity 
risk-taking before and after the retirement transition, statements around increases in risk taking 
are unfounded. This study is therefore limited to making associations between retirement related 
factors and risky cybersecurity behaviours in a cross-sectional format. However, given that this 
work is the first to identify such associations between areas of change associated with the 
retirement transition and risky cybersecurity behaviours, it retains some utility. Primarily, it 
serves a purpose in drawing attention to some of the possible areas of vulnerability for older 
adult’s cybersecurity. Whether or not directly related to the retirement transition, the factors 
identified here shed light on engagement in risky behaviours and factors identified in Chapter 4. 
These findings may also extend into other groups but given that they were identified through 
thematic research based on the retirement transition, are likely to be particularly pertinent to older 
adult populations.  
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5.6 | Conclusion 
This study investigated how factors associated with retirement influenced were related with 
cybersecurity vulnerability through engagement in risky online behaviours in retirement. Using 
factor analysis to identify retirement related constructs and following up with multiple regression 
analysis, this study found that eight predictors (Social Disconnectedness, Impulsivity, Time spent 
on Social Media, Computer Self-Doubt, Self Esteem, Risk Propensity, Perceived Cognitive 
Decline and Interest in Technology) significantly contribute towards predicting risky online 
behaviours. Contrary to one hypothesis, financial concerns and were not associated with 
engagement in risky online behaviours. The findings of this study provide a foundation for 
ongoing research by highlighting areas associated with the transition to retirement which may 
provide opportunities for online vulnerability in older. 
5.7 | Chapter Summary 
This chapter set out to understand whether the losses associated with retirement were prevalent 
in a much larger, more representative sample of retired older adults. Through factor analysis many 
of these themes were identified and were found to be associated with risky cybersecurity 
behaviours, suggesting that retirement as a motivator of loss, might be associated with the 
increased cybersecurity vulnerability seen in older adult populations. However this study had one 
key limitation. The study used risky cybersecurity behaviour as a sole measure of cybersecurity 
vulnerability, however as discussed above, that an individual is engaging in risky behaviours, 
does not necessarily mean that they at more risk of experiencing the negative consequences of a 
cybersecurity attack. Understanding how damaging engaging in risky online behaviours requires 
a more in-depth understanding of the circumstances surrounding an individual’s protective state; 
i.e. an individual who engages in more risky online behaviours may be in fact less likely to 
become a victim of a cyberattack than another, if they are adequately protected with appropriate 
safeguards prior to engaging in such behaviours. As very little literature currently exists with 
regards to older adults understanding and knowledge of cybersecurity behaviours, it was decided 
that the next chapter should seek to understand whether or not older adults were indeed engaging 
in protective online behaviours or not, and to understand what factors impacted whether or not 








Chapter 6: (Study 3): Exploring Older Adults Attitudes Towards Protective 
Cybersecurity Behaviours 
6.1 | Chapter Introduction 
This chapter reports the third study of the thesis. The previous study sought to understand how 
factors of the retirement transition might be associated with cybersecurity vulnerability. Although 
measuring such a relationship is difficult, given the inherent difficulty of measuring vulnerability 
to unknown and unreliable threats, the study identified that retirement related factors were 
associated with engagement in risky online behaviours. Despite identifying these relationships, 
there remains a gap in our knowledge in relation to older adult’s protective cybersecurity 
behaviours and the factors that influence their engagement in such behaviours. This is important, 
as the preceding chapters have demonstrated that following the retirement transition older adults 
can find themselves with little effective support, and without adequate knowledge to protect 
themselves online.  
The previous chapter identified that retirement related factors were associated with engagement 
in risky cybersecurity behaviours, however engaging in risky behaviours does not necessarily 
mean that an individual is more likely to experience the negative connotations of a cyber-attack. 
The extent of damage from a cyber-attack is likely to depend upon a range of factors, one of which 
is the extent to which they are protected whilst using the internet, however to date, little research 
has contributed to our understanding of older adults’ engagement in protective online behaviours. 
Although security literature which applies behavioural models such as PMT have begun to place 
emphasis on ‘coping behaviours’, something discussed in Chapter 2, we still know very little 
about how these manifest in older adult groups. Given this scarcity of research, this study set out 
to understand how retired older adults interact with protective cybersecurity behaviours.  
6.2 | Background 
Although a growing literature base has begun to focus on a broad range of older adult’s 
cybersecurity behaviours, relatively little has aimed at understanding how older adults interact 
with protective cybersecurity behaviours and what barriers that they may face when attempting 
to do so. In a qualitative study comprised of 18 focus groups, Jiang et al. (2016) sought to 
understand generational differences in online safety perceptions, knowledge and practices 
between the silent generation (born 1945 or earlier), older members of the baby boomer 
generation (born 1946 to 1954) and Millennials (born between 1977 and 1992). They found that 
the silent generation often limited their online activities as one of their primary mechanisms of 
online defence. The older baby boomers on the other hand engaged in a range of more proactive 
protective behaviours such as applying “common sense” i.e. through not giving out personal 
information and avoiding sites which had previously led them to experience negative 
repercussions. For example, one participant in their study deleted his Facebook account having 
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found out that he had unknowingly signed up to a magazine subscription. Both those within the 
silent generation and the older baby boomers also demonstrated a lack of confidence in their 
ability in comparison to the younger groups. Overall, their study demonstrated that older adults: 
see the internet as a riskier place than younger generations, are more threatened by online risks, 
were more concerned about their privacy (especially within the baby boomer group) and lacked 
online safety literacy and self-efficacy to appropriately deal with online threats, when compared 
to younger groups.  
Confidence has recently been shown to be an important factor in older adult technology and 
cybersecurity behaviour. For example, Kisekka, Chakraborty, Bagchi-Sen and Rao (2015) 
conducted a study investigating older adults web-browsing safety efficacy. They found that 
increased confidence in their ability to navigate the web subsequently increases their confidence 
in their ability to distinguish between safe and unsafe websites. Vaportzis, Clausen and Gow 
(2017) demonstrated that a lack of knowledge and confidence were significant barriers to older 
adults interacting with tablet computers. Similarly, Nicholson et al. (2019) outlined how older 
adults are reluctant to seek out cybersecurity information online, in part due to their low 
confidence with, and sometimes poor grasp of, cybersecurity language. Although confidence is 
likely to be an important construct with regards to engagement in protective online security 
behaviours, to date very little research has set out to specifically understand how older adults’ 
confidence in security behaviours influences how they engage in such behaviours, and what 
factors impact the confidence they have in relation to cybersecurity.  
Existing psychological models are likely to be helpful when seeking to understand cybersecurity 
behaviours in older adults (Briggs, Jeske, & Coventry, 2017). In relation to protective behaviours, 
Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) (Maddux & Rogers, 1983), as discussed within the literature 
review, is likely to be of particular use. As outlined in Chapter 2, the majority of security research 
which has applied PMT to understanding security behaviour has focussed on the threat appraisal 
component of the model, rather than the coping appraisal component. Despite this, threats have 
been seen to be weak predictors of actual security behaviours, and an emerging coping literature 
demonstrates area that coping may be particularly useful when seeking to understand security 
behaviour (Tsai et al., 2016). Although this offers promise for a greater understanding of security 
vulnerability as a result of coping behaviours, very little research has sought to understand how 
these findings might apply in older adult populations.  
To understand older adults’ perceptions of and engagement in, protective online behaviours, there 
are likely to be two key avenues of interest which map onto the coping appraisal identified in 
PMT. The first, relating to the coping efficacy component of PMT, relates to understanding what 
promotes feelings of efficacy in those who already engage in protective behaviours. 
Understanding what promotes confidence in engaging in such behaviours is likely to allow policy 
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makers, researchers and developers greater scope to promote confidence in engaging in these 
security behaviours. The second key area relates to understanding the barriers that older adults 
perceive in relation to engaging in security behaviours. Understanding which factors deter them 
from engaging in protective behaviours is likely to provide insight into the possible avenues of 
cybersecurity vulnerability. Given that the study was set within a PMT focussed coping 
framework, the following two research questions were derived: 
RQ1: What factors influence the confidence that older adults have in relation to 
engagement with protective online behaviours? 
RQ2: What barriers might lead older adults to disengage from protective online 
behaviours? 
6.3 | Method 
6.4 | Development of a Novel Card-Sorting Task 
6.4.1 | Aim of the Task 
The first part of this study involved the creation a novel card-sorting task, used to elicit 
information about security behaviours and beliefs, and to assess user confidence in engaging in 
protective behaviours. The task, discussed in more depth below, had two components: firstly, the 
task was designed to establish the participant’s perceptions of the effectiveness of different 
cybersecurity behaviours by asking the participant to rank these from most effective to least 
effective. Following the first component, the core component of the task was designed to have 
participants rate their confidence in engaging in each of the protective behaviours, explaining why 
they felt the way they did about each behaviour, whether or not they engaged with the behaviour, 
and what factors influenced their engagement in each behaviour.  
The first component of the task does not feed into the study aims proposed here for two reasons: 
firstly, the task was included simply to ensure that participants understood what each of the 
behaviours were, i.e. how they might be protective, and to promote discussion in the early part of 
the interviews. Secondly; response efficacy, or the perceived effectiveness of a given behaviour 
to act in a protective way, depends heavily on the threat that is perceived. Given that specific 
threats were not outlined within this study, with the focus solely on coping, it is likely that the 
perceived effectiveness of each of the protective behaviours would vary drastically depending on 
the threat given.  
6.4.2 | Card-Sorting Tasks and Data Collection  
Card sorting tasks have previously been used to stimulate discussion in similar research such as: 
The Desert Survival Situation (Lafferty et al., 1974) and The Moon Landing Task (Dembo & 
McAuliffe, 1987) and can be seen as effective visual methodologies to aid in the elicitation of 
knowledge (Pauwels & Mannay, 2019). The cyber-survival task (Nicholson et al., 2018), a card-
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sorting task based in security literature, differs from the Moon Landing and Desert Survival tasks 
as it provides a highly relevant situation specific task i.e. the ranking of cybersecurity behaviours 
based on their perceived effectiveness. In a similar way to the cyber-survival task, the task 
developed here differs from existing card-sorting tasks such as the moon landing and desert 
survival tasks, in that its context is specific to cybersecurity. Where this task differs from the 
cyber-survival task, however, is that its aim is not to understand the perceived effectiveness of 
security behaviours, although this is somewhat achieved within the first part of the task, but to 
elicit information about an individual’s feelings towards engaging in cybersecurity. Following the 
completion of an initial effectiveness based ranking task, a second axis is introduced, where the 
participant is asked to rate their confidence in engaging in each of the behaviours whilst 
maintaining their initial rank order. Furthermore, unlike the cybersurvival task, it is not the 
ranking that is of interest, although again this is something which can be obtained, but the use of 
the task to aid in the facilitation of conversation around security. This allows the participant to 
consider their understanding of, and feelings towards, different cybersecurity behaviours both 
individually and within the context of other cybersecurity behaviours. In doing so the task allows 
for more in-depth conversation, as well as allowing for discussion and comparisons between the 
behaviours.  
6.4.3 | Development of Cards for Use in the Task (Materials) 
A set of 9 prompt cards were produced, each consisting of an online protective behaviour. These 
cards were produced based on two sources of information. The first source was the UK 
Government’s cyber-security awareness campaign website (CyberAware). This source was 
chosen as it represented a range of security behaviours that an individual might engage in, 
presented in a way designed to be accessible by the general public. Furthermore, although some 
companies and organizations such as “Get Safe Online” and Age UK provide independent online 
information and may even offer more tailored advice for groups such as older adults, CyberAware 
specifically represented guidance produced by the UK Government and moreover was at the time 
widely advertising this campaign over media such as TV and Radio. Thus, the benefits of using 
CyberAware over these other sources were twofold: Firstly, the language and advice provided in 
the CyberAware campaign was likely to reflect government policy at the time, thus any issues 
with the language used within this campaign were likely to be highlighted. Secondly, given that 
we know that older adults typically do not seek cybersecurity information, and that they instead 
typically access security information passively through such media (Nicholson et al., 2019) 
CyberAware was considered as the source most likely to have been accessed by older adults with 
regards to security information, an important consideration when developing the card sorting task. 
At the time of thesis completion, this site has now substantially changed, and as such the 
information provided here is dated. For this reason screenshots of the archived website (retrieved 
using “the way back machine” are included in Appendix H. It is also likely that this source would 
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be seen as credible by older adults, and thus represents a real-world source of information that 
they might turn to for security advice. The second source of information used to create the cards 
came from Ion, Reeder and Consolvo (2015), a study which created a list of security behaviours 
for a sorting task, and that was subsequently used in the cyber-survival task (Nicholson et al., 
2018). These two sources provided a broad range of security advice, some of which were very 
similar. Behaviours were therefore thematically grouped to form a simple list, which was designed 
to avoid jargon and remain vague enough to allow for adequately broad discussion, whilst 
remaining specific enough to keep the individual discussing a set security behaviour. A full table 





















Table 13 Grouping of Behaviours from Ion (2015) and CyberAware Sources 
Behavioural Theme Behaviour Source 
Update Software 
Turn on Automatic Updates Ion (2015) 
Update applications Ion (2015) 
Install OS updates Ion (2015) 
Update mobile devices such as phones or tablets. CyberAware 
Update your operating system CyberAware 
Install the latest software and app updates CyberAware 
Update your web browser CyberAware 
Use Strong Passwords and 
Keep them Safe 
Use a password manager Ion (2015) 
Don't write down passwords Ion (2015) 
Use strong passwords Ion (2015) 
Use two−factor authentication Ion (2015) 
Use unique passwords Ion (2015) 
Write down passwords Ion (2015) 
Don't enter passwords on links in email Ion (2015) 
Save passwords in a file Ion (2015) 
Use three random words to create a strong 
password CyberAware 
Separate password for email CyberAware 
Use two factor authentication on your email 
account CyberAware 
Maintain Good Online / 
Browsing Behaviours 
Check if HTTPS Ion (2015) 
Clear browser cookies Ion (2015) 
Look at the URL bar Ion (2015) 
Visit only known websites Ion (2015) 
Use Public Wi-Fi Safely Don’t use public Wi-Fi to transfer sensitive information such as card details. CyberAware 
Guard Against Phishing 
Emails 
Never click suspicious links or attachments CyberAware 
Don't click links from unknown people Ion (2015) 
Don't open email attachments from unknown Ion (2015) 
Back-Up Data Back up important data CyberAware 
Have Software Protection Use antivirus software Ion (2015) 
Keep Your Device Secure 
Secure your device with a screen lock CyberAware 
Don’t jailbreak or root your phone CyberAware 
Be Aware of Fake Websites Beware of Fake Websites (regardless of https or padlock) CyberAware 
The behaviour titles that resulted from the grouping stage were agreed through discussion with 
the supervisory team to ensure the content validity of each card. The final list of the protective 










6.4.4 | Participants 
Nineteen Participants were identified predominantly through opportunity and snowball sampling 
(aged between 62-78 years old M=68.79) from the North East of the UK during May 2019. 
Although a specific number of participants was not decided prior to conducting the study, due to 
the difficulty in establishing such figures in qualitative research (Levitt et al., 2018), data 
collection was ceased at the point which “no new themes or information arose” (Guest et al., 
2006), often called ‘data saturation’. The number of participants fell in-line with a range of 
existing qualitative studies in the area of cyber-security (Durrant et al., 2017a; Fujs et al., 2019; 
Olivier et al., 2015). A participant information sheet was provided to those interested in taking 
part, which outlined the researchers contact details. Inclusion criteria were broad, only requiring 
participants to be retired and be within the baby boomer generation. Technology use was not 
necessarily required, as perceptions of threats and cybersecurity behaviours may have been a 
contributing factor behind technology rejection. Table 15 provides overview demographics of 
participants who took part. 
 
Table 15 Study 3 Participant Demographics 
Ppt Age Sex Pre-Retirement Occupation 
P1 74 F Worked in a range of retail roles 
P2 78 F A range of roles retail roles including a bookshop 
P3 73 F Teacher in a range of Artistic Disciplines 
P4 67 F Social Worker 
P5 66 F Worked for a Charitable Funder 
P6 68 F Social Worker 
P7 71 F Mental Health Nurse 
P8 61 F Chemical Manufacturing Engineer and Manager 
P9 72 M Medical Secretary 
P10 72 F Medical Receptionist 
P11 71 F Legal Secretary 
P12 61 F Teacher  
P13 65 F Teacher Married to P12 
P14 67 M Teacher 
P15 62 F Teacher 
Behaviour 
Have Software Protection 
Keep Your Device Secure 
Guard Against Phishing Emails 
Use Strong Passwords and Keep Them Safe 
Back-up Data 
Update Software 
Use Public Wi-Fi safely 
Maintain Good Online/Browsing Behaviours 
Be Aware of Fake Websites 
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P16 65 F City Council Worker (Library and Intranet) 
P17 68 F Salesperson for Labelling Marketing Company 
P18 75 M Married to P6 
P19 71 M Teacher 
 
6.4.5 | Procedure 
Participants were interviewed on the Northumbria University campus between June 2019 and July 
2019. Following consent procedures, participants were introduced to the task board (See Figure 
7). The list of protective behaviour cards (Table 14) were then placed in front of the participant, 
and they were asked to familiarize themselves indicating whether there were any behaviours they 
did not understand. The researcher then aided in the understanding of any unknown cards. The 
participant was then asked to sort the cards in order of how effective they were at keeping them 
safe online. Participants were informed that they were not able to rank cards equally, so that a 
final order could be established, this had the additional benefit of forcing participants to reflect 
on their reasoning for placing behaviours where they had. Following the card sort, the researcher 
briefly interviewed the participant in relation to each card in order of most effective to least 
effective. For each behaviour, the interviewer asked for a brief explanation of the card, to ensure 
the participant’s understanding of the behaviour, after which participants were asked whether or 
not they engaged in that behaviour (and their reasons behind doing so). After all cards had been 
reviewed, participants were asked to retain their original rank order, but to move the cards left or 
right based on how confident they would be in engaging in the behaviours without experiencing 
any negative repercussions, with the least confident behaviours placed towards the left hand side 
of the board and the most confident towards the right hand side of the board. Following the 
placement of the cards, the participants were asked: why they chose to place the card where they 
had and what factors might impact their confidence in carrying out the behaviour. It was made 
explicit to participants that the positioning of the cards was based not on whether they currently 
carried out the behaviour or not, but instead, how confident they would be in carrying out the 
behaviour regardless, for example, if they were asked to do so. This meant that the output of the 
final images would reflect their perceived confidence in engaging in such behaviours, rather than 
their current state of protection. Discussion once again started at the top card and proceeded 
towards the bottom card, after which a photograph was taken to note the final order. A visual 
representation of the task can be seen in Figure 7 and completed participant examples can be seen 
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6.5 | Findings and Discussion 
6.5.1 | Ranking Task – Protective Effectiveness  
It is important to note that the ranking task developed for use in this study was designed to aid in 
the elicitation of security knowledge during qualitative interviews, as well as to allow for more 
in-depth conversation aided by the placement of behaviours in relation to other behaviour cards. 
Within this study, participants were asked to rank the behaviours as an early task to promote 
discussion, but it is interesting to note where participants placed the behaviours when no specific 
threat was specified. Figure 8 shows an overview of card placement based on the mean ranking 
scores of behaviours. This was calculated by assigning a score of 9 to the behaviour seen as the 
most effective protection and a score of 1 being assigned to the behaviour seen to be the least 
effective. Furthermore, confidence scores were calculated by overlaying a 10x10 grid over the 
completed task. From this, the mean confidence for each of the behaviours was calculated. 
Step 1: Ppts are shown behaviours and asked to 
familiarize.  
Step 2: Effectiveness markers introduced. (top and 
bottom) Ppts asked to rank behaviours based on 
effectiveness.  
Step 3: Confidence markers introduced (left and 
right). Ppts asked to move cards left or right based on 
their confidence in engaging in them. Following this, 
discussion of efficacy and confidence in engaging in 
each 
 
Figure 7 Visual Representation of New Card Sorting Task 
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Participants saw having software protection and using strong passwords as the most effective 
behaviours to keep themselves safe online. Device security was considered the third most 
effective security behaviour, although notably lower than both software protection and passwords, 
but notably higher than the other behaviours. The rest of the behaviours clustered together with 
average ratings of effectiveness. In terms of confidence, having software protection was the 
behaviour that most older adults were most confident at engaging in. Although device security 
was seen to be less effective, older adults in this study reported being more confident at engaging 
in this behaviour than having software protection, the behaviour seen to be the most effective at 
keeping them safe online. Again, all other behaviours groups together, but perhaps surprisingly 
these behaviours grouped together on a medium-high rating, suggesting that regardless of the 
perceived effectiveness of the behaviours, on average the older adults generally reported being 














6.5.2 | Interview Analysis Procedure 
Data was analyzed using Braun and Clarke’s (2006) Thematic Analysis approach. This approach, 
used widely in qualitative research, and used within Chapter 4, consists of 6 steps; familiarization 
with the data, generating initial codes, searching for themes, reviewing themes, defining and 
producing themes and finally; producing a report.  
Have Software Protection 
Use Strong Passwords and 
Keep them safe 
Keep your device secure 
Update Software 
Guard against phishing emails 
Be aware of fake websites 
Maintain good browsing 
behaviours 




Figure 8 Visual representation of Average (Mean) Card Placement 
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Familiarization was achieved through the interviewer conducting the interviews, transcribing the 
data and reading and re-reading finalized transcripts. Transcripts were printed and coding was 
conducted in paper form and using brief margin-based descriptions with interesting extracts 
highlighted. Extracts were then cut out and grouped, after which they were further grouped into 
early themes. The interviewer then worked with the supervisory team who are experienced in 
qualitative methods to review the themes. Each theme was scrutinized for relevance of quotes as 
well as appropriateness of sub-themes, with revisions made where necessary. At this stage, themes 
were revised into the final themes discussed below.  
6.5.3 | Themes 
Two thematic maps were produced (see Figure 9 and Figure 10). Discussed in their subsequent 
sections below, these maps work to answer each of the major research aims of this chapter. The 
findings below are ordered according to their research questions and titled according to their 
thematic map descriptions. 
6.5.4 | What Factors Influence the Confidence That Older Adults Have in Relation to 
Engagement with Protective Online Behaviours? 
The first research question related to the confidence that older adults have in relation to protecting 
themselves online. Following analysis, three major themes were identified which were seen to 
impact upon older adults’ confidence in protecting themselves online: Personal factors, Support 









Figure 9 Thematic map outlining factors influencing older adults’ confidence relating to 
engagement in protective behaviours 
112 
 
6.5.4.1 | Personal Factors 
6.5.4.1.1 | Level of Understanding 
‘Personal factors’ was the term used to describe individual-level characteristics that impacted 
confidence in engaging in protective online behaviours. The first of the personal factors identified, 
was the level of understanding in relation to how threats work, something which reassured the 
individual that they could be responsive to threats.  
P14: I understand how the PC, the Laptop, the Tablet work, there is that confidence 
there, it’s like riding a bike I suppose, before you even jump on the bike if you have got 
that confidence you can do it, which sounds arrogant but it’s not meant to be 
P19: I phoned my bank up and said “look I’ve had an email” but I now know from the 
bank that they will not send emails out like that, so I feel a bit more comfortable about 
that. 
Likewise, one participant explained that understanding how passwords work, gave her confidence 
in her ‘system’, whereas engaging in other forms of protection lacked familiarity leading to 
feelings of reduced control. 
P5: With this I kind of know my system and I know why I’m doing it, the password 
thing, with the software protection, I think I’m doing it but actually it isn’t my system so 
I’m not as familiar with it as with the password thing, I’m not as in control of it as I am 
with the password system. 
It might be suggested that it is the understanding of the processes and procedures that lead to 
feelings of confidence when choosing whether or not to engage in protective behaviours, rather 
than rote learned knowledge alone. Redmiles et al. (2016) found that the tangibility of a threat 
lead to greater feelings of confidence, whereas those threats which were the least tangible lead to 
the greatest level of worry. Understanding how password style attacks work, or at the very least 
having a more tangible mental model of how password attacks might happen (a hoodie-wearing 
shadow in a basement guessing password after password) promotes confidence in older adults as 
they can imagine the impact of implementing complex passwords on the agent. Similar findings 
concerning how mental models are utilised in this way have recently been reflected in a US based 
sample (Frik et al., 2019). The password H0Rs3 may seem un-hackable when considering an 
agent guessing password after password, however when one understands that in brute force 
attacks, increased entropy is more important than complexity, one can more intuitively produce 
safer passwords.  
More complex protective mechanisms such as updating have even less tangible mental models, 
meaning that users cannot imagine attack vectors, and so they may see even less protective utility 
in these behaviours, leading to lower salience and lower engagement. Previous security literature 
has determined that mental models, and the metaphors that represent these models, differ between 
experts and non-experts (Camp et al., 2007). It is possible that the accuracy of one’s mental model 
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may be key to promoting confidence, as a more tangible mental model likely provides assurance, 
although any usable mental model is better for security than nothing at all (Wash & Rader, 2011). 
It is also likely that better internal representations of threats promote a more fluidic ability to 
respond to the changing nature of threats, rather than a reliance on static knowledge, which can 
quickly become outdated and is likely to lead to vulnerabilities. One such example of this might 
be seen in relation to https encryption. If an individual can generate a rudimentary mental model 
of how https encryption works, even at a very basic level, when informed that hackers can 
purchase secure sites, they are likely to more easily understand why the padlock is something that 
might not guarantee their safety, rather than feeling as if they are receiving conflicting advice 
from policy makers (rely on the padlock vs do not rely on the padlock). The findings here suggest 
that policy makers should focus on promoting understanding, rather than promoting knowledge, 
to increase the effectiveness and longevity of security guidance. A clear avenue for future research 
would be to determine whether cyber security mental models differ based on age, and how the 
training and implementation of such models influence ongoing engagement with security 
behaviours.  
6.5.4.1.2 | Perceived Locus of Control 
A feeling of reduced control was discussed by some participants. Behaviours which were seen to 
have high controllability were seen as more effective than those which were not. 
P15: (when asked why strong passwords were more effective than updating software): 
Because that is something that it down to me, I can control it. 
Conversely, lower controllability was cited as a reason for avoiding engagement in online 
banking.  
P3: Well I always think of financial things, like banking, but I never do banking online, 
mainly for that reason… [Interviewer: What reason?]. Mainly because I’m worried 
about not being in control of it.  
Locus of control is a well-researched concept and has previously been used in information 
security research to help understating why people may or may not engage in security behaviours 
(Workman et al., 2008). In addition, locus of control has previously been found to be “crucial” in 
encouraging information security policy compliance (Ifinedo, 2014). The findings here support 
earlier information systems literature and the suggestions of Bada et al. (2019) who posit that 
promoting feelings of control should be considered when developing future security awareness 
campaigns, as doing so promotes acceptance of the suggested behaviours.  
6.5.4.1.3 | Previous Experience and Engagement Frequency 
Another personal factor that impacted feelings of confidence, was the previous experience that 
the individual had with engaging in specific protective online behaviours. 
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P11: I suppose I have always done it, I have had various different ones, I have had 
Norton, I have had MacAfee, Norton is a nightmare… I have done it in a work capacity 
as well because when I was at [local charity], because they are just a little company 
you do most things yourself sort of thin, so I’ve done that all the time and I’ve done that 
with my own computers so I’m quite happy with that. 
P12: I think it’s just because I’ve had to change it so I know where it is now.  
In a similar but subtlety different vein, participants discussed how their confidence was 
strengthened by the frequency with which they engaged in protective behaviours in that greater 
levels of engagement with a task led to greater levels of confidence. 
P8: If I’m doing something all of the time, I tend to feel a lot more confident about what 
I’m doing. 
P12: I think the thing is when you’re not used to using technology, there are so many 
sub-menus and you think, oh where did I find that thing, it’s just impossible so I have 
done it a few times before and I have sort of fathomed out where the fingerprint thing is 
and I have managed to delete it and set it up again 
These findings support previous literature which suggests that prior experience of conducting a 
task leads to greater feelings of comfort within those tasks (Chung & Monroe, 2000; Hicks et al., 
2002). Existing theoretical models of behaviour such as TPB are often improved through the 
addition of ‘previous behaviour’ which may be due to the dictum “past behaviour is the best 
predictor of future behaviour” (Ajzen, 2011). It is possible that the relationship between prior 
experience and future behaviour are mediated by the increase in confidence that repeated 
successful trials generates, or through the habituation effect that may take place in such stable 
contexts (Ajzen, 2011). These findings suggest that having older adults engage in protective 
behaviours, or providing instructions that can be followed, may promote confidence in engaging 
in similar behaviours in the future. This posits an interesting question, would it be better to 
promote manual updating (and other such protective behaviours) in older adults, rather than to 
allow for automatic updating? Although automatic updating provides safety, on occurrences 
where the individual is forced to engage in the process, they are unfamiliar with doing so and as 
such may avoid updating altogether. If programs automatically updated after a set period, but first 
prompted the user to engage in some of the process, it may be that users would gain confidence 
in engaging in other, similar protective behaviours. This provides an interesting area for future 
exploration.  
6.5.4.1.4 | Computer Self-Efficacy 
It is likely that regularly navigating technology leads to increased feelings of computer self-
efficacy, as the individual is able to navigate interfaces whilst experiencing a threat free browsing 
experience. In this study, low levels of computer self-efficacy were identified as impacting 
confidence levels  
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P4: Because I don’t understand techy things I tend to avoid them at all costs, whereas I 
think some people are better at sitting down and playing with things 
P15: You know, you’re just wary of it and I know from friends who are very computer 
savvy, there are times when I say hang about, I don’t quite know what I’m doing here 
and because of that I couldn’t say I’m confident. 
One participant even demonstrated this lack of confidence in her technological ability prior to the 
task starting. 
P1: I have a nasty feeling you are going to regret using me because I know nothing. 
This participant went on to demonstrate a range of knowledge during the task and thus these 
feelings of low computer self-efficacy may not always be justified, reflecting that computer self-
efficacy, rather than computer literacy alone, may be of particular importance in older adult 
populations. This finding supports previous literature which demonstrates that older adults 
underestimate their actual computer knowledge (Marquié et al., 2002). Furthermore, the findings 
of this study support similar previous findings which have suggested that computer self-efficacy 
is important for short term (Czaja et al., 2006) and as well as long term technology adoption 
(Mitzner et al., 2019) in older adults. Future research in this area might look to see if interventions 
aimed at increasing computer self-efficacy might also influence the likelihood that older adults 
increase their engagement in security behaviours as a function of increased confidence.  
6.5.4.2 | Support Factors 
6.5.4.2.1 | Support Network – Independence Promoting Support 
Support factors were identified as a theme and referred not only to the support network available 
to the individual, but also to the method by which these support structures provided help. For 
some participants, receiving support was a process of learning and development, problems were 
addressed through collaboration or through demonstrations of how to engage in protective 
behaviours, this positive support style promoted independence and fostered feelings of high 
confidence.  
P6: I wouldn’t know how to do that, no. I would have to ask someone. [Interviewer: 
Who would you ask?] I might go into the apple store to ask about that, because 
although my husband is very confident with computers… well we might be able to work 
it out between us. 
The desire of older adults to become independent is also reflected in the language used when 
judging whether they would be comfortable engaging in protective behaviours. Participants 
discussed how they could complete a range of behaviours if they were first given the opportunity 
to be shown by someone else. 
P1: if I was going to set up a password on my phone, I would be happy if somebody 
showed me, I am the kind of person where if somebody could show me how to do it, I 
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am quite happy, then I will try it on my own but I won’t try it without somebody to 
advise me what to do. 
P7: (when asked about backing up) I have probably forgotten it all now, but if he had 
just sat down with me for a short while and talked to me about it for a few minutes then 
I am pretty sure that I would be able to get on and do it.  
Participants also demonstrated that they would feel comfortable carrying out tasks such as 
engaging in protective online behaviours if they had instructions that they could follow. 
P5: I’d be confident to work it out or to following the instructions, I wouldn’t be 
confident doing it off my own back, but yeah… 
P12: I think I would manage it if I had the information on how to do it. 
This finding is important as it appears that older adults are happy to engage in protective online 
behaviours when provided with basic written support. Receiving independence-promoting 
support allows the individual to temporarily ‘borrow’ confidence from those who they are 
confident in, this then contributes towards empowering them to engage in protective online 
behaviours. The findings here support recent literature (Betts et al., 2019) which suggests that 
older adults have a ‘thirst for knowledge’ relating to technology and have a desire for digital 
technology sessions to teach them the essential digital literacy skills they require. Clearly the lack 
of support in this area only adds to the ongoing digital exclusion of older adults and the widening 
of the digital divide (Godfrey & Johnson, 2009).  
Although there are issues surrounding digital exclusion through a lack of support, new literature 
provides promise that such information and support can be provided and implemented to older 
adults. Martínez-Alcalá et al., (2018) demonstrated that not only can older adults benefit from 
digital literacy training, but also suggest a ‘blended workshop’ platform by which this learning 
can be particularly effective. In a UK sample, Fletcher-Watson, Crompton, Hutchison and 
Hongjin (2016) demonstrated the acceptability and feasibility of a six-week training course in 
digital literacy aimed at older adults, finding almost 100% attendance throughout the course and 
a large increase in self-efficacy following the course. Although such courses are beginning to 
emerge, at times these can be seen to be too niche to be relevant to all, often aimed at specific 
groups (Nicholson et al., 2019). Clearly, there is a desire for older adults to partake in digital 
interventions and suggestions that such interventions are efficacious. Policy makers should 
capitalize on these findings to increase digital literacy in older adults, and future research should 
hone these methods to determine the best methodologies to support older adults with digital 
literacy and cybersecurity skills. This could be through media such as workshops mentioned 




6.5.4.2.2 | Confidence That It Can Be Done, Just Not by Me 
Support structures, such as those referred to above, were not always available to some of the older 
adults interviewed. Some participants discussed how they paid for professional help and relied on 
them for technical support. The confidence that they had in these individuals, directly transferred 
to the confidence that they had in the products that they provided. 
P5: I don’t think I have any confidence in my ability to use software protection, but I 
think I have bought good software protection and I suppose one of the reasons I am 
more confident in that is that it is out of my hands, it is something that was 
recommended to me by someone I trust, so I don’t feel like I have any input in that, but 
I’m confident in it. 
Confidence in technical ability and trust in the individual became intertwined for some 
participants, and the factors that generated this trust could be quantified for some participants. 
P4: I just prefer, if I know somebody who is confident to do it, that I trust and know, 
rather than somebody I don’t, if they have a shop in a local village or something… it’s 
like buying something isn’t it, you wouldn’t buy something from a market trader if he 
wasn’t there every week, but if he was you could always go back. 
P2: I trust them, you know, they’re not young people… they are young to middle aged 
and very chatty, and they will chat to you about computers and computing and they will 
admire your screen and things like that, they are likeable people that you trust.  
Previous literature by Nthala and Flechais (2018) found five factors considered by older adults 
when assessing a source of support: perceived competence, trust, availability, cost and closeness 
of the source. In this study, trust was an important factor for participants who did not have access 
to readily available support. Interestingly, some participants described their paid IT help as 
‘friends’, due to having known and relied upon them for a long period of time, even though any 
assistance was still charged at full price as a paying customer. Delegation of security 
responsibilities may provide some cover for those who can afford it; however, this leads to two 
key issues. 1) Many cannot afford such support and 2) Even in those who can afford support, 
many attacks are social-engineering based and as mentioned above, pre-established protection 
can only protect an individual so-far. Delegating responsibility may likely to lead to an “it’s not 
my responsibility” mentality, something which is less favorable than the promotion of personal 
security. This lack of personal ownership is even more of an issue for those who receive 
dependence promoting support, or what might be considered a ‘negative support style’. A second 
reason that this may become an issue is when first seeking a trustable source, older adults may be 
identified as targets who can be over-charged for unnecessary protection or ‘cleaning out’ 
services. Although this might be favorable to those with very low computer self-efficacy, ensuring 
a basic level of knowledge in terms of security and protection for these individuals is important.  
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6.5.4.2.3 | Support Network – Dependence Promoting Support 
Some participants described receiving support from family members, which may ultimately be 
negative in terms of promoting engagement in protective online behaviours. The support they 
received promoted dependence on those who they requested help from, and ultimately lead to 
lowered confidence and disengagement from protective behaviours.  
P7: when I got it my son came around and said “oh, I’ll set this up” and he set it up 
and I said thank you, and then he did it and buggered off and so I have to phone him up 
and say “well, what do I do about this?” 
P1: I am of a generation that is very wary, I know what I know, if I need to know 
something new, I am the sort of person that is much better off if somebody shows me 
how to do it rather than tells me. You know, like if my granddaughter just says, you do 
this and that, that and that, and I just look at them and say… “forget it” 
Despite the negative repercussions of dependency inducing support, participants showed an 
awareness that this was occurring. 
P10: I just don’t know what I’m doing, and if I ask the kids to do it, it’s “yeah I’ll come 
over and do it at some point or other” but it just doesn’t happen, too busy doing other 
things, and then it gets forgotten about... 
As well as this, one participant could foresee how her reliance on her support (her husband) was 
likely to lead to vulnerability following the recent passing of her spouse.  
P3: You see my husband always set everything up, I’ve got virus protection that he put 
on it for me, but it worries me that it’s going to run out and I won’t be able to do it 
myself.  
Older adults recognize the need for protection and are keen to engage in protective behaviours. 
Moreover, they are keen to be shown how to protect themselves. Although previous literature has 
demonstrated that receiving some inter-generational support can be useful for older adults, 
sometimes even improving self-efficacy (Damodaran & Sandhu, 2016), the method of its delivery 
is important to its success. When older adults rely on younger members of the family, who may 
be particularly impatient (Xie, 2007), the device may be taken from them and the task completed 
without any instruction to learn from. Because of this, the individual learns very little, causing 
them to be unprepared when the situation arises again (Sandhu et al., 2013). In addition, watching 
a younger person overcome a technological barrier with relative ease reinforces the notion that 
one needs expertise to engage in such tasks (Barnard et al., 2013). Thus, this support style 
promotes dependence on those who can provide support, something which is particularly 
problematic when these individuals are not available. A wealth of knowledge now exists relating 
to older adults learning preferences and support based policies should utilize these to encourage 
independence-promoting interventions designed at empowering older adults to protect themselves 
online.   
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6.5.4.3 | Demand Factors 
The final theme explaining older adult’s confidence in engaging in protective online behaviours, 
related to the demands that were placed upon them by technology. These factors either increased 
or decreased confidence, and consequently their confidence in engaging in protective behaviours. 
6.5.4.3.1 | Demand Reducing – Simplicity 
Although there are undoubtedly a large range of factors that increase or reduce the demands that 
an older adult feels when engaging in security behaviours, two key factors were identified during 
this study. The first related to the simplicity of the technology that they used, something which 
reduced demands and lead to increased confidence. Typically, Apple devices were seen to be 
more user friendly, easier to navigate and easier in terms of engaging with behaviours such as 
updating. 
P16: I think Apple is easier than the laptop, I think I’m probably more confident with 
the phone and the iPad then I am with the laptop which isn’t an Apple. 
P19: See I think one of the reasons I like the iPhone and the iPad is that when it comes 
to loading new software it’s easy. It’s absolutely easy whereas the laptop, it’s not as 
straightforward and sometimes causes problems 
P6: if we’re talking about the iPad now because that is what I use the most. I am aware 
of where the settings are and they are advising me when it needs…. What is there, and 
what needs updating so I’m aware of messages and it’s clear when a message does 
come up.  
Previous research has demonstrated that for older adults, touch screen interfaces such as tablet 
computers and smartphones are preferable over more traditional input methods such as the more 
traditional mouse input (Findlater et al., 2013). Despite this, few devices are manufactured with 
older users in mind, and as such technology developers should attempt to ensure that their 
products are usable to those both young and old (Czaja et al., 2006; Page, 2014).  
Participants in this study described how they found certain devices easier to use, reducing the 
difficulty associated with engaging in such behaviours. The findings here support recent PMT 
based research which also demonstrates that difficulty reducing factors promote intention to 
engage in protective online behaviours (Holmes & Ophoff, 2017). Simplicity has also been shown 
to be one the heuristics behind why information security advice is followed (Redmiles et al., 
2016). These findings, as well as those from earlier literature, suggest that designing interfaces 
and advice with simplicity in mind is likely to lead to increased confidence and engagement in 
protective online behaviours.  
6.5.4.3.2 | Demand Increasing – The Need to Keep Up-To-Date and ‘Digital Vigilance’ 
Although simplicity reduced the demand experienced by older adults, demands were increased 
by a need to stay up to date with threats, and the need to re-learn based on new emerging advice. 
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Participants referred to the Padlock (signifying https security) and explained how the advice they 
receive around threats such as this regularly changes, forcing them to re-learn to stay safe. 
P16: I think that things change all of the time, and so I’m always slightly wary of what 
I’m doing, like the padlock, before I was like, oh I have to look for the padlock but now 
I’m thinking, well that doesn’t actually mean very much so I think there are always 
things to learn. 
In addition, participants referred to the digital vigilance required to stay safe online, and the 
possible repercussions of falling into a ‘false sense of cyber-security’. 
P18: Because in a moment of relaxed state of mind you could, if you were doing a 
search or even a link to it that would pop up on a google search or something like that, 
if it looks genuine and if you’re not actively thinking make sure this is not a fake 
website, it could easily happen and draw you in.  
P11: I’m fairly confident but I think sometimes I am a bit lax. But that’s because you 
get… because everything is just going along swimmingly you get a bit blasé and you 
forget to be that little bit extra careful and something pops up like that thing last week. 
It wasn’t exactly a fake website, but it was a one I didn’t really know, well it had 
something wrong with it… so yeah... I’m not 100% confident but fairly confident.  
Maintaining up to date knowledge about threats and protective behaviours may be particularly 
difficult for older adults, as they may have previously relied on support and training from the 
workplace, something no longer available in retirement (Grimes et al., 2010). Several other 
participants in this study also discussed misconceptions such as those relating to https/padlock 
security this throughout the study, something which has also been found in similar work in a US 
older adult sample (Frik et al., 2019). These misconceptions may represent a failing on the part 
of policy makers and researchers and suggests that future campaigns should focus on establishing 
easily digestible messages or the promotion of mental models, which highlight the changing 
nature of threats and make older adults more resilient to changes in security advice.  
6.5.4.3.3 | Language Miscommunication and Misinterpretation 
Jargon is something that is well known to be barrier in digital literacy and understanding (Cook 
et al., 2011; Nicholson et al., 2019). Naturally, this was reflected in this study and eloquently 
outlined by participant 14. 
P14: it’s the understanding process, I think also much of the IT now is couched in 
terms…. Which people don’t understand, its jargon and it is designed to confuse, rather 
than inform. 
However, an interesting and unanticipated secondary finding of this study, is that terminology 
used by the researcher was often misunderstood or misinterpreted by participants, even though 
jargon was avoided.  In fact, the terminology used as prompts within this study were taken from 
sources of information designed for public dissemination and consumption. This led to a range of 
interesting interpretations, which are likely due to generational language differences. One such 
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area of confusion related to the word ‘updating’. When asked about updating, participants 
regularly referred to buying new subscriptions, upgrading to better packages or renewing existing 
payment-based packages. This confusion was present in approximately half of the participants 
interviewed. 
[Interviewer: And do you ever update your Norton?] P14: it’s every 12 months, I buy 
the license for 5 machines and that’s every 12 months. 
P5: I update it every year, I pay for a new one every year 
P1: I update it every two years, I have an ongoing… it was every year but now it’s 
every two years, it’s not due to be renewed until next April. 
Another participant knew the word ‘update’, but having stopped to think for a second, 
demonstrated a lack of understanding of updating in an online setting. 
[Interviewer: So updating software, what does it mean to update software?] P4: Well 
it’s self-explanatory! ... I have no idea really? 
Other terms, which have also been repurposed from the real world into a digital setting also had 
similar reactions. 
P2: Browsing… is that looking at different websites?  
It is easy to understand why jargon is problematic. Those unfamiliar with such terms have to learn 
what new terms mean. Often this can lead to having to learn a string of jargon-based terms before 
one can actually deduce the word they were originally looking to understand i.e. imagine how 
you might explain what malware is to an alien, without first explaining what software, computers 
or programs are. The issue highlighted here however is that the terminology used by younger and 
older adults is the same. It is established, basic language that previously existed in an offline 
setting and has since been adopted into online settings. However, during this language 
digitization, and with a new generation growing up using terms with new online meanings, older 
meanings of identical terms have been replaced. Understanding their new meaning relies on 
learning, experience and digital literacy. Young people are likely to grow up in an environment 
where the word ‘update’ is synonymous with required downloads. Older adults are more likely to 
have first learned the term word in more tangible offline settings. Although this posits an issue 
for those responsible for delivering security campaigns, it is something which is likely to be 
encouraged and possibly even capitalized on by software providers who are keen to sell newer 
packages, suggesting the need for paid upgrades over free, necessary updates. This may become 





6.5.5 | RQ2: What Barriers Might Lead Older Adults to Disengage from Protective Online 
Behaviours? 
Discussions around why older adults choose not to engage in protective online behaviours 
revealed three major themes, that they: don’t want to, feel unable to, or feel that there is no need 
to. Some reasons for not wanting to engage in protective behaviours were specific to certain 
behaviours, these are outlined where appropriate. The thematic map for this theme can be seen in 






6.5.5.1 | I Don’t Want To 
6.5.5.1.1 | It Changes What I Am Used To  
Participants discussed not wanting to engage in online protective behaviours for a number of 
reasons. Some behaviours such as updating caused issues with the graphical user interface (GUI) 
and changed the layout, look and feel of programs, something which acted as a barrier to updating.  
P5: I always resist it (updating) because it always messes with your organization… you 
know. You think, oh I can’t find that anymore and that isn’t where it used to be… 
P13: When I get a message on my phone or my laptop, I try to ignore it because when I 
do that it changes everything around and I don’t know where it is and I have to re-learn 
that and I don’t like that very much so I tend to ignore it… 
This finding supports earlier research from a younger US based population which found that 
changes to user interfaces (UI) are considered one of the most negative aspects of updating and a 
driving factor behind refusing future updates (Vaniea, Rader, & Wash, 2014). These findings 
suggest that developers should attempt to introduce interface changes incrementally or perhaps 
split updates into non-optional security updates and optional feature updates. 
Figure 10 Thematic map outlining why older adults disengage from protective behaviours 
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6.5.5.1.2 | I Don’t Want to Have to Pay for It  
Another barrier that caused an unwillingness to engage in protective behaviours, namely updating 
of anti-virus software, was the perception that purchasing additional software was a pre-requisite, 
or that this might happen accidentally. Something which may be attributed to aggressive 
marketing during the update process. 
P11: (about Avast Updates) it does it automatically, it does itself, but what I don’t want 
is to go through the pay things, where it says you’re running slow and we can speed you 
up.  
P19: When it gets updated the first thing it does, before you can actually do the update, 
is it tries to sell you the other things that can go along with it. I’m not interested in that 
but if you happen to make a wrong click you might find that you have bought something 
you don’t want. 
As well as the fear of making accidental purchases, one participant pointed out that they saw 
antivirus as an unnecessary financial cost, due to the devices’ reassurance that they were otherwise 
secure. 
P17: I’m sure I have seen somewhere on my phone that it’s protected, that’s why I 
haven’t got any software protection, because I think that it’s a waste of money. 
Older adults’ purchasing decisions relating to protective software are complex. For many, the 
costs associated with purchasing protective software are too high and are seen as not justifiable 
in terms of what is returned in terms of security gains (Coventry et al., 2014). This, however, does 
not explain why older adults refuse to update free software already installed on their devices. The 
quotes above, although initially indicative of financial concern, are perhaps more likely to be 
related to older adults feelings of low computer self-efficacy (Marquié et al., 2002), with the 
biggest concerns relating to accidentally agreeing to unnecessary purchases. This may lead these 
individuals to become particularly vulnerable, if access to appropriate support is limited 
(Nicholson et al., 2019). 
6.5.5.1.3 | It Requires Effort / I Would Rather Be Doing Something Else 
For those who feel confident enough to engage in protective behaviours, the amount of effort 
required to do so may be a barrier. Some participants saw engaging in protective behaviours as 
being too costly in terms of the amount of effort required, and suggested that they would rather 
spend their time doing other things instead. 
P7: I like to try things, you know, I like to give it a go but eventually it gets frustrating. 
If you think, it’s probably some silly little thing that I’m doing, why am I sat here all 
day when I could be walking along the beach with the dog? I’ll ask somebody else and 
they can sort it. 
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P10: You have got to live a little bit as well; the phone is supposed to be there to help 
me. And the tablet is supposed to be there for my convenience, really isn’t it? I don’t 
want to be spending all of my time worrying about them. 
As well as general inconvenience, participants discussed how security might have ‘gone too far’, 
with ‘unusable’ security systems themselves becoming a barrier. This led to avoidance and 
frustration. 
P12: it doesn’t accept the fingerprint, it says; you’ve tried ten times to get in, put your 
pin number in. So I don’t know if between the two of us that we have given up, but’s 
that’s the thing, sometimes things are so secure that you think, it’s me! And it is my 
device so why don’t you let me in, you know… 
P1: Every time I went into my bank account they never realized my password and I had 
to keep changing the password, and then they wouldn’t recognize it again and I 
thought… blow this… so I just don’t bother any more. 
For those keen to engage in protective behaviours, ‘unusable’ security can be seen to be 
problematic. Previous research from occupational settings (Kirlappos et al., 2014, 2015) has 
demonstrated that users are often forced to engage in “shadow security”, or workarounds that 
allow them to achieve their goals whilst overcoming security obstacles, by developing their own 
security practices. When understanding is present, an individual can create workarounds, as they 
understand enough about the processes involved to be able to circumvent barriers put in place by 
an organization. Older adults may reflect this in the home, creating “domestic shadow security” 
policies designed to reduce obstacles and allow them to attain their end goals. What is important 
however, is whether their digital literacy skills are sufficient enough to allow for an adequately 
safe workaround. It may be that high levels of perceived effort, coupled with low computer 
literacy leads to avoidance of security practices, as their end goal is ultimately to use the device, 
not to protect it.  
Although the usability of the system may have an impact on whether older adults engage in 
protective behaviours, the extracts from P7 and P10 above suggest that engaging in security is 
seen as an effortful process. Some technology acceptance models, such as the Unified Theory of 
Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) (Venkatesh et al., 2003; Venkatesh & Bala, 2008) 
(and its newer iterations), implicate effort expectancy among the determinants of acceptance and 
ongoing use of technology, and although this is the case for many aspects of technology use 
general technology use (Mitzner et al., 2010; Nägle & Schmidt, 2012; Seifert & Schelling, 2018), 
there remains a scarcity of research investigating how effort expectancy impacts ongoing 
engagement with protective security behaviours in older adults. Future research should investigate 
how the functional usability of protective software and security systems are suited to older adults, 




6.5.5.1.4 | I Don’t Trust That They Are Safe  
Participants were aware that some software was available to make protective behaviours easier, 
such as password managers, but for those who knew of them, there were concerns of how secure 
they would be. 
P15: I’m fearful that get that one and they get everything, and I understand that they… 
the keychain set up is such that theoretically it is a lot better than memory but there is a 
sort of personal controllability assorted to it. 
P18: I’m reluctant to use these packages that look after your passwords for you 
because if they get cracked, it’s all there.  
Ion et al. (2015) reported that those who are more likely to use password managers are also more 
likely to demonstrate higher levels of expertise than those who do not. In a sample aged 18-64, 
Fagan, Albayram, Khan and Buck (2017) supported these findings demonstrating that those with 
higher technical expertise were more likely to use password managers. Interestingly, one of the 
main reasons provided by non-users in their study choosing not to engage in using password 
managers, related to security concerns. This study supports these findings in an older adult 
sample. 
6.5.5.1.5 | It’s Too Important to Get Wrong 
Some participants felt that engaging in protective behaviours was an important issue, so-much-so 
that it was seen as too important to get wrong. Instead, they felt it preferable to rely on others, 
often paid, rather than take risks themselves. 
P3: Because a lot of it I don’t understand, when they ask you some of the questions and 
I would rather someone do it who knows what they are doing. 
P7: To be honest I don’t think I would (Attempt to set up Anti-Virus) because I think it’s 
quite important to have it done properly and I think if I’m going to get something like 
that with the aim of making the thing secure, what’s the point if I’m ballsing it up? 
Although a preference for paid support may provide a baseline level of ongoing protection, this 
is something which is unlikely to be available to all older adults, especially those who struggle 
financially. This raises the question of how these older adults might overcome security obstacles 
which are perceived to be ‘too important to get wrong’. Russell, Weems, Ahmed and Richard 
(2017) found that those who were more neurotic were less likely to practice secure cyber 
behaviours, but were as likely to engage in insecure behaviours. They suggest that high anxiety 
among these individuals may limit the available resources they can dedicate to engaging in 
cybersecurity behaviours. Furthermore, they found that trait anxiety was a positive predictor of 
engagement in insecure cyber behaviours, and that secure behaviour was significantly and 
negatively correlated to trait anxiety. This suggests that those who are more worried about acting 
insecurely are probably justified in their thinking. It may be that these individuals are simply more 
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aware of previous negative experiences, and thus know that they are more likely to experience 
negative consequences in the future. Alternatively, increased levels of anxiety around security 
behaviours may produce enough fear to stop an individual engaging in protective behaviours, but 
not enough to stop them wanting to use the internet completely, thus they have no choice but to 
continue in an insecure way. Further research is required to clarify this issue.  
6.5.5.2 | Not Able To 
6.5.5.2.1 | Something Will Go Wrong 
Although older adults generally displayed positive attitudes towards security behaviours, they 
typically felt unable to safely engage in protective online behaviours. There were a number of 
reasons for this; in a similar vein to it ‘being too important to get wrong’, participants felt unable 
to engage in protective behaviours as doing so would lead to something ‘going wrong’, something 
which reflects the computer self-doubt construct produced in Chapter 5. Those who felt this way 
typically catastrophized when discussing the consequences of attempting to protect themselves, 
something which led to feelings of anxiety around these behaviours. 
P3: Well there are a lot of things I know that you need to do but because I don’t 
understand them I don’t do them. Because I’m always scared that I’m going to push the 
wrong buttons and do the wrong things, lose everything that’s on the program. 
P1: It’s… fear of the unknown shall we say. Because knowing my luck everything would 
go wrong and the computer would blow up or something. It stops me playing around 
with it in case I do something stupid.  
Not all participants were worried about data loss however, one participant discussed how their 
fear revolved around generating a vulnerability to attack, rather than losing data. 
P10: well someone would say to me, oh well that’s alright and I think well I’m not 
doing it, I don’t know… I don’t know why… I just don’t want to be scammed, I’m very 
careful about it [laughs] 
It is interesting that on more than one occasion participants used catastrophizing language to 
describe their perceptions of what might happen if they were to attempt to engage in protective 
behaviours. The language used here may simply reflect hyperbole, used to exaggerate the extent 
of their low technological confidence. Alternatively, this may suggest a more deeply rooted 
anxiety. One theoretical model which might help to understand this behaviour is the Transactional 
Theory of Stress and Coping (TTSC) (Lazarus & Folkman, 1987). Grounded in coping theory, 
the TTSC suggests that coping is the result of stress, something which comes from an appraisal 
process in which an individual compares their resources to their perception of a threat. If stress 
relating to a given threat is low, the individual can engage in ‘problem-focused’ coping, an attempt 
to overcome the problem which is causing the stress. If stress is high, the individual is unable to 
act at the problem-solving level, and instead engages in ‘emotion-focused’ coping, reducing the 
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emotional implications of the situation through strategies such as denial or morphing reality. In 
the participants here, emotion focused coping was prevalent, participants discussed avoiding the 
situation, such as P1 and P3’s comments above. Likewise, in the examples listed below, 
participants discuss how they are not at threat, something which is likely to reflect denial as a 
result of high security stress. Although this model seems useful in explaining this behaviour, very 
little existing research has applied the transactional theory of stress and coping to cyber security, 
something which may benefit future research, especially in older adult contexts. 
6.5.5.2.2 | I Can’t Remember Passwords 
Another way in which participants felt unable to protect themselves involved engagement in safe 
password behaviours. In general, participants reported being unable to remember passwords, 
which also led to feelings of anxiety. 
P19: My biggest worry is you have got something, and you can’t remember your 
password and you can’t get into it. 
P13: My big failing is that most of my devices have the same password and I know that 
if somebody found that, all of my bank accounts and all sorts would have the same… 
[sighs] I should change them… but I wouldn’t remember them.  
This fear of forgetting was present in several participants and even those who were aware of up 
to date password advice, found that the fear of forgetting new passwords caused them to hesitate 
when deciding whether or not to adopt newer guidance. 
P16: I think possibly because I haven’t go onto the strongest recommended type of 
password. I don’t know why I haven’t really… it’s a bit silly isn’t it? It’s ridiculous 
really isn’t it? When you think well that is a stronger password, why aren’t you using 
it? But it’s probably the fear of forgetting is what it is… But then I would have to write 
it down wouldn’t it? Somewhere… so I don’t know… 
Woods and Siponen (2018) present the argument that password memorability is an “imperative” 
issue. They conclude, based on their ‘contextualized metamemory theory’ that users can 
remember more passwords than they believe they can, but that they lack perceived control over 
their memory, lack motivation to remember, and do not understand how their memory works. An 
issue with their findings however is that their sample consisted of 48 participants, the oldest of 
whom fell into the 45 to 54 years old category. They do however acknowledge that age has an 
impact on metamemory (Cavallini et al., 2013) and that their sample was insufficient to 
extrapolate findings to older populations, something which leaves a gap in the literature. In 
comparison to younger users, older adults who report not being able to remember passwords, may 
in fact be telling the truth. Vu and Hills (2013) acknowledged that older adults are under-
researched in password security research. Understanding that older adults are more likely to 
experience declines in word memory ability, they suggest that older adults are better at 
remembering image-based mnemonic techniques rather than attempting to rely on text-based 
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passwords. Although using different authentication methods, where possible, might help older 
adults to remember passwords, participants in this study found themselves needing to make 
“trade-offs” to ensure that they could maintain good cybersecurity practices. 
6.5.5.2.3 | Security Trade-Offs 
The decision to write down passwords, something which has previously been considered poor 
password practice (Adams & Sasse, 1999; Duggan et al., 2012) became an acceptable and even 
necessary trade-off for a number of participants. For those who had strong passwords, there was 
almost always a trade-off required, typically involving the writing down of passwords. Despite 
this, participants had taken it upon themselves to devise strategies to ensure that passwords 
remained secure, typically this involved writing passwords as prompts or in an encrypted format 
rather than in full text. 
P5: The difficult with passwords you see, is you’re supposed to have lots and you’re not 
supposed to write them down but that isn’t actually possible, unless you have got some 
sort of photographic memory or something you know… So you have to find some sort of 
way that you think to have lots of sorts of passwords and be able to access them without 
giving them away, and I’m fairly confident that the way I do it you would actually have 
to know what the main words were before you get very far at all… 
P17: Because I can’t remember them (passwords) that’s why. But I haven’t got them 
written down as they are, I know what they are but nobody else would know. 
This behaviour and indeed this method of encryption was used by a number of participants, 
however some participants had decided to make other trade-offs, opting for more memorable 
passwords and deciding not to write passwords down, as writing passwords was seen to negate 
the positive behaviour. 
P10: I don’t use strong passwords; I use something I can remember 
P3: Well I could do that… (use three random words) but I would have to write them 
down though which then negates it doesn’t it? 
Almost all participants within this study discussed how they wrote down passwords, however 
almost all had devised an encryption system, usually consisting of prompts. The findings here 
support those of earlier work which demonstrate that older adults are prone to writing and storing 
passwords, and supports the notion that the reason for this is due to fears of forgetting them 
(Merdenyan & Petrie, 2018). Although typically participants in this study discussed preferring to 
write down passwords, the findings contrast to findings in younger adults. Boothroyd and 
Chiasson (2013) found that participants typically ignored advice and preferred to remember 
passwords, regardless of whether they were asked to write them down or not. This may however 
be explained by the fact that their sample was aged between 21 and 37 years old. It may be that 
the reasoning for writing and storing passwords for older adults is different to those of younger 
populations. In older adults, it is likely that password availability is seen as a necessity rather than 
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a convenience, with the implications of forgetting passwords seen as far more problematic than 
their younger counterparts, due to low computer self-efficacy and the requirement to carry out a 
number of computer based tasks to retrieve or reset a password. Alternatively, it may be that older 
adults value greater password security than younger adults, something which is suggested by 
earlier password sharing literature (Whitty, Doodson, Creese, & Hodges, 2015).  
All participants who discussed writing down passwords discussed this behaviour with a sense of 
shame, commonly participants used phrases such as ‘I have to admit’ or ‘I do, sorry’. Clearly, 
there is a stigma associated with poor security hygiene or computer literacy, something which 
possibly reflects a reliance on legacy knowledge. Within the workplace, employees are regularly 
reminded not to write down passwords, and previously available domestic advice has supported 
this. The most recent advice from the national cyber security center (NCSC), published in August 
2017 suggests that writing down passwords is acceptable, providing that they are kept in a safe 
place away from devices. It is likely then that the advice provided by the government is not 
accessible, or at the very least not filtering through to those who might need it the most, with older 
adults relying on outdated legacy knowledge to keep themselves safe. 
6.5.5.2.4 | I Don’t Know How To 
Some participants simply felt that they did not have the knowledge of how to protect themselves. 
P1: I have thought about having a password on to protect the computer, but I don’t 
know how to do it. 
P4: Well I wouldn’t know where to start (Updating Software) and I wouldn’t know 
when, sometimes I can remember, like at work you were meant to switch off your 
computer and it would update and whatever, I think mine possibly does that, I’ve not 
used it for a long time and my phone does updates but I wouldn’t know how to updating 
something, do you know what I mean? Well not without automatic anyway. 
Although there are clear risks to older adults being disempowered in relation to protecting 
themselves online, the above participants were aware of their need for protection. It is difficult to 
discuss older adult’s technological knowledge without discussing the ‘digital divide’. Although 
this knowledge divide between younger adults and older adults has previously been explicit, 
generational and cohort effects are currently leading to a blurring of the boundaries in technology 
inequalities between older and younger adults, a term described as a ‘grey divide’ (Friemel, 2016). 
Akin to the findings of Schreurs et al. (2017) this study found that modern day older adults are 
keen to engage in technology and are at times embarrassed by their limited knowledge. However, 
they do show a desire to learn, when outcomes are considered to be within their grasp. Clearly, 
future research should focus on how to empower older adults and equip them with the tools 
necessary to protect themselves online. Modern day older adults are likely to leave the workplace 
with greater levels of digital literacy and as such blurring the lines of the grey divide further, 
should become easier.  
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6.5.5.3 | I Don’t Need To  
6.5.5.3.1 | I’m Not Under Threat 
Two main reasons were provided for not needing to engage in protective behaviours. The first of 
these revolved around feeling as if there was no threat to guard against. One reason for this was 
that environmental factors which surrounded devices gave older adults a level of security which 
meant that device specific security was unnecessary. 
P17: I just feel it’s in the house and it’s secure in the house, nobody can use it apart 
from me 
P1: I used to always work in retail, it was an environment where there was a lot of 
people and a lot of people passing through, strangers and whatever, and you weren’t 
100% of whether your phone was secure enough. If I did say… get a little part time job 
or something and I needed to use the phone in public a lot, I would make sure that I 
went… even if I went back to the phone shop and they showed me how to put a 
password in. 
Another reason why participants felt as if they did not need to protect themselves was that they 
perceived attackers to be more interested in larger, more bountiful targets. 
P7: It’s unlikely that they are going to do that (ransomware attacks) to individuals 
unless you are somebody with some status or some money, what benefit is there? There 
is nothing that I’ve got that anybody would want.  
A wealth of previous literature has demonstrated that people typically demonstrate unrealistic 
optimism for internet events, seeing themselves as less likely to become a victim than others and 
more likely to have a positive experience than others (Campbell et al., 2007; Cho et al., 2010). 
Wash (2010) also found that users have mental models that mean that attackers only target “Big 
Fish” in home computer security as did Redmiles, Malone and Mazurek (2016), with participants 
seeing themselves not to be at risk. One issue with this previous literature however, like many 
areas of security research, is that findings are based either heavily upon younger samples which 
ignore older adults, or do not seek to investigate age differences between participants in their 
samples. The findings here suggest that similar unrealistic optimism biases, and a similar “big 
fish” mental model, may also be present in older adults.  
6.5.5.3.2 | It’s Not My Responsibility 
The second reason that participants gave for not needing to engage in protective behaviours is 
that they felt that security was not their responsibility, often this responsibility was delegated to 
others such as their spouse. 
P6: If it was on my computer at home, I wouldn’t be confident. It has got the protection 
but I would leave that to my husband to do, but it’s not my responsibility. 
P13: Erm… I do get… if there is any notification about the firewall I just tell [husband] 
and he does something about that 
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This delegation of responsibility was for some seen as not part of their ‘role’ and instead was part 
of the responsibility of paid professionals.  
P18: Norton now have got warnings of possibly fake sites or ones to be a bit wary of, 
but they should really protect you against I would think all threats, that’s what we pay 
them for. 
P6: Whoever provides your computing services, it is also their responsibility to you as a 
user and presumably their knowledge and expertise is in protecting their users 
Interestingly, one participant likened engaging in security protection to how they manage their 
car. 
P10: Update it? Erm… I just don’t know what I’m doing so I don’t do it. It’s like the 
car, I never sort of mess about with the engine, it’s not my problem.  
This delegation of responsibility may be a way that users can resolve dissonance around wanting 
to remain safe whilst online, while knowing that they do not have the knowledge or understanding 
to manage their security safety. Relying on trusted others, whether this be a relative or a paid 
professional was seen as an acceptable way to detach from the responsibility of having to engage 
in such behaviours. 
P5: Cyber safety and whatever… simply because I don’t understand it and I know I 
don’t, so if somebody I trust has put software protection on my machine then good, but I 
don’t take any ownership in a sense if you see what I mean. 
Detachment from security responsibility poses a dangerous issue for cybersecurity vulnerability 
and has been seen in recent workplace based literature (Nicholson et al., 2018). This is especially 
the case as the reliance on trusted others can only protect a person so-far. Having strong anti-virus 
installed by a trusted other may provide a baseline of protection against a range of threats, but 
without a personal ownership of security, threats that cannot be detected by software, such as 
social engineering attacks or apocryphal emails may lead to increased vulnerability in those 
relying on pre-established protection. Howe, Ray, Roberts and Urbanska (2012) outline how 
when home computer users are aware of threats, they care about security and view it as their 
responsibility, however many users do not understand threats and are thus unwilling or unable to 
try to protect against them. With older adults at increased risk of low computer self-efficacy this 
may be particularly problematic in an older adult population, and thus promoting understanding 
of threats to this population may be an important first step to increasing personal ownership of 
security and digital empowerment in older adults. 
6.6 | Discussion 
6.6.1 | Development of a Card-Sorting Task 
One contribution of this study is the development of a novel card-sorting task designed to increase 
the breadth and depth of conversation around concepts which older adults find particularly 
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difficult to understand and interact with (Vaportzis et al., 2017). Following on from existing 
research which has applied similar designs in the same field (Nicholson et al., 2018), this study 
involved the production of a bi-axis chart with prompt cards to facilitate conversation. This task 
proved useful in promoting conversation, with the prompt cards providing a starting point for 
discussion. Furthermore, the process of forced ranking (in assessing protective effectiveness) 
pushed participants to challenge their understanding of each of the concepts, before making 
judgement decisions based on their underlying mental models. Although this study did not set out 
to specifically investigate mental models, the task developed here, and it’s precursors, may be 
particularly useful for accessing such mental model representations in future research (Nicholson 
et al., 2018).  
Participants also gave positive feedback relating to their experience of engaging in the task. They 
suggested that engaging in such a task, forced them to question their own understanding of 
security practices, and suggested that doing so led to eye-opening realizations about how their 
behaviour, or lack thereof, was likely to influence their vulnerability. An additional contribution 
of this research is that it allowed for the testing, acceptability and feasibility of such a card sorting 
task in an older adult sample, whilst discussing topics usually seen to be outside of the 
understanding of such a sample (Grimes et al., 2010).  One reason why this task may have been 
particularly effective in promoting meaningful discussion could be due to the availability of other 
discussion prompts throughout the interview. With all prompts in front of the participant, they 
were able to revisit other topics whilst discussing the current prompt card. This allowed 
participants to discuss security within the context of other security behaviours and make 
associations between them. At times this was revealing to participants where they started to see 
connections between protective behaviours, realizing how protective practices are important 
across the board, rather than through one or two specific behaviours. Indeed Nicholson et al. 
(2018) suggest that such tasks may be useful for training purposes, something which may also be 
useful outside of workplace settings. 
Finally, through the late introduction of a confidence axis, participants were able to visualize how 
their confidence related to their perceived effectiveness of the security behaviours. The 
relationship between confidence and effectiveness beliefs is an interesting avenue for future 
research. 
6.6.2 | Implications for Researchers and Policy Makers 
6.6.2.1 | Researchers 
A range of recommendations for future research arose from this work. Akin to workplace shadow 
security policies, research should address the domestic security policies that older adults, and 
those of younger generations put in place to protect themselves at home. Understanding these 
policies may in turn elucidate why people act as they do in relation to security behaviours. In 
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addition, future research should investigate how effort expectancy surrounding the process of 
protection feeds into how older adults engage (or disengage) in protective behaviours.  
The delegation of security to others, and the reduction in personal responsibility for security was 
identified in this research. Future research should attempt to determine whether this is something 
which is better, as it provides a higher baseline of security, or worse, as it may provide a ‘false 
sense of cybersecurity’ in older adults. It would also be interesting to determine how digital 
vigilance and susceptibility to social engineering type attacks differs based on the level of 
personal responsibility feels over online protection. Understanding this process further would 
allow us to determine whether we should promote stronger support mechanisms or promote 
personal responsibility for security, something which is likely to be a contentious issue between 
security researchers.  
Future research should also have a greater focus on the role of emotion in older adult’s technology 
use. We know that older adults can become anxious about engaging in online protective 
behaviours, and that security is a stressful subject for older adults, yet we know relatively little 
about how this emotion manifests and influences behaviour in the moment, something which 
lends itself to experimental research. 
6.6.2.2 | Policy Makers 
Shortly after the completion of this study, the CyberAware website was taken down to be updated. 
In future, it will be interesting to note how the new advice differed to that of before, however 
there are some recommendations that can come from this paper for such advice. Firstly, 
conflicting advice (https is no longer reliable after years of this being key advice) (Herzberg, 
2009) may cause a sense of distrust in older adults. The message that is delivered regarding new 
advice should come with a note of caution that the internet offers a rapidly changing environment 
and not unlike a map, can often be out of date by the time it is published.  
Secondly, advice should be readily accessible to older adults, some of which are the most in need 
and the most desiring of such advice. At the date of writing, the advice currently provided on the 
NCSC site is not appropriate to those older adults i.e. the section entitled “dealing with common 
cyber problems” outlines “straightforward advice” and yet uses jargon such as Malware. This is 
likely to undermine older adults, or those with low digital literacy, reinforcing feelings of low 
self-efficacy and contributing to digital exclusion (Briggs & Thomas, 2015). Either this advice 
needs to be simplified or separate advice should be prepared for those unable to understand such 
terminology. Something as simple as hover-over definitions would give older adults a much 
greater chance of breaking through jargon. Policy makers should attempt to work with both older 
adult researchers and older adults themselves to provide appropriate, digestible, tailored advice. 
It appears that Age-UK are currently leading the way in terms of providing accessible cyber 
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security advice, however with the age of retirement declining, some may feel that they are too 
young to engage with organizations historically focused on helping older adults. Their recent 
internet advice (Age UK, 2017) document provides information more accessible to older adults, 
and should be emulated in government advice. 
This study also supports earlier findings that mental models may be key to understanding older 
adult’s engagement with security behaviours. Campaigns should seek to improve and develop 
basic mental models, designed at promoting mechanistic understanding, something which may 
also inspire confidence through increasing tangibility of threats and behaviours. Furthermore, 
such campaigns should seek to promote feelings of control, something which is likely to promote 
acceptance of such behaviours (Bada et al., 2019). Finally, the findings of this study suggest that 
campaigns that promote positive support styles “show them, don’t do it for them” may be useful 
in changing how support is delivered.  
6.7 | Chapter Summary 
This chapter set out to investigate older adults understanding of, and engagement in, online 
protective behaviours. It sought to understand the what impacts the confidence that older adults 
have when engaging in protective online behaviours and identified a number of factors that stop 
from doing so. The findings of this study reaffirm that older adults are keen to continue to use 
technology and see the benefit of doing so, more importantly older adults are keen to protect 
themselves online and generally understand the repercussions of not doing so. When possible, 
older adults are keen to engage in protective behaviours, but often this is seen as an unforgiving 
process which generates anxiety and avoidance. Poor sources of support in terms of available 
information and support structures may contribute to declining digital literacy in older adults, and 
lead to lower salience of cyber protection, something which researchers and policy makers should 
attempt to counteract.  
A key unanticipated finding of this study was that cybersecurity is an emotive subjective for older 
adults. They discussed fear, stress and anxiety around security behaviours, especially when 
confidence was seen to be low in engaging in security behaviours. Although this finding posed 
an interesting relationship i.e. that the emotional component of security might lead to engagement 
in poorer security behaviours, no existing models currently in circulation in security allowed for 
the testing of such a relationship. This led to a search for appropriate behavioral models which 
focus on the emotional components of behaviour. Although some models applied to security have 
an emotional component, many are unsuitable through their focus on threat appraisals rather than 
coping appraisals, thus a search was conducted to find a model which might be more suitable for 
understanding how emotion influences subsequent security coping behaviours. Finding such a 
model was seen to provide an avenue through which older adults security behaviours might be 
understood as a result of their emotional response to security stressors. In the following chapter 
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the transactional model of stress and coping, a model used extensively in psychology but rarely 
applied in HCI settings, is outlined as one such possible model. The following chapter provides a 
review of what this model is, how it has been applied, and how it might inform the remaining 
























Chapter 7: The Transactional Theory of Stress and Coping 
7.1 | Chapter Introduction 
The previous study found that security was typically seen as an emotive topic for older adults, 
particularly in those who had lower confidence in relation to protecting themselves online. 
Although existing psychological behavioral models have been applied within security settings to 
help explain security behaviours, as discussed within Chapter 2, often these models focus on 
threat rather than coping, and typically ignore the emotional component of security. This chapter 
seeks to outline a psychological model of behaviour change which explores the way in which 
coping behaviours are influenced as a result of a stress response. Although this model has been 
widely applied in other areas, its use in HCI settings is limited, however given the findings of the 
previous chapter, this model may be particularly helpful in explaining how older adults engage 
with cybersecurity as a result of the stress that it generates. 
7.2 | Introduction to The Transactional Theory of Stress and Coping 
 
 
Figure 11 Transactional Theory of Stress and Coping (Lazarus and Folkman, 1987) 
 
The transactional theory of stress and coping (TTSC) (Figure 11), suggested by Lazarus and 
Folkman (1987) suggests that behaviour in the face of stressful situations results from a two part 
appraisal process. They outline how stressors generate an emotional response (stress), and the 
way in which the stressor is appraised against an individual’s resources, determines their 
subsequent coping response. They differentiate between the two stages of appraisal. The first, or 
primary appraisal, concerns the motivational stressor. Here an assessment is made regarding 
whether the event is seen to be harmful (based on past experience), threatening (anticipatory 
threat) or challenging (an opportunity for potential mastery). The secondary appraisal is vitally 
linked to the primary appraisal and concerns how much control is seen to be had over the stressor 
as a result of the resources an individual has access to. The level of control when combined with 
the perceived threat together generate a stress response. 
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The coping component of their theory concerns the outcome of the primary and secondary 
appraisal and refers to the ways in which the stress or emotional response is handled. When the 
appraisal process leads to a high stress response, i.e. when control over the stressor is seen to be 
low, but the threat is seen to be high, people are unable to see any way to overcome the stressor 
and as such must focus on regulating the resultant emotional stress, termed as emotion-focused 
coping. When stress is low on the other hand, people are able to exert control over the stressor 
and focus on overcoming the problem, termed problem-focussed coping. Although Lazarus and 
Folkman (1987) suggest that both emotional and problem focused coping can be useful dependent 
on the situation and stressor, they also suggested that some forms of coping, such as ‘wishful 
thinking’, might generally be considered dysfunctional coping, being unlikely to help any given 
situation.  
Within these three overarching coping strategies exist a range of different coping strategies 
identified in existing coping literature. Based on the Ways of Coping Scale (Folkman & Lazarus, 
1980) and building upon the work of the TTSC (Lazarus & Folkman, 1987), The COPE, 
suggested by Carver, Scheier and Weintraub (1989) is a 60-item scale designed to measure the 
varying methods of coping which might be used following the appraisal process. They outline 13 
conceptually distinct scales, which span across the three major coping subscales (emotion 
focussed, problem focussed and dysfunctional coping). Active coping for example, is the process 
of taking active steps to overcome or circumvent a given stressor, something which would be 
considered problem focussed coping. In contrast, seeking emotional support (over instrumental 
support) would represent emotion focused coping. Self-blame on the other hand can be seen to 
neither benefit the individual emotionally (emotion focussed coping) or overcome the stressor 
(problem focussed coping) and as such represents a dysfunctional form of coping. In a follow up 
from this work, Carver (1997) developed a shortened 28-item version of the same scale named 
the ‘Brief COPE’. These scales, when used alongside an appropriate measure of an emotional 
response e.g. stress, can provide insight into the relationship between a given stressor and the 
coping strategy used to remedy the stress.  
7.3 | Applying the Transactional Model of Stress and Coping 
Although the transactional model of stress and coping might provide useful insights into 
cybersecurity behaviours in older adults, its application has three key pre-requisites representing 
areas of the model. The appraisal process comprises the first of these components. The appraisal 
process requires both a perceived stressor and an assessment of the resources that an individual is 
able to rally against the stressor. The second required component is a measure of the emotional 
response that results from the appraisal process, usually stress. The third and final component 
when applying this model to understand behaviour, is a measure of the specific coping 
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mechanisms which are relied upon to resolve the stress response that arises during the appraisal 
process. The following sections will outline each of these components.  
7.3.1 | Component 1: Measures of Primary (Stressor) and Secondary (Resources) 
Appraisals 
For an event to be considered a stressor within the context of coping theory, it must generate a 
stress response adequate enough to force the individual into the appraisal process, i.e. the stressor 
must be considered a threat, challenge, or opportunity for mastery (Lazarus & Folkman, 1987). If 
a stressor is not considered stressful, the individual will not feel the need to engage in an appraisal 
process, and thus no behavioural response is motivated. In existing research, stressors and the 
assessment of an individual’s resources have been measured in a number of ways across a range 
of research settings.  
Perhaps the most obvious example of this is the assessment of an individual’s self-efficacy against 
a known stressor. For example Ringeisen, Lichtenfeld, Becker and Minkley (2019) conducted a 
study seeking to understand stress experiences during an oral exam, and how self-efficacy, threat 
appraisals, anxiety and cortisol levels influenced this relationship. In this example the impending 
oral exam represents a clear stressor. Through measuring threat appraisals of the examination, 
Ringeisen et al. (2019) were able to demonstrate that an individual’s self-efficacy was negatively 
associated with the perceived threat of the exam. These findings align with TTSC in that assessing 
one’s resources highly, as might be expected in those with higher self-efficacy, leads to greater 
feelings of control over the stressor, reducing the stress response in relation to the threat and 
reducing the stress appraisal.  
Another example can be seen in healthcare settings. When seeking to understand psychological 
adjustment to cancer, Laubmeier, Zakowski and Bair (2004) measured perceptions of how life 
threatening patients cancer was as a given stressor. They hypothesised that the measures of 
spirituality, as one appraisal resource, would buffer the impact of life threat on psychological 
adjustment. They identified that regardless of perceived life threat, higher levels of spirituality 
were associated with less distress, symptom severity and increased quality of life. 
7.3.2 | Component 2: A Measure of Stress 
The second component that is required to apply TTSC to understanding behaviour is a measure 
of domain specific stress, i.e. something which measures stress related specifically to the stressor. 
For example, Gibbons (2010) set out to understand stress, coping and burnout among a sample of 
171 final year nursing students, within a TTSC framework. They used a domain specific stress 
scale (The index of sources of stress in nurses scale) which measured stress specific to the nursing 
education environment across factors such as learning and teaching, placement related stress and 
course organisation demands. Ultimately through the use of this scale they were able to attribute 
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the specific causes of stress (namely placement experience) to coping and burnout in this 
population.  
Another example that applied TTSC using a specific measure of stress can be seen in the study 
by Alhija (2015). They set out to understand how ‘teacher stress’ was influenced by their personal 
and job characteristics through the use of the 23-item teacher stress scale. This scale measures 
stress across a number of specific teaching relating demands such as workload, school climate, 
student behaviour and educational policy. Ultimately through the use of this measure alongside 
measures of coping specific to teaching workplaces, they outline a range of correlations that exist 
between specific forms of teaching stress and coping strategies applied by teachers.  
To apply the TTSC to cybersecurity behaviours, it is important to have a measure of the level of 
stress that is produced by engagement in cybersecurity. D’Arcy et al. (2014) developed a scale 
(the security related stress scale) based on ‘technostress creators’ (Tarafdar et al., 2010). They 
sought to understand how stress specifically generated by engagement in cybersecurity practices 
might influence subsequent coping behaviours. Through applying coping theory, they were able 
to establish how security related stress influenced subsequent behaviour, namely through 
promoting moral disengagement as a specific emotion focussed coping strategy, they were able 
to draw an association between security related stress and specific forms of coping.  
7.3.3 | Component 3: A Measure of Coping 
The Brief COPE, a scale used in a number of the studies mentioned above; is one of the most 
widely applied coping scales across all research settings (Kato, 2015). At the time of writing 
(May, 2020), the scale has over 5500 citations and has been applied in a wide range of research 
settings. For example, Cooper, Katona and Livingston (2008) applied the brief cope in 125 family 
carers of people with Alzheimer’s disease to understand how coping changed as perceptions of 
burden changed. They found that as burden increased, so too did problem focussed and 
dysfunctional coping styles. In a very different setting, Rafique, Anjum, & Raheem (2016) 
translated the Brief COPE and applied it to understand the effects of terrorism on the coping 
strategies used by men in both directly and indirectly exposed groups. They identified tendencies 
towards specific coping mechanisms for these groups. For example, the group directly exposed 
to terrorism scored more highly on self-distraction and venting coping strategies, whereas the 
indirectly exposed group scored more highly on denial, humour and acceptance.  
The Brief COPE has also been applied to a range of online settings, such as online and cyber-
bullying. Cheng, Sun and Mak (2015) for example conducted a 6-month study in which they 
sought to understand the psychological mechanisms underlying interaction addiction and 
psychosocial maladjustment in a sample of 271 Chinese undergraduate students. They identified 
that inflexible avoidant coping styles explained the link between internet addiction and 
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psychosocial maladjustment. McLoughlin (2019) used the Brief COPE to understand cyber-
bullying in a sample of 229 Australian 12-17 year old adolescents. They identified that young 
people who utilised unproductive coping strategies were also more likely to score highly on 
measures of depression, anxiety and stress. The also highlighted how the Brief COPE was a useful 
tool for understanding coping in relation to online cyber-bullying behaviours. Despite its wide 
use in a range of settings, and its more recent application in online settings, the brief cope has not 
yet been applied in cybersecurity settings, something which may be particularly interesting due 
to the scarcity of coping literature in this area.  
Emerging research outlines that technology use and cybersecurity are emotive concepts, and that 
emotion is important in security decision making (McDermott, 2012), something supported by 
the findings of Chapter 6. Emotion is likely to influence cybersecurity behaviours in a number of 
ways, however two main ways by which this may take place are clear. The first is that emotion 
can be used as a weapon against technology users within a cyber-attack, examples include social 
engineering attacks such as romance scams (Buchanan & Whitty, 2014; Whitty, Doodson, Creese, 
& Hodges, 2015; Whitty, 2017) or through phishing emails and mass marketing fraud which 
promise lottery winnings and other such incentives (Sannd & Cook, 2018; Whitty & Orbit, 2015). 
The second emotive aspect of security relates to the real or perceived negative repercussions of 
being a victim of a cyber-attack, the fear, anxiety and stress associated with this, and how these 
outcomes influence ongoing security behaviours. To understand more about how emotion, or 
within the context of TTSC, stress, might be associated with security coping behaviours, studies 
are required which apply structural modelling to understand the relationships between appraisal 
factors, stress and cybersecurity coping.   
So far this thesis has demonstrated that following retirement older adults are at risk of being left 
without adequate resources to protect themselves online. Furthermore, it has identified that older 
adults find security to be a complex and emotive subject. Given the stressful nature of 
cybersecurity to older adults, we might expect that their response to security threats leans towards 
more dysfunctional forms of coping, designed at reducing the perceived stress of security, rather 
than fixing the stressful situation. Thus, older adults may be more inclined to “bury their heads in 
the sand”, engaging in denial and other such coping strategies, rather than address the challenging 
and often stressful repercussions of having to deal with security threats, however before this can 
be established, appropriate measures of security related stress must be produced.  
7.4 | Chapter Summary 
Within this chapter it has been established that the transactional model of stress and coping might 
be useful when seeking to understand older adult’s online security behaviours as a product of the 
stress they feel towards perceived security threats. However to be able to properly apply this 
model, an appropriate measure of cybersecurity related stress that can be used outside of 
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workplace settings is required. The following chapter seeks to address this gap in the literature by 
developing a measure of general security related stress, whilst seeking to understand the 
association between security related stress and the three major coping styles identified in existing 
literature (dysfunctional, emotion focussed, and problem focussed coping). In doing so, the 
chapter will provide the foundations for the final study (Chapter 9) of the thesis which seeks to 
use structural equation modelling to explain older adult’s cybersecurity coping behaviours in the 




















Chapter 8: (Study 4): Developing A New Measure of General Cybersecurity 
Related Stress (GSRS) and Applying it to Understand Security Coping in A Baby 
Boomer Sample 
8.1 | Chapter Introduction 
The previous chapter provided an outline of the Transaction Theory of Stress and Coping (TTSC) 
(Lazarus & Folkman, 1987), suggesting that this theory might be useful when seeking to 
understand older adults’ cybersecurity behaviour. The previous chapter also outlined the three 
necessary components required in order to apply this theory:, a measure of primary (threat) and 
secondary (resource) appraisals, a measure of stress and a measure of coping. 
The first component discussed in Chapter 7 outlines the primary and secondary appraisal process. 
Within the context of TTSC these reflect the assessment of a threat (Primary appraisal) and how 
damaging this threat might be. The individual then appraises their available resources that might 
be rallied against the perceived threat. Some resources are likely to be personal characteristics, 
such as an individual’s knowledge or self-efficacy. Others are likely to be external to the 
individual, such as the level of support they can gain from others. Within the context of security, 
some scales already exist that might be used to measure an individual’s primary and secondary 
appraisals. With regards to the primary appraisal, existing measures are currently in circulation 
which allow for the measurement of threat appraisal in the form of threat severity and threat 
vulnerability (Liang et al., 2019; Tsai et al., 2016).  
With regards to measurements of an individual’s resources (secondary appraisal) some measures 
already exist for the assessment of an individual’s resources. Kajzer, Darcy, Crowell, Striegel and 
Van Bruggen (2014) for example used a security knowledge scale, alongside measures of 
personality traits to determine how security awareness messages were received depending on an 
individual’s characteristics. Similarly Martens, De Wolf and De Marez (2019) developed a 
security self-efficacy construct and used it to understand why people do or do not protect 
themselves within the context of PMT.  
As well as metrics that designed to measure the primary and secondary appraisal, there currently 
exists measures which allow for the measurement of the coping appraisal component of TTSC. 
Coping is widely measured using scales such as the COPE (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989) 
and Brief COPE (Carver, 1997), discussed in depth in Chapter 7. These scales represent a wealth 
of possible behavioural responses which might take place in response to varying stressors. These 
scales have been used in a broad range of literature (discussed within Chapter 7) and as such 
represent a broad range of possible coping styles such as: denial, behavioural disengagement, self-




Although measures exist for coping, primary and secondary appraisals, TTSC cannot yet be 
applied in general security related settings due to the scarcity of scales which can measure security 
related stress. As outlined in the previous chapter, D’Arcy et al. (2014) developed one such 
measure, the Security Related Stress scale (SRS) - however it’s use is limited to organisational 
settings due to items reflecting stressors unique to the workplace (e.g. security policies). 
Participants in Chapter 6 described security as a stressful topic, and this fed into their decision not 
to engage in security practices. However, without the development of an appropriate measurement 
instrument, the application of TTSC remains confined to workplace settings, even though it offers 
promise outside of such settings. For this reason, this chapter aims to develop a non-workplace 
measure of general security stress. 
While developing a more general measure of security related stress might be useful for mapping 
the TTSC onto security coping behaviours, it also has more immediate uses. As the stress 
component sits within the middle of the TTSC (see Figure 12 below) it can be seen to have two 
possible immediate uses before being applied in an overarching structural model. Firstly, such a 
measure could be used to establish the association between a given threat, the assessment of one’s 
resources against the threat (the appraisal process) and the resultant stress level that the threat 
generates. Alternatively, it could be used to understand how different levels of security related 






The discussion above highlights the need for a measure of security related stress. This chapter 
outlines the development of such a measure and is split into two key parts: Part 1 outlines the 
development and initial validation of a measure of general security related stress. Following this, 
part 2 uses this scale to understand the relationship between security related stress and the three 
major coping styles measured by the brief cope (emotion focussed, problem focussed and 
dysfunctional coping). Part 2 also revisits the earlier suggestions that the retirement transition 
might be a key factor in cybersecurity vulnerability for older adults. 
 
Figure 12 Simplified Transactional Theory of Stress and Coping Model 
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8.2 | Part 1: Development and Initial Validation of a New General Security Related Stress 
scale (GSRS) 
The aim of the first part of the study was to create and initially validate a new measure of security 
related stress for use outside of organisational settings. Although this thesis focusses on older 
adults, and particularly towards those within the baby boomer generation, this scale could be 
useful for the whole population, irrespective of age. The decision was therefore made to develop 
the scale using a large-scale sample, representative of the UK population. There currently exists 
a dearth of rigorously developed psychometric instruments in the extant literature base. 
Developing the scale in a representative sample at the point of creation not only meant that the 
scale could be used within this study but could be more widely used in future studies in different 
populations.  
8.3 | Part 1 Method 
8.3.1 | Survey Development 
8.3.1.1 | Security Related Stress 
D’Arcy, Herath, & Shoss (2014) developed the Security Related Stress (SRS) scale and applied 
it to understand deliberate information security policy violations. Based within technostress 
literature, their scale measures stress that accrues as a result of burdensome, complex and 
ambiguous information security requirements. This scale was designed to capture the security 
stresses experienced by employees, yet users outside of the workplace are also required to engage 
in complex security practices (Nicholson et al., 2019). The aim here was to develop a non-
workplace security stress scale, however, the starting point was to take the factors (overload, 
uncertainty and complexity) from the original SRS scale. 
Each item of the original SRS was reviewed between the student and the supervisory team. Each 
item was evaluated in relation to its original construct, as well as how the item could be modified 
to allow for non-workplace application, while maintaining the original essence of the items. For 
example; within the complexity subscale of the SRS, item 1 states: “I find that new employees 
often know more about information security than I do” this item was modified to remove 
“employees” and replaced with the word others to make the item “I find that other people often 
know more about online security than I do”. Ultimately, it was seen that this item captured the 
original essence of the item used within the SRS, i.e. that the individual rated themselves poorly 
against other individuals, something which reflected the complexity of security, and something 
which subsequently generated feelings of stress.  
Although some items involved simple replacements of one or two words, other items were more 
difficult to translate into non-workplace settings. For example, the second item of the overload 
subscale (OL2) states: “My organization’s information security policies and procedures hinder 
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my very tight time schedules.” This item clearly implies that engaging in security means less time 
to engage in other tasks, leading to an burdening effect and feelings of overload in relation to 
security. Given that users do not have such information security policies typically available within 
home settings, this item was modified to try to capture the essence of security taking more time 
than an individual would necessarily want to commit. The modified item was: “Protecting myself 
online takes too much time”. Although this item does not refer to the adoption or following of 
guidance, it is designed to reflect the feeling that engaging in security detracts from other activities 
and produces unnecessary burdens.  
Another example of how items were modified can be seen in item CX1. The original SRS item 
states “I find that new employees often know more about information security than I do”. This 
item reflects a comparison of an individual’s ability against others in relation to their knowledge 
of security. Where this assessment leads to the individual seeing themselves as lacking, stress is 
produced. According to the original technostress literature (Tarafdar et al., 2010) and SRS scale 
developed by D’Arcy (2014), the stress that is derived from security complexity is due to the fear 
that one may lose their job if they are seen to have inadequate technical ability, and that they may 
be replaced by those who do. Participants from Chapters 4 and 6 however also referred to the 
difficulties associated with the complexity of technology. Existing literature has demonstrated 
that older adults may feel embarrassed about asking for technology support (Hill et al., 2015; 
Sandhu et al., 2013) this likely reflects that having poor digital literacy is stigmatised in current 
society. Items were created to reflect the stress that is likely associated with uncertainty around 
uncertainty. Item CX1 was adapted to state “I find that other people often know more about online 
security than I do”.    
Table 16 below outlines the full list of items from the original SRS scale, alongside the items 
adapted for home use, to be used within this study. All items of the GSRS, as with the original 
SRS were measured on 7-point Likert scales reflecting agreement (from Strongly Disagree – 1, 
to Strongly Agree – 7). 
Following the development of the initial set of items, the newly generated items were subjected 








Table 16 Original SRS, Initial Proposed Items and Post-Pilot Items of the SRS and GSRS. 
 
8.3.1.2 | Piloting Items 
The first phase of piloting aimed to ensure that each item was interpreted by potential participants 
in the way it was intended. To this end, two older adults (1 male and 1 female) were invited to 
take part in a ‘think aloud’ exercise, whereby they attempted to complete the scale while 
vocalising their thoughts as they completed the questionnaire. This method has been used in 
existing research attempting to aid in developing better psychometric instruments (Renberg et al., 
2008). As well asking participants to explain any vocalisations they had about the readability and 
clarity of questions, participants were asked about their understanding and thoughts behind each 
item and whether there would be any issues associated with completing the items.  Items were 
changed following this phase based on their suggestions for acceptability purposes. Of the original 
Code Original SRS Item GSRS Items (Initial) 
CX1 I find that new employees often know 
more about information security than I do 
I find that other people often know 
more about online security than I do 
CX2 I do not know enough about information 
security to comply with my organization’s 
policies in this area 
I do not know enough about online 
security to protect myself 
CX3 I often find it difficult to understand my 
organization’s information security 
policies 
I often find it difficult to understand 
what is required to keep myself safe 
online 
CX4 It takes me awhile to understand my 
organization’s information security 
policies and procedures. 
It takes me a while to understand cyber 
security advice and guidance  
CX5 I sometimes do not have time to comply 
with my organization’s information 
security policies 
I sometimes do not have time to follow 
online security advice and guidance 
OL1 I am forced by information security 
policies and procedures to do more work 
than I can handle. 
Keeping myself safe online is more 
than I can handle 
OL2 My organization’s information security 
policies and procedures hinder my very 
tight time schedules. 
Protecting myself online takes too much 
time 
OL3 I have a higher workload due to increased 
information security requirements. 
Engaging in cyber security practices is 
taxing 
OL4 I am forced to change my work habits to 
adapt to my organization’s information 
security requirements 
I am forced to change my habits to 
properly protect myself online 
UC1 There are constant changes in information 
security policies and procedures in my 
organization. 
Cyber security advice is constantly 
changing 
UC2 There are frequent upgrades to 
information security procedures in my 
organization. 
I am always having to learn new cyber 
security behaviours 
UC3 There are always new information 
security requirements in my job. 
There is always new online security 
guidance that I should follow 
UC4 There are constant changes in security-
related technologies in my organization 




12 items given to the two participants, 5 items were highlighted as poorly worded and in need of 
change. These items, alongside the revised items which were subsequently agreed with the 
participants can be seen in Table 17 below.  
Before continuing on to the second round of piloting, two additional items were added as attention 
checks; these checks were items with explicit instructions of which response to choose and were 
designed to ensure that participants were paying attention to the survey. In the second phase of 
piloting, the survey was administered online to a sample of older adults (Aged 50+, n=60) using 
‘Prolific’ a UK based data collection company. This ‘soft-launch’ provided information on how 
long the survey would take, as well as ensuring that the online survey was set up correctly (i.e. 
identify any opportunities for missing data etc.).  
Table 17 Items Adapted Following Piloting Round 
8.3.2 | Participants and Online Survey Distribution  
The final instrument was distributed online using Prolific in November 2019. During piloting, the 
complete survey took on average 8 minutes to complete. Participants in the main study were 
therefore remunerated with £0.90 for completing the survey, an amount deemed ‘fair’ by Prolific. 
In total 901 respondents accessed the survey. Of these, 28 responses were removed due to 
attention check failures. Following removal, 873 responses were included in the data analysis. No 
missing data was present in the collected data due to items requiring a forced response. A 
representative sample of the UK population was collected, which consisted of 426 Males (48.8%, 
MAge = 44.13, SDAge = 15.35) and 445 Females (50.97%, MAge = 45.16, SDAge = 15.50). One 




Code GSRS Items (Initial) GSRS Items – Post-Piloting 
CX4 It takes me a while to understand 
cyber security advice and guidance  
I struggle to understand cyber security 
advice and guidance 
OL1 Keeping myself safe online is more 
than I can handle 
Keeping myself safe online is too 
demanding 
OL3 Engaging in cyber security practices 
is taxing 
Engaging in cyber security practices takes 
too much effort 
OL4 I am forced to change my habits to 
properly protect myself online 
I am forced to change how I behave online 
to properly protect myself 
UC2 I am always having to learn new 
cyber security behaviours 
I am always having to learn new procedures 
and processes to stay safe online 
n.b. – all other items remained as in Table 16.  
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8.4 | Part 1 Results 
8.4.1 | Summary of Approach 
Given that it is considered best practice to conduct confirmatory factor analysis in a fresh sample 
of data (Pett, Lackey & Sullivan, 2003), the sample was split in half prior to analysis using SPSS’ 
built in random split tool. The first half of the dataset (n=437) was to be used to explore the data 
using exploratory factor analysis. Following this, the second half of the dataset was used to 
perform the confirmatory factor analysis (n=436).   
8.4.2 | Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) 
EFA was conducted as items were adapted from the SRS (D’Arcy, 2014). Conducting EFA meant 
that items could be checked to ensure that they still aligned with their original constructs 
(Complexity, Overload and Uncertainty).  
Prior to EFA, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO) and Bartlett’s test 
of sphericity were conducted to ensure the factorability of the data and thus the suitability of EFA. 
Initial KMO was .880 and Bartlett’s test was significant (χ2 (78) = 3556.82, p<.001). These values 
are greater than the recommended cut off values of KMO>.60 and Bartlett’s significance (p<.05), 
indicating that the data was appropriate for EFA (Carpenter, 2018). 
 
 Group n % of Sample 
Gender Male 427 48.91% 
 Female 446 51.1% 
 Prefer not to Say 1 0.11% 
    
Age 18-27 156 17.87% 
 28-37 155 17.75% 
 38-47 162 18.56% 
 48-57 144 16.49% 
 58+ 256 29.32% 
    
Ethnicity Asian 71 8.13% 
 Black 35 4.01% 
 Mixed 21 2.41% 
 Other 16 1.83% 

















Figure 13 Scree Plot 
8.4.2.1 | Extraction and Rotation 
Maximum Likelihood (ML) with Varimax Rotation were used. ML was chosen as the extraction 
method as P-P plots indicated that the data was normally distributed, as well as its generalisability 
to confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) (Carpenter, 2018). Multiple extraction techniques were 
used to decide on the number of factors extracted. Investigation of the scree plot as well as 
eigenvalues greater than one were used in accordance with published guidance to decide on the 
number of factors to be extracted (Williams, Onsman, & Brown, 2010). The scree plot can be 







8.4.2.2 | Item Removal and Final Factor Structure 
Item removal was conducted whilst considering a range of factors. Firstly, the pattern matrix was 
assessed for non-loadings, cross-loadings and weak loadings (<.40). Secondly, the communalities 
table was assessed to determine which factors shared the least variance with the other factor items 
(As recommended by Worthington and Whittaker (2006)). Before any removal decision was 
made, items were considered in relation to their theoretical background and construct structure.  
The initial model explained 64.89% of the variance however one item cross-loaded on two factors. 
Item C5 “I sometimes do not have time to follow online security advice and guidance loaded both 
into complexity and overload (.565 on F1, .414 on F2). This is understandable due to its similarity 
to O2. Removing item C5 resulted in the variance explained increasing to 66.23%. In addition, 
C5 was more likely to be redundant due to its similar wording with O2, and thus was removed. 
The final rotated factor matrix can be seen in Table 19. The final EFA model had KMO of .864 
and Bartlett’s significance (χ2 (66) = 3272.11, p<.001). The individual contribution of factors to 
this total variance can be seen below in Table 20. Other than cross-loadings from C5, items 
retained their original structure consisting of Overload, Complexity and Uncertainty, suggesting 




Table 19 Rotated Factor Matrix 
 
Table 20 Variance Explained by Each Factor 
 Initial Eigenvalues Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Factor Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 4.868 40.570 40.570 2.759 22.995 22.995 
2 2.567 21.388 61.958 2.643 22.024 45.019 
3 1.441 12.006 73.964 2.545 21.212 66.231 
4 .662 5.513 79.477    
5 .533 4.440 83.917    
6 .472 3.936 87.853    
7 .341 2.839 90.692    
8 .291 2.426 93.118    
9 .267 2.228 95.346    
10 .207 1.722 97.068    
11 .190 1.587 98.655    
12 .161 1.345 100.000    
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood. 
 
8.4.2.3 | Reliability 
Internal consistency checks were then conducted on the 3 sub-scales identified above using 
Cronbach’s Alpha (CA) (Cronbach, 1951). The internal consistency of each sub-scale can be seen 
in Table 21 below. All alpha scores were above the .80 threshold; usually considered to indicate 
high levels of reliability. The CA of the Overload construct could have been increased to .914 
  Factor 
Item 1 2 3 
O2 Protecting myself online takes too much time .882   
O3 Engaging in cyber security practices takes too much effort .864   
O1 Keeping myself safe online is too demanding .849   
O4 I am forced to change how I behave online to properly protect myself .454   
C3 I often find it difficult to understand how to keep myself safe online  .842  
C4 I struggle to understand cyber security advice and guidance  .831  
C2 I do not know enough about online security to protect myself  .773  
C1 I find that other people often know more about online security than I 
do 
 .613  
U3 There is always new online security guidance that I should follow   .843 
U1 Cyber security advice is constantly changing   .821 
U2 I am always having to learn new procedures and processes to stay 
safe online 
  .738 
U4 Online security technology is constantly changing   .720 
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. 437 from the first 873 cases (SAMPLE) = 1 
b. Rotation converged in 5 iterations. 
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with the removal of item O4, however for the sake of retaining items and to retain similarity to 
the original SRS; this was retained at this stage. 




Following reliability analysis. Retained factors were taken through to confirmatory factor 
analysis. 
8.4.3 | Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) 
For the purposes of cross validation, the dataset was inverted so that those participants whose data 
had contributed to the EFA were removed and the analysis could be conducted on fresh data 
(n=436). There was no missing data as survey responses required forced responses on all items. 
CFA was conducted using IBM SPSS AMOS Version 25. The Initial Model generated can be 


















Figure 14 Initial CFA Fit Model 
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8.4.3.1 | Initial Fit Model 
As there is debate around which measures of fit are to be reported, or whether arbitrary cut offs 
are useful at all (Niemand & Mai, 2018), this paper uses a range of measures and fit indices from 
a number of guidance sources (see Table 22). The same indices have been used in a range of 
previous papers including the recent scale developed by Timmermans and De Caluwé (2017).  
Table 22 Fit Indices Used in this Paper 
 
The initial model (See Figure 14) demonstrated acceptable fit statistics across two of the six cut 
off indices and good fit on two of the indices (See Table 23), the model was inspected to determine 
if reasonable adjustments could be made and to determine if there was a substantive issue with 
any one part of the model. 
Table 23 Initial Model Fit for Confirmatory Factor 
 Value Fit 
Chi-Square Statistic .000 No  
CMIN/DF 3.440 Acceptable 
CFI .962 Good 
RMSEA .075 Acceptable 
PCLOSE .000 No 
SRMR .0632 Good 
 
Inspection of the initial model (Figure 14) showed low loading on item O4 (.41). As this item also 
demonstrated low factor loading in the EFA, and as its removal would lead to an increase in CA 
for the subscale, the decision was made to remove O4. The CFA was re-run and the revised fit 
statistics are reported in Table 24. 
 
 
 Cut Off Values  
 Acceptable Good Very 
Good 
Source 




≤5 ≤3 ≤2 Kline (2005) 
CFI ≥.90 (with SRMR <.09) ≥.95 - Hu and Bentler (1999) 
RMSEA ≤.10 ≤.08 ≤.05 Chen et al. (2008) 
PCLOSE >.05 (closer to 1 the 
better) 
- - Kenny (2015) 
SRMR - ≤.08 - Hu and Bentler (1999) 
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Table 24 Revised Model Fit for CFA after O4 Removal 
 Model Value Fit 
Chi-Square Statistic .000 No  
CMIN/DF 2.723 Good 
CFI .977 Good 
RMSEA .063 Good 
PCLOSE .062 Acceptable 
SRMR .0397 Good 
 
As can be seen in table 24, removing item O4 led to improvements across almost all fit indices. 
The final model demonstrated good fit over four indices and acceptable fit on an indices which 
previously did not demonstrate any fit. Only the Chi-square statistic remained outside of the 
threshold of acceptable fit, something that is common when using large sample sizes as this leads 




















8.4.3.2 | Validity and Reliability of Final CFA model 
Validity and reliability were assessed using a range of metrics (see Table 25 for an overview of 
validity and reliability statistics). Average Variance Extracted (AVE) statistics were above .50 for 
each factor indicating good convergent validity. Reliability was evidenced by all Composite 
Reliability (CR) values being above .80. Discriminant Validity can be seen as the square root of 
the AVE was higher than any inter-factor correlation (Seen in bold). In addition, all Maximum 
Shared Variance (MSV) scores were lower than Average Variance Extracted scores again lending 
evidence of discriminant validity. All of these factors meet recommended thresholds (Hair, Black, 
Babin & Anderson, 2010). 
Table 25 Validity and Reliability Statistics of CFA Model 
 CR AVE MSV MaxR(H) Uncertainty Complexity Overload 
Uncertainty 0.864 0.615 0.130 0.868 0.784     
Complexity 0.910 0.719 0.291 0.922 0.303 0.848   
Overload 0.914 0.779 0.291 0.916 0.361 0.539 0.883 
 
8.4.3.3 | Common Method Bias 
Guidance from Roni (2014) was used when calculating common method bias. Harmon’s single 
factor test was used due to it being the simplest and most widely used test for common method 
bias in the literature (Podsakoff et al., 2003). All items from the model were entered into a single 
factor analysis. The model was forced to produce a single factor and the variance was checked to 
ensure it was under 50%. Values over this level indicate significant interference from CMB. The 
value produced was 43.04%. Thus, it was concluded that common method bias was not a 
significant concern for the model. 
8.4.3.4 | Final Items 
Following CFA the final scale consisted of 11 items (see table 26). The removal of Item O4 also 
led to a change in the reliability, thus the final CA scores can be seen in table 27 below. A factor 
correlation matrix is also shown to demonstrate the relationships between the factors, this is 







Table 26 Final General Security Related Stress scale (GSRS) Items 
Item  Dimension Item 
C1 Complexity I find that other people often know more about online security than I do 
C2 Complexity I do not know enough about online security to protect myself 
C3 Complexity I often find it difficult to understanding how to keep myself safe online 
C4 Complexity I struggle to understand cybersecurity advice and guidance 
O1 Overload Keeping myself safe online is too demanding 
O2 Overload Protective myself online takes too much time 
O3 Overload Engaging in cyber security practices takes too much effort 
U1 Uncertainty Cybersecurity advice is constantly changing 
U2 Uncertainty I am always having to learn new procedures and processes to stay safe 
online 
U3 Uncertainty There is always new online security guidance that I should follow 
U4 Uncertainty Online security technology is constantly changing. 
 
















Sub-Scale CA  
Complexity .86  
Overload .92  
Uncertainty .86  
Full scale .87  
 Complexity Uncertainty Overload 
Complexity Pearson’s r 1 .247** .507** 
Sig.  .000 .000 
N 437 437 437 
Uncertainty Pearson’s r .247** 1 .134** 
Sig. .000  .005 
N 437 437 437 
Overload Pearson’s r .507** .134** 1 
Sig. .000 .005  
N 437 437 437 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Note that Overload Item 4 was removed in CFA – Scores above represent inter-correlations after this 
removal and thus the final correlation matrix. 
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8.5 | Part 2: General Security Related Stress and Coping in the Baby Boomer Generation 
Following the development of the General Security Related Stress scale (GSRS), part two sought 
to apply this scale to understand the relationships between general security related stress and 
coping behaviours in a sample of baby boomer participants.  
Figure 11 in Chapter 7 outlines the transactional theory of stress and coping (TTSC) (Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1987). According to TTSC, the appraisal of a threat against an individual’s resources 
causes a stress response. The stress level is determined by an assessment of the threat in question, 
when considered against an assessment of the resources that an individual can rally against the 
threat. When an individual determines that they have insufficient resources to counteract the 
threat, the threat is seen to be uncontrollable and the resulting stress response is high. Conversely, 
if resources are seen to be adequate to counteract the threat, the stressor is seen to be controllable 
and as such the stress response is low. The level of stress experienced subsequently leads to one 
of three forms of coping. When the stress response is considered to be high, individuals are more 
likely to move towards emotion focussed (such as seeking emotional support) and dysfunctional 
forms of coping (such as denial of the threat) styles. Thus it would be expected that; 
Hy1: Higher GSRS will be associated with greater levels of emotion focussed coping. 
Hy2: Higher GSRS will be associated with greater engagement in dysfunctional coping. 
When the stress response produced from the appraisal process is considered to be low however, 
the individual is able to focus on overcoming the stressor, and thus can engage in problem 
focussed coping (such as actively trying to address the problem). With reference to the original 
theory, it would be hypothesised that; 
Hy3: Lower GSRS will be associated with greater engagement in problem focussed 
coping.  
Finally, the development of such a scale has a further use within the confines of this thesis. 
Although it was suggested in chapters 4 and 5 that retirement may be a delineating factor leading 
to the differences in cybersecurity vulnerability we see between working and retired older adults, 
no quantitative differences have yet been investigated between those still in the workplace and 
those who have retired. The development of the GSRS provides an opportunity to directly 
compare those in the workplace and those who are already retired, whilst matching for age, 
meaning that the impact of employment status, rather than age, can be measured. Based on the 
notion that higher security related stress promotes either ineffective (emotion focussed) or 
potentially harmful (dysfunctional) coping styles, something which is likely to lead to subsequent 




Hy4: Retired Individuals, when matched for age, will have higher GSRS than those in 
full-time employment 
 
8.6 | Part 2 Method 
8.6.1 | Survey Instrument 
The original survey which allowed for the development of the GSRS, also contained other 
constructs for use within part 2 of the study. 
8.6.1.1 | Measure of Coping 
To test hypotheses 1, 2 and 3, a coping scale was included in the survey. To measure coping, the 
28-item Brief COPE (Carver, 1997) discussed in Chapter 7 was used. This can be seen in Table 
29 overleaf. The items of the Brief COPE had minor modifications to their tense to change “I’ve 
been” to “I would” so that participants’ reported coping behaviours would be in response to a 
given threat. Modifications such as these are suggested by Carver (1997) and used regularly 
throughout the extensive citing literature. As with the original Brief COPE scale, all items were 
measured on 4-point Likert scale reflecting a measure of frequency that each behaviour might be 
performed (I wouldn’t do this at all - 1 to I would do this a lot – 4). 
8.6.1.2 | Threat Vignette 
A vignette, based on a ransomware attack, was provided (see Table 30, also overleaf) so that 
participants had an example of a cyber-attack situation that they might respond to when rating 
their coping behaviours. Although a range of threats could have been used (such as a phishing 
attack, romance scam, pension scam etc.) a ransomware attack was used as the vignette within 
this study. The vignette was designed to provide a high threat to as many participants as possible. 
In providing the ransomware scenario, all perceived control was taken away from the participant, 
If, for example, a phishing email had been used as the prompt, it may be that participants would 
reject the notion that they might fall foul of such a scam. Similarly, if the threat posed was a 
specific threat such as having lost a fixed sum of money as the result of such an attack, it may be 
that the result would be moderated substantially by the financial status of the participant. 
Providing a high threat vignette in which the attack has already taken place (i.e. the ransomware 
is already on the system), and giving generic loss messages (i.e. that important documents AND 
financial statements were at risk), meant that the scenario was likely to be seen as highly 
threatening by as many participants as possible. Furthermore, providing a threat which requires a 
high technical skill level to overcome, meant that participants were forced into thinking about 
how they might react to the scenario, whereas a lower threat such as a phishing email might simply 
lead to participants refusing that a threat exists (i.e. I would simply delete the email and not need 
158 
 
to cope). The following vignette was produced to demonstrate a tangible threat, something 
required before coping appraisals can be made, as discussed in Chapter 7. 
8.6.1.3 | Baby Boomer Sub-Sample Participant Information 
To investigate the relationship between general security related stress and coping strategies used 
by those within the baby boomer sample, a sub-sample of the overall sample was taken, which 
included only those aged 56 to 74, the birth date range for those in the baby boomer generation 
(Venter, 2017). The split resulted in a sample of 264 participants made up of 126 males (MAge= 





















Table 29 Items of the Brief COPE (Carver, 1997) 
 
Table 30 Threat Vignette Used in Study 4 
“You switch your computer on to take part in an important task. After turning on the computer, 
you see a black screen with a red skull in the centre. A box appears, which states that your 
computer has been locked by a hacker, and you have to pay a large sum of money to regain 
control of your computer. You have recently transferred important documents such as financial 
details, as well as family photographs and other valuables onto the PC, but due to being busy 
with other things, you have had no had time to create a backup yet. The threat of losing your 
documents and photographs etc. is very real, how likely are you to engage in the following 
behaviours?” 
Dysfunctional Coping Emotion Focussed Coping Problem Focussed Coping 
Behavioural Disengagement 
I've been giving up trying to 
deal with it. 




I've been saying to myself 
"this isn't real.'" 
I've been refusing to believe 
that it has happened 
 
Self-Distraction 
I've been turning to work or 
other activities to take my 
mind off things 
I've been doing something to 
think about it less, such as 
going Io movies, watching TV. 
Reading, daydreaming, 
sleeping, or shopping 
 
Self-Blame 
I've been criticizing myself 
I've been blaming myself for 
things that happened. 
 
Substance Use 
I've been using alcohol or 
other drugs to make myself 
feel better. 
I've been using alcohol or 




l've been saying things to let 
my unpleasant feelings escape 
I’ve been expressing my 
negative feelings. 
Acceptance 
I've been accepting the 
reality of the fact that it has 
happened. 
I've been learning to live 
with it. 
 
Use of Emotional Support 
I've been getting emotional 
support from others. 
I've been getting comfort 




I've been making jokes 
about it. 




I've been trying to see it in a 
different light, to make it 
seem more positive. 
I've been looking for 




I've been trying to find 
comfort in my religion or 
spiritual beliefs. 
I've been praying or 
meditating 
Active Coping  
I've been concentrating my 
efforts on doing something about 
the situation l'm in. 
I've been taking action to "try to 
make the situation better. 
 
Planning 
I've been trying to come up with 
a strategy about what Io do. 
I've been thinking hard about 
what steps to take. 
 
Use of Instrumental Support 
I've been trying to get advice or 
help from other people about 
what to do. 
I've been getting help and advice 




8.7 | Part 2 Results 
8.7.1 | GSRS as a predictor of Dysfunctional, Emotion Focussed and Problem Focussed 
Coping 
To determine the impact of security related stress on coping in baby boomers, a multivariate 
multiple regression was carried out using GSRS score as a predictor of dysfunctional coping (DC), 
emotion focussed coping (EFC) and problem focussed coping (PFC). There was a significant 
effect of GSRS scores in predicting DC, explaining 13.2% of the variance (R2=.132, 
F(1,262)=40.0 p<.001). GSRS was not however found to be a significant predictor of PFC or EFC 
in the baby boomer sub-sample. These findings suggest that those with higher levels of general 
security related stress engage in more dysfunctional coping, however no such relationships exist 
between general security related stress and either problem focussed, or emotion focussed coping. 
Given that general security related stress predicted dysfunctional coping, hypothesis 2 can be 
accepted. Given the lack of significance of both emotion focussed, and problem focussed coping 
however, both hypothesis 1 and 3 must be rejected. The reasons and implications behind these 
findings are discussed further within the discussion. 
Further analysis was conducted on the subscales of the GSRS (Overload, Complexity and 
Uncertainty) to determine how each facet of security related stress was associated with coping 
strategies. Three linear regressions were conducted with the sub-scale scores entered as predictors 
and each of the coping styles (Emotion Focussed, Problem Focussed and Dysfunctional) entered 
as dependent variables. Bonferroni corrections were applied (p<.017 indicated significance) to 
control for the increased risk of type 1 error associated with repeated testing.  
8.7.2 | GSRS Subscales in Predicting Emotion Focussed, Dysfunctional, and Problem 
Focussed Coping 
8.7.2.1 | Emotion Focussed Coping 
The first linear regression was conducted with sub-components of the security related stress scale 
as predictors of emotion focussed coping. The model was not significant. EFC was also not 
significantly predicted by any individual facet of security related stress. Table 31 shows the 














t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) 17.02 1.339  12.72 .000 
Complexity .083 .053 .112 1.56 .120 
Uncertainty .056 .066 .055 .852 .395 
Overload -.129 .067 -.133 -1.923 .056 
**Indicates significance at the p<.017 level 
 
This result suggests that in participants from the baby boomer generation, none of the components 
of security related stress influence engagement in emotion focussed coping.  
8.7.2.2 | Dysfunctional Coping 
The second linear regression was conducted with sub-components of the security related stress 
scale as predictors of DC. A significant model was found explaining 17.1% of the variance of 
dysfunctional coping (F(3,260)=17.84, p<.001). Complexity was found to be significant 
predictor. Overload was significant at the standard alpha (p<.05) however it did not meet the 
Bonferroni adjusted p-value of .017 and was thus considered non-significant. Table 32 shows the 
contribution of each factor to the model.  






t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) 14.437 1.441  10.018 .000 
Complexity .301 .057 .345 5.242 .000** 
Uncertainty -.050 .071 -.042 -.702 .483 
Overload .153 .072 .135 2.122 .035 
**Indicates significance at the p<.017 level 
 
This result suggests that those who see security as more complex, engage in greater levels of 
dysfunctional coping.  
8.7.2.3 | Problem Focussed Coping 
The final linear regression was conducted with sub-components of the security related stress scale 
as predictors of PFC. A significant model was found explaining 12.8% of the variance of problem 
focussed coping (F(3,260)=12.67, p<.001). Again, both overload and uncertainty were seen to be 
significant predictors of problem focussed coping.  Table 33 shows the contribution of each factor 
to the model.  
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t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) 17.996 .837  21.51 .000 
Complexity -.052 .033 -.104 -1.543 .124 
Uncertainty .170 .041 .252 4.141 .000** 
Overload -.170 .052 -.264 -4.049 .000** 
**Indicates significance at the p<.017 level 
 
This result suggests that those who have lower scores on overload and higher scores on 
uncertainty are more likely to engage in problem focussed coping. Interestingly these figures also 
suggest that in baby boomers, being more uncertain and experiencing security related overload, 
are equal but opposing in terms of their contribution towards the likelihood of engaging in 
problem focussed coping.  
To test the fourth hypothesis, retired participants were matched with a working case control based 
on age and sex. Out of 111 retired participants, 43 suitable matched pairs with full-time employed 
individuals were found. Following removal, two groups; one currently in full time employment 
and one retired (n=43) remained, matched directly by age (MAge=61.63 SDAge=3.02) and sex. Both 
groups consisted of 17 females and 26 males. 
A one-way independent groups t-test was conducted on security related stress scores between 
retired and working adults. A significant result was found with working adults having 
significantly higher (M=46.60 SD=11.76) security related stress scores than retired individuals of 
the same age (M=39.86 SD=8.91) (t(84)=2.998, p<.01). This finding was in the opposite direction 
of the hypothesised relationship and suggests that those within the full-time employment 
experience greater levels of security related stress than those who are retired. Because of this 
finding, hypothesis 4 must also be rejected. This finding is also discussed within the discussion 
section below.  
To investigate these differences further by looking at stress sub-scale score differences, a one-
way MANOVA was conducted to compare scores between full time employed and retired 
individuals across the sub-facets of security related stress. Prior to conducting a MANOVA, 




8.7.3 | Assumptions of MANOVA Prior to Testing 
8.7.3.1 | Multivariate Outliers 
Mahalanobis distances were compared to the chi-square distribution with the same degrees of 
freedom. All distances were greater than .001 suggesting no presence of multivariate outliers. 
This assumption was therefore met.  
8.7.3.2 | Equality of Covariance Matrices 
Box’s Test of equality of covariance was used to determine whether the covariance matrices were 
equal across groups. The test result was non-significant (p=.150) therefore this assumption was 
also met.  
8.7.3.3 | Multicollinearity 
The highest correlation between factors was between Complexity and Overload (r=.460, n=86, 
p<.001) suggesting a lack of Multicollinearity in the data, this assumption was therefore met. 
8.7.3.4 | Multivariate Normality 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were conducted to test multivariate normality among the three 
dependent variables. All three statistics were significant (Complexity: KS=.098, p<.05, 
Uncertainty: KS=.117, p<.05, Overload: KS=.129 p<.05). These results suggest that the data 
violate the assumption of multivariate normality; however, MANOVA is robust to normality 
issues when other assumptions are met and thus analysis was continued. 
A MANOVA was conducted with employment status entered as the IV, this IV had 2 conditions 
(Full-time employed vs retired). The sub-scales of security related stress represented the three 
levels of the DV (Complexity, Uncertainty and Overload). There was a statistically significant 
difference in scores across SRS subscales between those who were retired and those in full time 
employment (F(3,82)=3.327, p<.05; Wilk's Λ=.891, partial η2=.109). Individual ANOVA results 
are indicated in Table 34 below. The result of the MANOVA and subsequent ANOVAs suggest 
that working adults score higher on complexity (M=14.65 SD=6.25) than retired adults (M=12.37 
SD=5.83). That working adults (M=21.63 SD=4.19) also score higher on Uncertainty than retired 
adults (M=19.21 SD=4.29), and that working adults score higher (M=10.33 SD=5.00) on 





Table 34 ANOVA Results of Significant MANOVA model. 
df F Siga partial η2 
Complexity 1,84 3.37 .070 .039 
Uncertainty 1,84 7.00 .010* .077 
Overload 1,84 4.84 .031 .054 
a=Bonferroni adjusted for multiple comparisons *= significant at p<.017 
These results of the ANOVA, conducted to test the individual relationships of the MANOVA, 
indicate that only one subscale of the GSRS scale (Uncertainty) is significantly higher for those 
in the workplace than those who are retired. The difference in Complexity score and Overload 
followed this trend however were not significant at the adjusted .017 alpha level. There were no 
significant differences in coping sub-scale scores found between working and retired baby 
boomers. These findings suggest that although those still within the workplace have higher 
security related stress than their matched-age retired counterparts, only security uncertainty is 
significantly higher in workplace groups.  
8.8 | Discussion 
8.8.1 | Development of a Measure of General Security Related Stress 
The first part of this study developed a new 11-item scale, based on D’Arcy’s (2014) Security 
Related Stress (SRS) Scale. The developed scale allows for the measurement of general security 
related stress outside of organisational settings and has been shown to be effective at explaining 
variance in dysfunctional coping behaviours. Given the scarcity of psychometric measures 
relating to cybersecurity (Camp et al., 2007), this scale is likely to provide useful in future 
research. Furthermore, developing this scale in a sample representative of the UK population 
provides a starting point for ongoing work which seeks to further validate this scale. The 
development of this scale also means that the future research is able to further understand the 
impact of emotion on behaviour across a range of security problem areas. This includes the ability 
to apply the TTSC to understanding cybersecurity behaviours, the focus of the next chapter.  
Following development of the GSRS scale, the scale was used to address 3 key hypotheses 
relating to how security related stress might be associated with the various coping strategies used 
by baby boomers in the face of a security threat. An overview of the hypotheses can be seen in 
Table 35 below: 
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Table 35 Table of Hypotheses 
Hyp Hypothesis Outcome 
1 Higher Security Related Stress (SRS) will be associated with higher 
levels of emotion focussed coping. 
Rejected 
2 Higher SRS will be associated with greater engagement in 
dysfunctional coping. 
Accepted 
3 Lower SRS scores will be associated with higher engagement in 
Problem Focussed Coping. 
Rejected 
4 Retired Individuals, when matched for age, will have higher 
GSRS than those in full-time employment 
Rejected 
 
8.8.2 | Discussion of Hypotheses 
8.8.2.1 | Emotion Focussed Coping 
Emotion focussed coping was not predicted by security related stress scores meaning that 
hypothesis 1 was rejected. Additionally, none of the sub-facets of security related stress predicted 
emotion focussed coping. A number of reasons might explain this finding.  
One possible reason is that although the Brief COPE (Carver, 1997) has been used widely in a 
range of research settings, the behaviours outlined within it are likely to be more appropriate in 
some settings than others. For example, one might see greater levels of religious coping in health 
settings (praying for a cure) than in security settings (praying to remove a virus from a computer). 
Similarly, it may be that some coping styles relate specifically to online settings, such as seeking 
support from online friends (i.e. people who the individual has never met before, via forums or 
social media). Future research can elucidate whether this is the case by seeking to understand how 
people react and cope when faced with IT related problems, whether online or offline.  
8.8.2.2 | Dysfunctional Coping 
The strongest relationship between security related stress and coping styles was in predicting 
dysfunctional coping, meaning that hypothesis 2 can be accepted. With 13.2% of the variance of 
dysfunctional coping explained by security related stress, the findings here suggest that baby 
boomers engage in dysfunctional coping when faced with security related stressors. Dysfunctional 
coping is likely to lead to a range of negative outcomes for older adults when faced with a stressful 
security situation. For example, one form of dysfunctional coping measured within the Brief Cope 
(Carver, 1997) is self-blame. For those who already struggle with low security self-efficacy in 
online environments, a problem typically experienced by older adults (Mitzner et al., 2010) 
blaming oneself for security victimisation is likely to drive down feelings of efficacy, leading to 
a cycle which is likely to either promote further victimisation or push older adults away from 
technology use, furthering the digital divide (Hunsaker & Hargittai, 2018). Future research in this 
sphere should attempt to determine why people turn to certain types of dysfunctional coping over 
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other more useful forms of coping. It is worth noting that of the six forms of dysfunctional coping 
which combine to generate the sub-scale score, three (Venting, Self-Blame, Self-Distraction) 
were substantially higher than the others (Substance Abuse, Denial and Behavioural 
Disengagement). This is likely due to the security setting of this study, with factors such as 
substance abuse unlikely, and factors such as behavioural disengagement not possible with many 
online threats such as the one given in the vignette. However these findings reinforce the need for 
future research to investigate specific forms of security coping, something missing in the current 
literature base. 
8.8.2.3 | Problem Focussed Coping 
PFC was not predicted by GSRS leading to the rejection of hypothesis 2, however through further 
investigation of the facets of GSRS against PFC, it was identified that GSRS was significantly 
predicted by both overload and uncertainty sub-scale scores. Investigation of the beta weights of 
this sub-scale analysis leads to interesting questions. The regression of GSRS sub-scale scores 
onto problem focussed coping scores resulted in a positive relationship between uncertainty and 
problem focussed coping, and a negative relationship between overload and problem focussed 
coping. One of these results, overload, is perhaps obvious. Those who are feeling less ‘over-
loaded’ may have more time to dedicate to overcoming their security problems and vice versa. 
However, the relationship between uncertainty and problem focussed coping is less clear. As 
uncertainty increases, problem focussed coping increases. This suggests that those who are more 
uncertain about security practices are also the people most likely to engage in problem focussed 
coping. This may reflect that those who are less confident with security, feel greater levels of 
stress, and as such feel that they need to immediately overcome issues since the perceived 
repercussions of not doing are seen to be higher. Alternatively, this relationship could reflect a 
knowledge gap in relation to security. It may reflect that those who are more uncertain about 
security, do not understand the severity of cybersecurity threats, and as such do not experiencing 
levels of stress stressed high enough to push them towards emotion focussed or dysfunctional 
coping styles.  
Finally, this finding may reflect that the fear level of the provided vignette was seen to be too high 
i.e. although uncertainty levels were high in the sample, it may be that the threat that was 
perceived meant that participants could not imagine doing something to attempt to counteract the 
threat i.e. attempting to overcome the problem. This reflects an issue that is likely to be pervasive 
when understanding coping, and when using self-report measures rather than actual behaviour to 
do so. Participants may report attempts to overcome issues that generate high stress responses, 
however how they would actually act in a real scenario is unknown. Furthermore, we currently 
know little about how other factors such as an individual’s resilience would influence this coping 
behaviour i.e. how long are older adults likely to engage in what they see as problem focussed 
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coping before resorting to other less useful coping styles. Although exploring these factors in real 
world settings whilst gathering behavioural data is beyond the scope of this thesis, it offers an 
interesting avenue for future research.  
Finally, the study sought to understand the differences between retired older adults and those in 
full-time employment when case-matched by age. Contrary to hypothesis 4, working age adults 
scored higher in general security related stress than retired adults when matched by age. This may 
be because the original security related stress scale was designed for use within the workplace 
and referred to workplace-based stressors (D’Arcy, 2014). Although in many instances these 
stressors will be present outside of the workplace, they likely occur less frequently. Overload for 
example, refers to the ‘piling up’ of work while an individual is engaging in security practices set 
by an organisation. This stress may equivalate in many ways to the feeling of unnecessary burden 
described by older adults when discussing security requirements (Nicholson et al., 2019). In the 
workplace however, an individual usually has little say over whether their accruing workload is 
completed or not. A retiree on the other hand may be inconvenienced by security, but may have 
more control over other accruing tasks, with more time to deal with them, and more influence 
over whether they have to be completed or not. Therefore, in this circumstance one can see why 
pressure that comes from security might be more demanding for workplace-based individuals.  
Working adults were found to have higher scores on the uncertainty stress dimension, as well as 
the other sub-scales of security related stress. The uncertainty sub-scale refers to the changing 
nature of security advice and is likely to reflect an individual’s perception of their security 
literacy. This stress may be higher in those within the workplace as a result of the workplace 
acting as an information source. Within the workplace, individuals are likely to receive training 
and updates about threats. Because of this, they may be more aware of the prevalence of cyber-
attacks or the implications of becoming the victim of such an attack. Conversely those outside of 
the workplace may over time become ‘blissfully unaware’ of security threats, something which 
may result in their victimisation if they are not adequately prepared to handle threats due to their 
outdated knowledge.  
An alternative explanation for the unexpected finding between uncertainty and problem focussed 
coping also might relate to resilience. The items which make up the uncertainty sub-scale refer 
less to one’s knowledge of security and more to a perception of the frequency of security changes 
that take place around them. Those who score highly on the uncertainty scale are more likely to 
see security as a constantly changing environment, something which indeed may cause more 
stress. However, it might be that the individuals most likely to notice and acknowledge changing 
security advice and guidance are also those most resilient to these changes. In this instance those 
who are more uncertain, but also more resilient may feel that they should engage in more problem 
focussed coping. Future research should attempt to address this gap by addressing personal factors 
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such as resilience when considering how security stress is formulated, and how this stress is 
addressed.  
A further consideration when comparing security related stress between those in the workplace 
and those in retirement is the overall amount of exposure to security that is likely to be had by 
both groups. In Chapter 4 it is suggested that during retirement, individuals change the way that 
they use technology, moving away from work usage and towards more exploratory leisure 
focussed use. One reason why security stress may be higher in those at work is that they are likely 
to be exposed to the same security issues within both the home and the workplace. Those who 
use technology both at home and in the workplace are likely to receive twice as many prompts to 
update, twice as many suspicious emails (if using separate workplace and home emails), and twice 
as much information assuring them that there are tangible threats they should be aware of. Thus, 
the differences found in this study may simply reflect the increased hourly usage of technology 
and as a result the increased demands associated with this increased technology use. Further 
research could investigate this by objectively measuring time spent using technology across those 
within workplaces, the number of accounts or devices used, and understanding how these metrics 
are associated with security related stress during and after the retirement transition.  
A final consideration with regards to the differences in security related stress in retired and 
working age adults relates to the ways in which this stress is handled. Although those in the 
workplace may have greater levels of security related stress, when factoring for the effect of age, 
it may be that those within the workplace have more avenues of support and infrastructure to 
support them through such stress. In the workplace if an individual becomes stressed about 
security, there are likely to be avenues of support such as other staff members, dedicated IT 
support or policies and procedures that can be referred to. For those who are in retirement, dealing 
with security related stress may be more difficult given the reduction in social interaction, the loss 
of workplace support structures (as discussed in Chapter 4) and the reliance on those who are 
available, rather than those who might be more capable (Nicholson et al., 2019). An important 
consideration with regards to this suggestion is that although this study measured self-report 
coping strategies, resources that might aid in mitigating this stress were not measured. This is 
likely to require further mixed methods research which seeks to understand how older adults deal 
with security related stressors as well as understanding the quantitative impact of these reliances. 
8.8.3 | Limitations 
A limitation which may have influenced the results of this study was the threat level of the 
vignette applied. The vignette used within this study outlined a ransomware attack, something 
which was designed to set a threat level high enough to initiate a coping appraisal prior to 
asking participants to rate how they would cope in that specific scenario. The high fear nature of 
the vignette may have led participants to report higher engagement in dysfunctional coping than 
a different vignette, however the scenario provided can be seen to be successful in promoting 
the coping that would be expected in such a scenario i.e. high threat did not promote reported 
problem focussed coping. Although the high threat level may have influenced the findings, it 
would be expected that the level of threat from the vignette would only influence emotion 
focussed coping, and this is only if one considers a spectrum whereby dysfunctional coping and 
problem focussed coping sit at the far extremes with emotion focussed coping in the middle. 
This is because even with a high threat scenario, a strongly negative association would be 
anticipated with problem focussed coping and a strongly positive association would be 
anticipated with dysfunctional coping. If the coping styles existed on a spectrum one might not 
anticipate any relationship with relation to emotion focussed coping in the middle of such a 
spectrum. However, no existing literature has explicitly sought to outline the relationship 
between emotion focussed coping and dysfunctional coping in this way. Moreover, typically 
emotion focussed, and dysfunctional coping are correlated in such a way that higher stress 
would demonstrate associations with both forms of coping even if one was higher than the other. 
Thus, that emotion focussed coping was not seen to be significantly associated with security 
related stress is likely to raise questions around the types of emotion focussed coping and 
whether these might be applicable to online settings, something discussed further above. 
Furthermore, that emotion focussed coping was not associated with security related stress does 
not detract from the findings presented here which are valid within the context of this study and 
the original TTSC theory (Lazarus & Folkman, 1987). 
8.9 | Chapter Summary 
This chapter describes the creation and validation of a scale that can measure general security 
related stress and demonstrates the use of this scale to understand more about how security related 
stress might be associated with various coping strategies. Developing a scale using a sample 
representative of the UK, means that the study outlined in this chapter has clear implications for 
future research. The scale developed within this survey allows for a range of new research avenues 
which seek to understand how security related stress is associated with cybersecurity behaviours 
and their subsequent outcomes.  
Within this study the scale was applied to understanding how security related stress might be 
associated with coping behaviours outlined within the transactional theory of stress and 
coping. That dysfunctional coping was predicted in this study by security related stress, lends 
support to the notion that security related stress, as measured by the GSRS developed here, 
is linked to coping strategies applied in the face of a security threat. 
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This study was also able to revisit the earlier suggestions that the retirement transition might be  
an important factor in relation to cybersecurity vulnerability between similarly aged individuals 
separated only by their employment status. That retired older adults were seen to have lower 
levels of security related stress highlights that this may not necessarily be the case, however 
future research is required to understand how this stress is resolved, and whether those in the 
workplace are better equipped to do so.  
The following chapter seeks to use the GSRS scale developed here to determine whether the 
TTSC can be applied to understand cybersecurity coping behaviours in the baby 
boomer population. Through the use of structural equation modelling, the study will aim to 
establish linear relationships between constructs reflecting primary and secondary appraisals 
and the stress generated from this appraisal process might be associated with subsequent 
coping behaviours.  
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Chapter 9:  (Study 5): Applying the Transactional Theory of Stress and Coping to 
Explain Cyber-Security Behaviours in a UK Baby Boomer Population  
9.1 | Chapter Introduction 
This thesis set out to understand factors which influence older adult’s cybersecurity vulnerability. 
Chapters 4 and 5 identified that the retirement transition might offer one possible explanation as 
to how this vulnerability arises through changes that take place across a wide range of areas during 
the transition into retirement. Moreover, these studies also drew attention to the fact that 
cybersecurity is emotive subject for older adults, something also reflected in Chapter 6 when 
exploring their feelings towards engaging in protective online security behaviours. In particular, 
it was found that older adults find security to be a stressful topic, however, to date very little 
research has sought to understand the impact of how stress might lead to security vulnerability as 
a result of the coping mechanisms that users apply when faced with security threats. 
The previous chapter directed the thesis towards understanding cybersecurity as a stressful subject 
and set out to develop a measure of security related stress to enable the application of the 
transactional model of stress and coping to understanding cybersecurity coping behaviours. This 
short, 11-item scale, measures security related stress across three core components (complexity, 
uncertainty and overload). Furthermore, the previous chapter demonstrated that this scale was 
effective at explaining engagement in dysfunctional coping behaviours, suggesting that the 
transactional theory of stress and coping (TTSC) might provide useful when attempting to 
understand cybersecurity coping behaviour.  
This study builds upon the previous chapter and pulls together the findings of the previous 
chapters by applying the transactional theory of stress and coping to predict older adults coping 
behaviours in response to cybersecurity threats.  
9.2 | Research Model and Hypotheses 
As outlined in Chapter 7, the TTSC (Lazarus & Folkman, 1987) proposes that coping is the result 
of a two part (primary and secondary) appraisal process, the result of which determines a stress 
response. This stress response subsequently leads to either functional or dysfunctional coping 
behaviours, depending on the level of stress experienced and whether or not this breaches a 
control threshold. In the following sections, relevant existing literature for each component of the 
TTSC is reviewed, following this, derived hypotheses are presented before providing the 
hypothesised model tested within this study (Figure 16). 
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9.2.1 | Primary Appraisal (Threat appraisal) 
Lazarus and Folkman (1987) outline that the primary appraisal is concerned with threat. They 
suggest that there are three types of primary appraisal: harm that has already been experienced, 
anticipated harm and challenge (which brings with it the potential for mastery or gain). Two of 
these three can be seen to easily apply to security threats. Many older adult users are likely to 
have experienced the negative repercussions of poor security, whether that be simply obtaining a 
virus which impedes their device’s performance, or whether they have experienced financial or 
data loss (Age-UK, 2015b). Furthermore, users are likely to experience anticipated harm i.e. a 
fear that future cyberattacks will have negative consequences. Not only do the earlier findings of 
this thesis (chapters 4 and 6) suggest that older adult users worry about cyber-attacks, but existing 
research also supports this. For example, Jiang et al. (2016) for example outlined that older baby 
boomers have specific concerns about online threats such as hacking and online privacy. The final 
form of appraisal mentioned above is ‘challenge’ which provides “potential for mastery or gain” 
(Lazarus & Folkman, 1987). In a security setting this may refer to the challenge of learning to 
engage in certain security behaviours, such as backing up, with the individual gaining added 
security by overcoming the challenge. However, this form of appraisal is less useful when 
considering responses to threats and how older adults may respond to such threats. Generally, the 
primary appraisal component of the TTSC can be considered akin to the threat appraisal seen in 
other psychological models such as PMT (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). 
Little existing research has applied the TTSC to security research, and as such little is known 
about the relationship between threat appraisal and stress. As a result, no measures currently exist 
that can be used to assess anticipated harm in relation to cybersecurity threats. Existing models 
such as PMT have however been applied in security settings and involve the assessment of 
security specific threats (Crossler, 2010; Lee & Larsen, 2009). As such PMT may provide a 
starting point from which measures of threat can be taken. PMT splits threat assessment into two 
key areas; the severity of the perceived threat (threat severity), and an individual’s perception of 
their vulnerability to the threat (threat vulnerability) (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). It would 
anticipated that both of these facets of threat would be positively associated with stress, however 
even when borrowing from models such as PMT, a model used extensively in security literature 
(Briggs et al., 2017), little research has sought to understand how this threat appraisal relates to 
stress, with most research focussing on how threats assessments impact on an individual’s level 
of fear.  
There is however a relationship that can be identified between fear and stress that means that 
using such measures as a proxy of anticipated harm might be considered acceptable. TTSC states 
that stress experienced as a result of the primary and secondary appraisal process ultimately leads 
to feelings of control over a stressor. Where stress is considered too high, control is reduced, and 
the individual is unable to counteract the stressor. Fear has also been shown to demonstrate this 
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relationship, with higher levels of fear reducing an individual’s ability to exercise control over a 
stressor (Coopamootoo, 2017), Thus, we might expect that fear and stress will manifest similarly 
in their relationship to threat appraisals. As threat severity and threat vulnerability might be 
considered akin to the ‘anticipated harm’ component of the primary threat appraisal seen in TTSC, 
this study seeks to apply these measures as proxies of anticipated harm. Given that a wealth of 
existing PMT literature demonstrates that higher threat severity and threat vulnerability lead to 
greater fear responses (Coopamootoo, 2017), we would expect that; 
Hy1: Higher threat vulnerability will positively predict security related stress. 
Hy2: Higher threat severity will positively predict security related stress. 
According to TTSC, we might expect that perceptions of anticipated harm would be associated 
with higher security related stress. This is also likely to be the case for the other threat appraisal 
component of the model (harm already experienced). Perloff (1983) outlines how victimisation 
creates an “unpleasant sense of vulnerability” and discusses how this feeling is associated with 
symptoms of emotional distress. These findings were supported by Sironi and Bonazzi (2016) 
who found that past experience of victimisation led to greater perceptions of victimisation 
susceptibility. These two components of the threat appraisal are therefore likely to be linked, with 
past experience of victimisation promoting stress from anticipated harm. 
Similarly, the inverse of this relationship can also be found in those who are yet to become 
victims. Experiencing a negative event may reduce overly optimistic expectations in relation to 
their chance of future victimisation. Jefferson, Bortolotti and Kuzmanovic (2017) outline that 
those who experience negative events are less likely to demonstrate unrealistic optimism when 
judging the likelihood of future negative events. It may be that those who have previously 
experienced cyber-attacks are more likely to provide a judgement based on the severity of their 
own experiences, as well as a more pessimistic representation of their victim likelihood in future, 
given that they have already experienced victimisation in the past. Recounting these events and 
considering negative experiences that they previously have had, may promote stress in relation to 
cybersecurity, as such it is hypothesised that: 
Hy3: higher scores on past experience of cyber-victimisation will positively predict 
threat severity 




9.2.2 | Costs Associated with Security 
Although not necessarily fitting with the original TTSC model, many of the older adults 
interviewed within Chapters 4 and 6 highlighted areas which they saw as stressful in relation to 
security. For example, some participants discussed how to them, engaging in security meant 
possible changes to their systems which meant that they avoided updates, this finding is not 
surprising and has been identified by existing literature which demonstrates that updates lead to 
changes in graphical user interfaces which confuse and annoy older adults (Nicholson et al., 2019; 
Vaniea et al., 2014). Similarly, participants discussed the financial costs of engaging in security 
practices, such as paying for support or purchasing anti-virus software packages. Costs such as 
these sit outside of the traditional TTSC as they cannot be considered either a threat (primary 
appraisal) or a resource that can be rallied against a threat (secondary appraisal). Given that older 
adults throughout this these reported these costs to be stressful however these factors were added 
as an additional construct entitled ‘response costs’ it was hypothesised that; 
Hy5: Higher ratings of Response Costs will be positively associated with security 
related stress 
9.2.3 | Secondary Appraisal 
Lazarus and Folkman (1987) distinguish between primary and secondary appraisal in that the 
secondary appraisal concerns the perceived level of influence an individual has with regards to 
the stressor-person environment. Thus, the secondary appraisal concerns one’s assessment of their 
ability to rally resources against a given threat or challenge. They outline a range of factors within 
the secondary appraisal including generalized beliefs in one’s competence, often referred to as 
self-efficacy.  
Although self-efficacy as a construct has been extensively researched across a wealth of fields 
(Bandura, 2010; Honicke & Broadbent, 2016), less research has specifically looked in efficacy 
beliefs in relation to cyber security. Rhee, Kim and Ryu (2009) developed an instrument designed 
to measure self-efficacy in information security (SEIS) based on computer self-efficacy literature 
(Higgins & Compeau, 1995; Rhee et al., 2009). Applying this scale in a sample of 415 graduate 
students, and through the use of structural equation modelling, they demonstrated that SEIS was 
strongly and significantly predicted by computer and internet experience. Furthermore, they 
demonstrate that SEIS subsequently predicts security practices and intentions to strengthen 
security efforts. Similarly, Shillair et al. (2015) outline how knowledge and previous experience 
are inextricably linked to self-efficacy, in that familiarity with a process is likely to promote ease 
of learning and in turn increase self-efficacy. These findings are supported by existing habit 
research, which demonstrate how repetitions and habituation of behaviours are likely to reinforce 
coping appraisal behaviours and promote self-efficacy beliefs (Vance et al., 2012). This leads to 
the following hypotheses; 
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Hy6: Higher security knowledge will positively predict security self-efficacy 
Hy7: Higher engagement with protection habits will positively predict security self-
efficacy. 
Although knowledge and protection might enhance efficacy beliefs, these constructs heavily 
focus on the individual, failing to take into account the importance of others in security practices. 
Social support is important for older adults, impacting both the uptake, and ongoing use of 
technology (Tsai et al., 2017). Moreover, older users are likely seek sources of support when 
faced with technology challenges, and those with greater levels of social resources are more likely 
to be introduced to cybersecurity risks by friends and family (Nicholson et al., 2019). Social 
support has recently been shown to increase technology self-efficacy in older adults (Czaja et al., 
2018) and as such it is anticipated that this finding would apply within security settings, thus it is 
expected that: 
Hy8: Higher perceptions of social support will positively predict security self-efficacy. 
The final relationship to consider within the secondary appraisal is the relationship between one’s 
perception of their ability to counteract a given threat, and the emotive response caused by such 
an appraisal. In this instance, this would be how security self-efficacy (made up of both specific 
security self-efficacy items and the fore-mentioned factors) relates to the stress response caused 
by the appraisal process. As discussed above, limited research currently exists which explicitly 
looks at how self-efficacy is associated with security related stress, however a wealth of literature 
from other areas has demonstrated that self-efficacy and stress are related in older adult 
populations, with low self-efficacy linked with greater levels of stress in domains such as: 
physical activity (Mudrak et al., 2016), work burnout (Shoji et al., 2016) an post-traumatic 
recovery (Benight & Bandura, 2004). Given the existing literature with regards to the influence 
of self-efficacy on stress, it is hypothesised that: 
Hy9: Self-efficacy will be negatively related to security related stress such that low self-
efficacy will be associated with high security related stress’. 
9.2.4 | Coping Appraisal and Security Related Stress 
The coping appraisal of the TTSC concerns the relationship between the affective response 
(stress) generated by the primary and secondary appraisals and the mechanisms applied to resolve 
it. If the generated threshold for stress is considered to be low, the controllability of the situation 
is seen to be high, and as such the individual can engage in problem focussed coping i.e. trying 
to overcome the issue causing the stress. Where stress is high, the individual is more likely to 
engage in emotion focussed coping, or behaviours designed to reduce their feelings of stress. 
Finally, as discussed above, some forms of emotion focussed coping might be considered 
dysfunctional, such as denying the threat exists, blaming oneself or venting, actions which may 
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exacerbate the problem through promoting further negative outcomes, rather than help in any 
way.  
Very little existing research to date has investigated the use of emotion focused, problem focused 
and dysfunctional coping styles in relation to general security behaviours, and those which have 
(D’Arcy et al., 2014), have used surrogates rather than the original coping styles outlined in 
existing coping literature. The previous chapter demonstrated that security related stress was 
positively associated with dysfunctional coping and no other significant relationships were 
identified. However, the study also found unexpected relationships between the sub-components 
of security related stress and problem focussed coping. Given that the previous chapter was the 
first study to apply the TTSC in this way, and given the general scarcity of literature in this area, 
the hypotheses of this study are again based on the original concepts of the underpinning 
theoretical model (TTSC) and as the following three hypotheses are suggested:  
Hy10: Security Related Stress will be positively associated with emotion focussed 
coping.  
Hy11: Security Related Stress will be negatively associated with problem focussed 
coping. 
Hy12: Security related stress will be positively associated with dysfunctional Coping. 
A proposed model consisting of all hypotheses and their proposed directions can be seen in Figure 
16.  
Figure 16 Hypothesised Model and Hypotheses Directions 
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9.3 | Method 
9.3.1 | Measurement Instrument 
A range of constructs were used within this study, which are discussed within the following four 
sections. These sections outline the items in relation to; the primary (or threat) appraisal, the 
secondary (or resources) appraisal, the emotive response (stress score) and the coping response. 
9.3.1.1 | Primary Appraisal 
The appraisal primarily concerns the appraisal of a threat as a stressor. Although little existing 
literature has applied the TTSC in security settings, a range of existing literature has used items 
and constructs to assess threat appraisal when applying other models such as PMT (Crossler, 
2010; Martens et al., 2019). The items used within this study were adapted from Martens et al. 
(2019). They used constructs to measure both threat severity and threat vulnerability however 
their measures refer to ‘malware’ specifically. Items used in this study were adapted to reflect 
cybersecurity more generally and included items such as “I think that cybersecurity attacks are an 
important problem” and “I think that cybersecurity should be taken seriously”. Their measure of 
threat vulnerability also reflected malware, and thus items were also changed slightly to instead 
refer to cybersecurity vulnerability more generally. Items included “It is possible that I will 
become a victim of a cyber-attack” and “The risk is high that I will become a victim of a cyber-
attack”. 
In addition to the measures of threat severity and vulnerability, two other constructs were included 
in the primary appraisal; past experience and response costs. According to TTSC, previous 
experiences are likely to feed into future appraisals. I.e. if an individual has a negative outcome 
from a cyber-attack, it is likely that they will perceive their threat severity and threat vulnerability 
as higher in the future. Few scales exist which explicitly refer to past experience of cyber-attack 
victimisation thus a new construct was devised consisting of three items. Examples include; “I 
have suffered as a result of cyber-security attacks in the past” and “I have had negative 
experiences because of cyber-attacks in the past”.  
Finally, within Chapter 6 participants discussed the possible costs of engaging in security 
practices. For example, they referred to financial costs such as the cost of software packages that 
act as protection against security threats, but also referred to costs in the form unwanted, 
unfamiliar changes, and the cognitive effort required to stay up to date with changing security 
knowledge. Thus, items were created to reflect these ‘response costs’. Examples include 
“Cybersecurity software is expensive to purchase and upgrade” and “I avoid updates on my 
devices or software, so that they continue to work in a way in which I am familiar”.  
All items used to measure primary appraisal constructs were measured on 7-point agreement-
based Likert scales (1 – strongly disagree to 7 – strongly agree).  
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9.3.1.2 | Secondary Appraisal Items 
As discussed above and within Chapter 7, the secondary appraisal concerns the resources an 
individual can rely upon to aid in counteracting threats. Generally these are individual level 
resources reflecting an individual’s own perceived ability in response to a given threat.  
A consistent theme throughout chapters 1 and 3, the qualitative chapters of this thesis, was that 
older adults rely on social support-based resources. Although this supports the findings of 
emerging literature (Nicholson et al., 2019), little existing research have used measures to assess 
this in a quantitative way. Thus, items were created to measure social support resources. A 
statement was given to participants setting the context of; “when it comes to issues involving my 
digital devices… I…” then items were provided such as: “I know someone who is around when 
I am in need” and “I know someone that I can talk to for support”. Participants were then able to 
score these statements on a 7-point Likert scale of agreement ranging from strongly disagree (1) 
to strongly agree (7).    
As discussed above, typically the secondary appraisal refers more to the assessment of an 
individual’s capability to respond to the threat. Thus, items were included that were specific to an 
individual’s security information self-efficacy. Items were adapted from Martens (2019) and 
included examples such as “Taking the necessary security measures against cyber-attacks is easy” 
and “I possess the knowledge and skills to take the necessary security measures against cyber-
attacks”. As with the Martens (2019) items discussed in the threat appraisal section, these items 
were modified to change their context from malware to cyber-attacks more generally.  
Security knowledge was also included as a construct. Items were developed based on those used 
by Kajzer et al., (2014). Although their items reflect security knowledge across a range of areas, 
they do not refer to the knowledge required to protect oneself from cyber-security attacks. Thus, 
items were created to reflect this. Participants were asked to rate their knowledge from very poor 
(1) to very good (7) on a 7-point Likert scale across a range of protective online behaviours such 
as; installing updates for security reasons, using strong passwords and keeping them safe, using 
public wi-fi safely and using antivirus software. The list of behaviours used in the creation of this 
construct reflect those used within the card-sorting task developed and applied in Chapter 6.  
Finally, a construct was created reflecting the habits and engagement frequency that individuals 
have with regards to security behaviours. These items were taken from Shillair and Meng (2017). 
Items included “Online safety protection is part of my routine”, “online protection is something I 
do without thinking” and “the use of security protections has become a habit for me”.  
All items in the secondary appraisal section were also measured on a 7-point Likert scale. Other 
than security knowledge, which is discussed separately above, all Likert scales reflected 
agreement ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7).  
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9.3.1.3 | Affective Response - Stress 
The GSRS scale developed and applied in Chapter 8 was also used within this study to measure 
security related stress. The full list of GSRS items can be seen in Table 26 within Chapter 8. All 
items of the GSRS, as within the previous study, were measured on 7-point Likert scales reflecting 
agreement (from strongly disagree – 1, to strongly agree – 7) 
9.3.1.4 | Coping Appraisal 
The Brief COPE (Carver, 1997) was again used within this study as it was successful in 
identifying a relationship between security related stress and dysfunctional coping behaviours. 
The Brief COPE measures coping across three sub-scales; problem focussed coping (such as 
active coping and seeking instrumental support), emotion focussed coping (such as the use of 
humour and relying on others for emotional support), and dysfunctional coping (such as self-
distraction and denial). The full list of items included within the Brief COPE can be seen in Table 
29 in Chapter 8. In addition, the procedure of providing a vignette to contextualise the coping 
behaviour was copied from Chapter 8. The same vignette was provided to participants as the one 
used in the previous study. This vignette can also be seen in Table 30 within Chapter 8. Appendix 
C outlines all of the items and constructs used within the survey, alongside the original source of 
the items where they were taken from existing research.  
As well as items used to reflect constructs of interest within the study, two additional items were 
added as attention checks prior to piloting the survey; these checks were items with explicit 
instructions of which response to choose and were designed to ensure that participants were 
paying attention to the survey. Following the collation and generation of items, the scale was 
subjected to two rounds of pilot testing. 
9.3.1.5 | Piloting Items 
The first round of piloting involved sending the survey to 12 participants from the Baby Boomer 
population who were known to the researcher through their involvement in previous studies. 
Participants were asked to provide feedback on the length of the survey (to approximate 
completion time), as well as the acceptability, feasibility and clarity of the items used in the 
survey. Following this phase, items were modified slightly through discussion with the 
supervisory team. 
The second round of piloting involved administering the survey to a small portion of the overall 
sample (10% of the overall sample) of baby boomers (Aged 56-74, n=80) using ‘Prolific’, the 
data collection company used within the previous study. This ‘soft-launch’ facilitated an accurate 
approximation of the duration of the study, to allow for appropriate compensation for taking part, 
as well as ensuring that the online survey was set up correctly (i.e. to identify any opportunities 
for missing data etc.).  
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9.3.2 | Participants and Online Survey Distribution 
The final measurement instrument was distributed online using Prolific in February 2020. The 
second stage of piloting identified that the survey took on average 13 minutes to complete. 
Participants in the main study were paid £1.58 for taking part, an amount deemed ‘fair’ by Prolific. 
In total; 947 respondents accessed the survey. Of these, eight responses were removed due to 
failing one or more attention checks. Following removal of these responses, 939 responses were 
taken through to data analysis. No missing data was present in the collected data, due to all items 
requiring a forced response. The final sample consisted of UK Baby Boomers (aged 56-74) 
consisting of 330 Males (35.14%, MAge = 62.07, SDAge = 4.78) and 608 Females (64.75%, MAge = 
62.10, SDAge = 4.62). One participant listed their sex as ‘trans female’ (Age=57) (See table 36 for 
full demographics).  
Table 36 Participant Demographics for Study 5 
Sex n % Age: Min Max Mean (SD) 
Male 330 35.14 56 74 62.07 (4.78) 
Female 608 64.75 56 74 62.10 (4.62) 
Other 1 .001 57 57 
Education Level n % 
PhD or Equivalent 32 3.40 
Master’s Degree or Equivalent 104 11.01 
Postgraduate Diploma or equivalent 66 7.03 
Undergraduate degree or equivalent 287 30.56 
A-Level or equivalent 215 22.90 
GCSE/O-Level or Equivalent 201 21.41 
No Formal Qualifications 34 3.62 
Relationship Status n % 
Married 563 59.96 
Widowed 46 4.89 
Divorced 122 12.99 
Single 105 11.18 
Separated 24 2.55 
Living with Partner 72 7.66 
Other 7 0.75 
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9.4 | Results 
Analysis was conducted in three key stages. First, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was 
conducted to ensure that the items loaded onto their anticipated factors. Given the novelty of some 
of the items used in this study (see Appendix C), this analysis was designed to further assess 
construct validity. Following EFA, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted, this 
analysis allows for the ‘confirmation’ of these factors under more statistically rigorous conditions 
and allows for an assessment of the fit of the data i.e. how well the suggested constructs ‘fit’ the 
underlying data. Finally the data was subjected to covariance based structural equation modelling 
(CB-SEM). This also represents a statistically rigorous analysis and allows for the assessment of 
linear relationships between variables in a similar to way to regression analyses.  
9.4.1 | Exploratory Factor Analyses (EFA) 
Prior to EFA, the dataset was randomly split into two halves using the built-in random split within 
SPSS. This created two equal sized datasets meaning that cross-validation from CFA and SEM 
could be conducted in a fresh dataset in accordance with published guidance (Pett, Lackey & 
Sullivan, 2003). The sample for the EFA consisted of 469 participants, 170 of which were male 
(36.25%, MAge = 62.17, SDAge = 4.86) and 299 of which were female (63.75%, MAge = 62.16, SDAge 
= 4.65). 
Two exploratory factor analyses were conducted, the first explored the factor structure of 
constructs used as exogenous variables. Since Independent and Dependent Variables should be 
analysed separately in an EFA (Hair et al., 2010) a second EFA was carried out with the GSRS 
scale developed in Chapter 8. The GSRS scale was subjected to EFA because: it represented an 
endogenous variable within the model, is a recently developed scale, and has little existing re-test 
validation. The remaining measure used in this study; the Brief COPE scale (Carver, 1997), was 
not subjected to EFA due to its substantive use in existing literature including validation and 
factor structure studies (Martz & Livneh, 2007).  
For the exogenous variables, prior to EFA, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy (KMO) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity were conducted to ensure the factorability of 
the data and thus the suitability of EFA factor analysis. Initial KMO was .910 and Bartlett’s test 
was significant (χ2 (496) =12383.01, p<.001). For the GSRS scale, KMO was .886 with Bartlett’s 
test significant (χ2 (55) = 4024.43, p<.001). Both of these sets of values are greater than the 
recommended cut off values (KMO>.60 and Bartlett’s significance (p<.05) indicating that the 
data was appropriate for EFA (Carpenter, 2018). 
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9.4.1.1 | Extraction and Rotation 
Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) was used as the extraction method with Direct Oblimin; an 
oblique rotation, applied due to anticipated medium correlations between factors (Carpenter, 
2018). PAF was chosen over the Maximum Likelihood (ML) approach typically used with 
conducting EFA and CFA due to its robustness and as it is the recommended extraction method 
when normality is violated (Carpenter, 2018), something identified in some of the constructs. 
Multiple extraction techniques were used to decide on the number of factors extracted. 
Investigation of the scree plot, eigenvalues greater than one and the anticipated number of factors 
expected based on construct creation, were used in accordance with published guidance to decide 
on the number of factors to be extracted (Williams, Onsman, & Brown, 2010).  
9.4.1.2 | Item Removal and Final Factor Structure 
A number of considerations were involved in item removal, firstly the pattern matrices were 
investigated for any non-loadings, cross-loadings and weak loadings (<.50). Secondly, before 
removal decisions were made, items were considered in line with their theoretical background 
and the remaining construct structure following their removal. Finally, communalities were 
investigated to determine the amount of variance shared with other items as recommended by 
Worthington and Whittaker (2006).  
9.4.1.3 | EFA of Constructs 
The initial EFA model explained 67.56% of variance through a seven-factor structure. However, 
there were some issues found within the pattern matrix. Items from security self-efficacy and 
response costs loaded together and items from response costs cross-loaded with other constructs. 
Removing items relating to response cost; improved the variance explained to 69.22%. This 
removed several issues with item loadings and resulted in a six-factor structure. Despite this, 
security self-efficacy items loaded together with protection habits, this is understandable due to 
the nature of these constructs. Forcing a seven-factor structure resulted in a variance explained 
increase and meant that items loaded as expected into their pre-defined constructs, without the 
need to remove any further items. The resulting seven-factor solution explained 71.55% of the 
variance and as such was retained for further analysis (See Table 37 for overview of variance 
explained by factor).  
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Table 37 Total Variance Explained by Each Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rot. Sums of 
Sqrd Loadings 
Factor Total % of Variance Cumul % Total % of Var Cumul % Total 
1 9.638 33.234 33.234 9.354 32.256 32.256 7.717 
2 4.043 13.940 47.174 3.865 13.326 45.582 3.716 
3 3.164 10.910 58.084 2.963 10.219 55.801 3.029 
4 2.118 7.304 65.388 1.824 6.291 62.091 2.573 
5 1.463 5.044 70.431 1.173 4.045 66.136 2.380 
6 1.297 4.472 74.903 .965 3.327 69.463 8.202 
7 .856 2.952 77.855 .604 2.081 71.545 6.638 
8 .643 2.217 80.072 
9 .592 2.043 82.115 
15 .344 1.185 91.189 
… … … … 
29 .065 .223 100.000 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. Rows 16 to 28 Removed for Parsimony 
a. When factors are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance.
The pattern matrix for the seven-factor solution, as well as the internal consistencies of the 
constructs (Cronbach’s Alpha used) can be seen in Table 38 below. All Cronbach’s Alpha scores 
were above .70 demonstrating good reliability (Nunnally, 1967), these can also been seen within 
Table 38. The factor correlation matrix for the seven-factor solution can also be found below 
(Table 39). 
9.4.1.4 | EFA of GSRS 
For the GSRS Factor analysis, the initial model (based on eigenvalues greater than one), generated 
a two-factor solution explaining 65.91% of the variance explained by GSRS factors. However 
this model involved cross-loading of one uncertainty item, as well as complexity and overload 
items loading together. Forcing a three-factor solution resulted in the variance explained 
increasing to 73.02%, with items loading into their anticipated factors (complexity, uncertainty 
and overload) with no cross-loadings or loadings less than .698. Therefore a three-factor model 
was retained. See Table 40 for an overview of the variance explained by each factor, Table 41 for 
the pattern matrix of the GSRS Items with their constituent loadings and Table 42 for the factor 
correlation matrix of the 3-factor solution.  
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Table 38 Pattern Matrix of Rotated Solution 
Factor: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Abbrv. Item Text Cronbach’s Alpha: .89 .97 .89 .90 .81 .97 .89 
SK 4 Keeping your device secure (such as with a pin or lock) .770 
SK 8 Using Strong Passwords and keeping them safe .759 
SK 7 Installing Updates for Security Reasons .753 
SK 1 Backing-up data .656 
SK 6 Maintaining good browsing behaviours (hovering over links and checking URL's etc.) .644 
SK 3 Spotting and guarding against phishing emails .570 
SK 2 Antivirus Software .546 
SK 5 Using public Wi-Fi safely .544 
SS 2 I know someone who I can turn to for help .972 
SS 4 There is someone who can show me how to fix it .935 
SS 3 I know someone that I can talk to for support .934 
SS 1 I know someone who is around when I am in need: .927 
TV 6 The risk is high that I will become a victim of a cyber-attack .909 
TV 5 It is probable that I will become a victim of a cyber-attack .888 
TV 4 It is possible that I will become a victim of a cyber-attack .734 
PE 2 I have had negative experiences because of cyber-security attacks in the past .918 
PE 1 I have suffered as the result of a cyber-security attack in the past .899 
PE 3 I have experienced severe cyber-security attacks in the past .766 
TS 1 I think that cyber-security attacks are an important problem -.865 
TS 2 I think that cyber-security should be taken seriously -.740 
TS 3 I think that cyber-security is a severe problem -.725 
PH 2 Using security protection has become natural to me -.960 
PH 3 Online security is something that I do automatically -.933 
PH 5 Online safety protection is part of my regular routine -.923 
PH 1 The use of security protections has become a habit for me -.916 
PH 4 Online protection is something that I do without thinking -.791 
SSE2 I feel comfortable taking security measures against cyber-attacks .883 
SSE3 I possess the knowledge and skills to take the necessary security measures against cyber-crime .718 
SSE1 Taking the necessary security measures against cyber-attacks is easy .709 
Abbreviations: SK=Security Knowledge, SS= Social Support, TV= Threat Vulnerability, PE=Past Experience, TS=Threat Severity, PH=Protection Habit, SSE=Security Self-Efficacy. 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation converged in 8 iterations. 
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 Table 39 Factor Correlation Matrix 
Table 40 GSRS Total Variance Explained 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums ofSqrd Loadings 
Factor Total % of Var Cumul % Total % of Var Cumul % Total 
1 5.313 48.29 48.298 5.103 46.386 46.386 4.515 
2 2.615 23.77 72.073 2.259 20.533 66.920 2.662 
3 .900 8.181 80.254 .671 6.103 73.023 4.256 
4 .479 4.359 84.613 
… … … … 
11 .137 1.245 100.000 
N.B. Rows 5-10 removed for parsimony. Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
Table 41 GSRS EFA Pattern Matrix 
Factor: 1 2 3 
Abbrev. Items Cronbach’s Alpha: .92 .95 .86 
C 3 I often find it difficult to understand how to keep myself safe online .858 
C 2 I do not know enough about online security to protect myself .845 
C 1 I find that other people often know more about online security than I do .828 
C 4 I struggle to understand cyber security advice and guidance .808 
U 1 Cyber-security advice is constantly changing .849 
U 3 There is always new online security guidance that I should follow .810 
U 4 Online security technology is constantly changing .760 
U 2 I am always having to learn new procedures and processes to stay safe online .698 
O 3 Engaging in cyber-security practices takes too much effort .941 
O 2 Protecting myself online takes too much time .879 
O 1 Keeping myself safe online is too demanding .848 
Abbreviations: C=Complexity, U=Uncertainty, O=Overload. Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.  Rotation Method: 
Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
Table 42 Factor Correlation Matrix of GSRS Factors 
Factor 1 2 3 
1 1.000 
2 .227 1.000 
3 .713 .142 1.000 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.   
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 1.000 
2 .072 1.000 
3 -.183 .071 1.000 
4 -.014 .054 .317 1.000 
5 -.105 -.111 -.308 -.108 1.000 
6 -.719 -.121 .131 .031 .186 1.000 
7 .647 .073 -.209 -.113 .019 -.709 1.000 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
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Following the completion of EFA procedures, analysis proceeded to confirmatory factor analyses. 
9.4.2 | Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) 
As previously outlined, for the purpose of cross-validation of the established factor structures, 
prior to analysis the dataset was inverted so that CFA was conducted within a fresh dataset. The 
sample for the CFA therefore consisted of 470 participants, 170 of which were male (36.25%, 
MAge = 62.17, SDAge = 4.86) and 299 of which were female (63.75%, MAge = 62.16, SDAge = 4.65) 
and one of which who identified as trans female (aged 57). 
9.4.2.1 | Measurement Model: Initial Model Fit 
As there is debate around which measures of fit are to be reported, or whether arbitrary cut offs 
are useful at all (Niemand & Mai, 2018), this paper uses a range of measures from a number of 
guidance sources, as done so within Chapter 8. The same indices have been used in a range of 
previous papers including the recently published scale developed by Timmermans and De Caluwé 
(2017). The fit values used as cut offs in this study can be seen in Table 43. In accordance with 
the guidelines set by Levine, Hullett, Turner, and Lapinski (2006) the existing endogenous scale 
(Brief COPE) was included in the confirmatory factor model phase to ensure their loading and to 
validate it’s dimensional structure. The initial model fit statistics can be seen in Table 44 below.  
Table 43 CFA Fit Indices Used in this Paper 
A measurement model) was constructed (see Figure 17), for which initial fit statistics can be seen 
in Table 9.  
Acceptable Good Very 
Good 
Source 
𝜒𝜒2 Statistic p>.05 - - (Kenny et al., 2015); (Hoe, 2008) 
CMIN/DF 
(𝜒𝜒2/df) 
≤5 ≤3 ≤2 (Kline, 2005) 
CFI ≥.90 (with 
SRMR 
<.09) 
≥.95 - (Hu & Bentler, 1999) 
RMSEA ≤.10 ≤.08 ≤.05 (Feinian Chen et al., 2008) 
PCLOSE >.05 - - (Kenny et al., 2015) 
SRMR - ≤.08 - (Hu & Bentler, 1999) 
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Table 44 Initial Model Fit for Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Value Fit 
𝜒𝜒2 Statistic .000 No 
CMIN/DF 1.678 Very Good 
CFI .936 Acceptable 
RMSEA .038 Very Good 
PCLOSE 1 Acceptable 
SRMR .0644 Good 
Acceptable fit indices were found for the majority of fit indicators. Although the Chi-Square 
statistic was found not to be significant, this is to be expected given this statistics’ tendency to 
over-inflate in large sample sizes (Schermelleh-Engel et al., 2003). After assessing initial model 
fit, the Brief COPE’s 2-item sub-scales were parcelled using mean scores to condense the model 
into a more parsimonious one and to resolve some normality issues identified, that would 
otherwise impact upon the SEM (Matsunaga, 2008). In addition, items from the GSRS scale were 
parcelled. Given the exploratory nature of the IV’s and their novel use in this field, items from 
Figure 17 Initial Measurement Model 
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the other survey constructs were not parcelled. Following item parcelling, low loading factors 
(those with weights less than .50) were removed to ensure a model that accurately represented the 
influence of security stress on coping. 
Removing low loadings resulted in the loss of all emotion focussed coping sub-scales as well as 
instructional support (A PFC sub-scale). In addition, within the dysfunctional coping scale, low 
loadings were found for substance abuse, self-blame and venting and thus these were removed. 
Finally, the uncertainty sub-scale of the GSRS loaded poorly (.17) and therefore was removed at 
the measurement model stage. The two other subscales of GSRS were retained however (overload 
and complexity). The implications of these removals are discussed within the discussion section. 
Given the item removal at this stage, it is important to acknowledge that the subsequent analyses 
move away from a confirmatory model and towards a more exploratory one. The result of the 
removal of low loading items led to improvements in multiple model fit indices. Table 45 
demonstrates the fit indices of the final measurement model and Figure 18 represents the final 
measurement model. 
Table 45 Final Model Fit for Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
 Value Fit 
𝜒𝜒2 Statistic .000 No  
CMIN/DF 1.874 Very Good 
CFI .967 Good 
RMSEA .043 Very Good 
PCLOSE .996 Acceptable 
SRMR .0327 Good 
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Figure 18 Final Measurement Model 
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9.4.2.2 | Validity and Reliability of CFA Structure 
The table of validity and reliability measures can be seen in Appendix D alongside Composite 
Reliability (CR) scores for the sub-scales. Although the AVE of Dysfunctional Coping fell below 
the expected cut off of .50. Prior to parcelling the AVE was .526 and the CR was .685 for its two 
constructs. Given that some variance would be removed by the parcelling procedure, as second 
order constructs would become first order constructs, the analysis continued, confident that the 
items and constructs demonstrated appropriate convergent validity prior to parcelling. Some 
discriminant validity issues were identified between Security Self-Efficacy, Security Knowledge 
and General Security Stress. This however was anticipated given the strong relationship between 
these constructs and the anticipated high correlations between them. 
9.4.2.3 | Dropped constructs/adaptations prior to SEM. 
During CFA, some factors were dropped (response costs and emotion focussed coping 
constructs), because of this, the hypothesised model was revised prior to the final measurement 
model. To revisit the initial hypothesis, the prior analysis means that hypotheses 5 and 10 must 
be rejected as it cannot be established whether these relationships are predicted or not, something 
discussed further below. The SEM analysis was therefore based on the following revised 
hypothesised model (Figure 19) 
Figure 19 Revised Hypothesised Model 
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9.4.3 | Structural Model 
A structural model was produced using AMOS version 25, the same software used for the CFA 
stages of the analysis. The SEM allowed for the investigation of the relationships between 









9.4.3.1 | Model Overview 
9.4.3.2 | Primary Appraisal Paths 
Threat vulnerability was a significant predictor of security related stress (β=.19, p<.05) suggesting 
a weak but significant positive relationship, thus as perceptions of threat vulnerability rise, 
security related stress increases. This finding means that the revised H1 can be accepted.  
Although it was anticipated that higher perceptions of threat severity would be positively 
associated with general security related stress, the opposite relationship was identified within the 
model. A weak but significant negative relationship was found between threat severity and 
security related stress, suggesting that those who perceive security threats to be more severe, had 
lower levels of security related stress (β= -.08, p<.01). This result lead to the rejection of H2. 
Finally, past experience of victimisation predicted both threat severity (β=.14, p<.01) and threat 
vulnerability (β=.34, p<.05). Despite their beta weight relationships, both of which were 
significant and positive, interestingly past experience of victimisation explained a greater amount 
of variance of threat severity (12%) than of threat vulnerability (2%). These findings allow for 
the acceptance of H3 and H4 respectively. Past experience also demonstrated mediation through 
Figure 20 Full Structural Model 
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its significant indirect relationships with GSRS through both threat severity and threat 
vulnerability (see Table 46 for overview of Indirect Effects). 
Table 46 Indirect Effects within the Model 
Relationship Estimate Lower Upper P Value 
Past Experience -> Threat Vulnerability -> 
GSRS 
.067 .043 .102 .000** 
Past Experience -> Threat Severity -> 
GSRS 
-.011 -.028 -.002 .027* 
Social Support -> Security Self-Efficacy -> 
GSRS 
.022 -.014 .060 .306 
Protection Habits -> Security Self-Efficacy 
-> GSRS 
-.346 -.430 -.258 .001** 
Security Knowledge -> Security Self-
Efficacy -> GSRS 
-.791 -1.033 -.598 .001** 
**=p<.001 *=p<.05 
9.4.3.3 | Secondary Appraisal Paths 
The path from social support to security self-efficacy was found not to be significant suggesting 
that social support does not influence the individual self-efficacy a person has in relation to 
security behaviours. Because of this finding H8 was rejected. However, both protection habits 
(β= .40, p<.01) and security knowledge (β= .51, p<.01) were found to predict security self-
efficacy. Both of these predictors demonstrated moderate positive correlations, suggesting that 
those who engage in protection habits and have greater levels of self-report security knowledge 
are likely to have greater levels of security self-efficacy. These relationships were expected and 
promote the acceptance of both H6 and H7. Furthermore, these two factors combined explained 
74% of the variance of security self-efficacy.  
A very strong significant negative path was identified between security self-efficacy and security 
related stress (β= -.91, p<.01). This finding suggests that as feelings of security self-efficacy 
increase, general security related stress drastically decreases. Likewise, those with very low 
security self-efficacy are likely to experience far greater levels of security related stress. This 
finding allows for the acceptance of H9.  
Combined, security self-efficacy, threat severity and threat vulnerability were able to explain 88% 
of the variance of security related stress. Suggesting that little variance remains unexplained in 
relation to security related stress. 
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9.4.3.4 | Coping Appraisal Paths 
The final set of hypotheses related to how security stress was associated with coping. As outlined 
above, H10 was immediately rejected as emotion focussed coping was removed prior to the 
structural model. This is discussed further below within the discussion section. General security 
related stress was however found to be a significant predictor of both problem focussed and 
dysfunctional coping styles.  
A moderate significant positive path was found between security related stress and dysfunctional 
coping (β= .50, p<.01), explaining 25% of the variance of dysfunctional coping behaviours. This 
suggests that those who experience higher levels of security related stress also experience greater 
levels of dysfunctional coping. This relationship was anticipated and allows for the acceptance of 
H12.  
A weak significant negative path was found between security related stress and problem focussed 
coping (β= -.27, p<.01) explaining 7% of the variance of problem focussed coping. This suggests 
that those who have lower levels of security related stress engage in more problem focussed 
coping. Again this path was expected and thus H11 was accepted.  
A final overview of all hypothesised outcomes can be seen in Table 47. 
Table 47 Hypotheses and Outcomes 
Hyp 
Numb Hypothesis Outcome 
1 Perceptions of Threat Vulnerability will positively predict security related 
stress. 
Accepted 
2 Perceptions of Threat Severity will positively predict security related 
stress 
Rejected 
3 Past experience of being a cyber-victim will positively predict threat 
severity 
Accepted 
4 Past experience of being a cyber-victim will positively predict threat 
vulnerability 
Accepted 
5 Response Costs will positively predict threat severity. Rejected 
6 Security Knowledge will positively predict security self-efficacy Accepted 
7 Protection Habits will positively predict security self-efficacy Accepted 
8 Social Support will positively predict security self-efficacy Rejected 
9 Security self-efficacy will negatively predict security related stress. Accepted 
10 Security Related Stress will be positively associated with emotion 
focussed coping. 
Rejected 
11 Security Related Stress will be negatively associated with problem 
focussed coping. 
Accepted 




9.5 | Discussion 
This study set out to apply the transactional theory of stress and coping to explain cyber-security 
coping behaviours in a UK baby boomer sample. The model generated in this study was 
successful at explaining variance in both dysfunctional and problem focussed coping styles as a 
product of security related stress in line with the existing TTSC theory (Lazarus & Folkman, 
1987). The model did not however explain emotion focussed coping behaviours. Furthermore, 
some dysfunctional and problem focussed coping behaviours also failed to contribute to the model 
and were therefore removed. Thus, it must be highlighted that the model proposed here moved 
away from a confirmatory model and towards an exploratory model (Schreiber et al., 2006), 
something discussed alongside removal decisions further below.  
This discussion begins by outlining why items and constructs were removed and why these 
constructs may not have been appropriate for the initially proposed model. Following discussion 
of item and construct removal, discussion will centre on the model presented.  
9.5.1 | Item/Construct Removal 
several constructs were removed during the analysis process and thus did not contribute to the 
model produced within this study. Most of the removed items were components of the Brief 
COPE scale, the scale used to measure an individual’s coping appraisal in response to the threat 
vignette.  
Emotion focussed coping (EFC) as an over-arching construct, and as a key component of TTSC, 
was removed during the exploratory factor analysis stage, as weak loadings indicated the lack of 
a single underlying latent construct. There are a number of reasons why these factors may not 
have loaded as expected. Chief among them is likely to be that these factors are not appropriate 
for coping in online environments. Although the Brief COPE has been used extensively in existing 
literature (Kato, 2015), it’s use in online environments is lacking. Many of the types of coping 
found in the brief COPE, for example, religious coping, acceptance and humour, are unlikely to 
be of use, or even considered when facing tangible online threats, especially when a threat is 
considered to be high, such as the vignette used within this study. This is likely to explain the 
highly skewed nature of the responses for the emotion focussed items, suggesting that engagement 
in these forms of coping are not appropriate when faced with a cyber-attack scenario. There are 
likely to be emotion focussed coping strategies that are used in online settings, however there is 
currently a scarcity in the extant literature around what these behaviours might be, and the 
implications of engaging in them. Qualitative research is required which investigates which 
coping strategies are used by citizens across all ages, but especially within older adults, to 
determine how people react to online threats and whether their actions might contribute to their 
vulnerability. After such a piece of work is completed, research which investigates emotion 
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focussed coping in the face of threats, within the context of a TTSC model, is likely to be far more 
productive.  
Some components of dysfunctional coping were also removed. The removed sub-scales were; 
denial, self-blame, substance abuse and venting, leaving only behavioural disengagement and 
self-distraction as the dysfunctional coping styles explained by security related stress. In a similar 
way to the lack of relevance of emotion focussed sub-scales, some forms of coping such as denial 
and venting might not be possible responses to the situation provided, where a ransomware attack 
limits the use of technology. In the scenario provided, an individual would be unable to engage 
in denial without disengaging from the use of the technology and although venting might take 
place, it is unlikely to be the reported behaviour of those outlining how they would resolve the 
situation. Behavioural disengagement, or removing oneself from the situation, on the other hand 
is far more relevant given the situation and this was reflected in that it did load appropriately 
alongside self-distraction, a semantically similar and more feasible coping strategy. Further 
research seeking to understand specific coping mechanisms, as discussed in relation to emotion 
focussed coping above, is again likely to provide more appropriate measures of coping to online 
settings.  
A more surprising finding was the low loading of instrumental support onto problem focussed 
coping. i.e. this construct did not align with the other constructs found within the problem 
focussed coping category. Thus, due to poor loading, instrumental support was removed. That 
instrumental support loads poorly on problem focussed coping, suggests that it differs from 
planning and active coping when facing an online threat. However, there are a number of reasons 
why instrumental support may not have aligned with active coping and planning behaviours. One 
reason is that those with higher scores of planning and active coping may not seek instrumental 
support through the lack of a need to do so. For those with higher levels of digital literacy, 
attempting to plan or overcome the situation may not align with the need to seek advice and help 
from others, as they may see themselves as capable without the need for support. Conversely, for 
those who do not have any available support, planning and active coping may be the only option 
available to overcome the given threat (Nicholson et al., 2019). It may also be that the vignette 
presented to the participants offered a threat level which was so high, that it was seen to require 
immediate action, meaning that relying on others, especially for those who have less frequent 
access to support resources (Nicholson et al., 2019), may not have been seen as a tenable option.  
The response costs construct also failed to reflect a single underlying latent construct and as such 
the hypothesis relating to the direct effect between response costs and GSRS was immediately 
rejected. Because of poor item loadings on the response cost factor, it remains unknown whether 
response costs may or may not be associated with security related stress (as hypothesised within 
the original model), as the construct reflecting response costs was invalid. This is possibly due to 
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the scope of the three item sub-scale being too broad. The items included within this construct 
ranged from financial costs to effort costs. Given the lack of loading onto a single construct this 
finding would suggest that costs associated with security vary across older adults, i.e. those who 
see security as financially costly do not necessarily see security as effortful etc. Future research 
seeking to include response costs should introduce specific types of response costs to increase the 
likelihood of items loading into a single factor. 
The final construct removed during analysis was the Uncertainty sub-scale of the GSRS. This 
sub-scale demonstrated poor loading on the GSRS and as such was removed. Given the strength 
of the variance explained by GSRS following removal of the uncertainty subscale, as both an 
endogenous and exogenous variable, it may be that the GSRS is equally useful without the 
uncertainty sub-scale and thus a 7-item version of this scale, made up of complexity and overload, 
might be more useful in future research. It may be that the items included within the uncertainty 
scale, many of which refer to the changing nature of security, instead reflect an awareness of 
information security, something which is likely to load poorly with items referring to feelings of 
overload and complexity. Future research which applies this model to varying security scenarios 
of varying threat levels is likely to determine whether uncertainty as a sub-scale of the GSRS is 
useful, or whether moving to a 7-item scale would be more appropriate.  
9.5.2 | Primary Appraisal 
Having prior experience of being a victim of a cyber-attack was significantly associated with 
greater perceptions of both threat severity and perceptions of threat vulnerability. This suggests 
that those who have previously been a victim of cyber-attacks see themselves to be more 
vulnerable to future attacks as well as seeing those tasks as being more severe. These findings 
support those Perloff (1983) who suggests that prior victimisation leads to greater feelings of 
vulnerability to future threats, and contributes to recent literature which suggests that these 
relationships also exist in relation to modern-day cyber-attack scenarios (Nam, 2019).  
As was anticipated, threat vulnerability was significantly associated with security related stress, 
suggesting that those who see themselves as particularly vulnerable to cyber-attacks also 
experience greater levels of security related stress. This finding, although perhaps intuitive, 
contributes to a relatively vacant literature space. That vulnerability perceptions were associated 
with stress, may reflect an accurate knowledge of the negative repercussions of cyber-security 
victimisation. Benbasat (2010) found that those who had greater levels of information security 
awareness also had greater feelings of intrinsic cost about security non-compliance behaviours 
i.e. stress, guilt, shame or embarrassment, suggesting that those individuals who were aware of
information security threats, understood the negative repercussions of not complying with them.
Likewise, it may be that higher perceptions of vulnerability are associated with greater levels of
stress as a result of fear, whereby those who feel most vulnerable, also feel most afraid of the
possible negative outcomes, increasing their stress response. Although a wealth of literature has 
investigated fear and fear-appeals (Latour & Rotfeld, 1997), literature which seeks to disentangle 
fear and stress, and the relationships between these disparate emotive constructs, is both important 
and currently lacking in cybersecurity research. Although we understand how fear-appeals can 
influence cyber-security awareness campaigns (Bada et al., 2015), understanding the relationship 
between fear, the stress it provokes, and the coping behaviours associated with this stress, is likely 
to be an important avenue in future research and might help to inform campaigns which aim to 
promote cybersecurity.  
Although a relationship between threat severity and security related stress was anticipated, the 
direction of the relationship identified within the model was unexpected. The findings of this 
study suggest that those who had greater perceptions of threat severity had lower levels of security 
related stress. Although initially this result is surprising, it may reflect a knowledge relationship, 
whereby knowledge of security threats reduces stress of threats and whereby a lack of knowledge 
leads to greater levels of stress as the result of a fear of the unknown (Nam, 2019). It may be that 
those who have greater knowledge of cyber-security threats also report them as being more severe, 
due to knowing how damaging a security attack can be, whereas those with limited knowledge 
may rate a threat to be less severe given that they are unable to accurately assess how much 
damage a security threat might cause and as such are stressed as a result of this lack of knowledge. 
Alternatively it may be that those who have greater knowledge of a given threat, also have in 
place mechanisms which they see as protective of certain threats, based on their mental models 
of how threats work (Wash & Rader, 2015). Although little existing literature has specifically 
looked at how knowledge of security threats is directly associated with assessments of threat 
severity and stress, research from other fields may help to support this suggestion. Rolison and 
Hanoch (2015) found that those who had greater levels of knowledge about the Ebola virus saw 
it as more severe than less knowledgeable participants, conversely however, they found that those 
who were more knowledgeable about the virus saw themselves as less likely to contract the virus 
than those with less knowledge. It may be that participants in this study who had greater levels of 
perceived security threat reflected the findings of Rolison et al. (2015), in that although they saw 
threats as more severe, they may have seen themselves to be less likely to become a victim and 
as such had a reduced stress response.  
A key limitation which may have led to the issues seen with threat severity may have come from 
a typographic error in the survey instrument. Item 3 of the threat severity construct stated: “I think 
that cyber-security is a severe problem”. This item should have stated: “I think that cyber-security 
attacks are a severe problem”. This error is important as this changes the meaning of the item 
from one which assesses security attacks as a problem, to an item which becomes a judgement of 
cyber-security, something which may have caused the participant to judge how they feel 
about cyber-security, rather than how they feel about cyber-attacks. This may explain 
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the unanticipated finding whereby threat severity loaded significantly only security related 
stress, but with the wrong sign (threat severity negatively predicted security related stress rather 
than the anticipated positive relationship). A consideration linked to this, but equally important 
for future research seeking to conduct similar research is consistency within the terminology 
used. Within the same survey items referred to cyber-attacks but also cyber-security attacks. 
The wording of ‘cyber-attacks’ is immediately recognisable as a negative term, thus 
this terminology is likely to be more useful especially within older adult samples. Cyber-
security attacks on the other hand lead to a negative switch. I.e. ‘cyber-security’ is a 
positive term, made negative by the addition of attack. It would be recommended that future 
research remain consistent in using only one of these terms, and that older adults might 
benefit from the simplest of the two (cyber-attacks).  
9.5.3 | Secondary Appraisal 
Although it was hypothesised that social support might produce enhanced feelings of 
security self-efficacy, no significant relationship was found between these two constructs. These 
findings contradict the recent research by Czaja et al. (2018) which suggest that 
increasing social connectivity and reducing loneliness have the potential to increase 
technology self-efficacy. Although social support has been found to be positive in terms of 
internet adoption and ongoing use of technology (Chopik, 2016; Damodaran & Sandhu, 
2016), the findings here suggest that social support does not influence the self-efficacy that an 
individual has in engaging in security behaviours. There are a number of reasons why this 
relationship may not have been significant. At a methodological level, the scale used to assess 
security self-efficacy, adapted from Martens (2019), focusses on an individual’s ability to 
engage in security behaviours and as such ignores the social components of cyber-security, 
such as support seeking or deferring security responsibility to others. An alternative 
explanation may be that having access to instrumental social support removes the need to 
have security self-efficacy, as tasks which are seen as too demanding are deferred to others, 
such as younger members of the family (Portz et al., 2019).  
Given that cybersecurity in older adults typically involves the use of others as support 
structures, something identified in Chapter 4 of this thesis and a wealth of existing research 
(Damodaran & Sandhu, 2016; Godfrey & Johnson, 2009; Portz et al., 2019), it is possible 
that social support might instead be more important in relation to other parts of the model. 
It may be that social support directly relates to general security related stress, however 
limited existing literature allowed for the drawing of this relationship within the 
hypothesised model. Retrospective investigation of the zero order correlations between the 
social support and general security related stress constructs demonstrate no relationship between 
these constructs either, suggesting that such linear relationships would have not been 
appropriate within the model presented here. It is however likely that access to social 
support of various kinds, such as the dependence promoting 
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or independence promoting types discussed in Chapter 6, will influence a wide range of security 
behaviours which raises questions of how this model might be applied to understand how social 
support influences security behaviours. Future research could benefit from splitting an 
appropriately powered sample into two based on whether they consider themselves to have high 
support or low support, and compare the models that arise in response to one or multiple threats. 
Doing so would for a comparison of how security related stress varies as a result of social support, 
but also highlight differences in engagement in each of the coping mechanisms used. Given that 
neither of the coping mechanisms which could have contributed to the model with regards to 
external support (EFC – Emotional support seeking and PFC – Instrumental support seeking), 
loaded appropriately as coping mechanisms, this model instead reflects TTSC components on an 
individual level. The primary appraisal outlines an individual’s threat perception, the secondary 
appraisal refers to an individual’s response appraisal and the subsequently derived coping 
behaviour which results from the stress threshold reflects the online behaviours which can be 
engaged in as an individual.  
Although social support was not found to be associated with security self-efficacy, both protection 
habits and security knowledge were, explaining 74% of the variance of security self-efficacy. 
These findings support those of Rhee et al (2009) who found that security self-efficacy was 
predicted by computer and internet experience in graduate students. Furthermore the findings 
demonstrate that security knowledge and engaging in protection habits are associated with 
security self-efficacy in older adults, an area relatively ignored in existing security self-efficacy 
literature. These findings also provide evidence to support the suggestions of Shillair et al. (2015) 
who suggest that knowledge and previous experience are likely to promote self-efficacy in online 
settings. Finally, the findings are in-line with existing literature by Vance et al. (2012) who 
demonstrated that repetitions of habitual behaviours are likely to promote self-efficacy beliefs, 
something which can now be supported within an older adult security context. Understanding that 
protection habits and security knowledge are important for promoting self-efficacy provides 
avenues for future research but also for those developing campaigns aimed at promoting security 
self-efficacy. Generating and maintaining security habits is likely to promote ongoing security 
behaviours. As such it is likely that promoting engagement in simple security behaviours will 
promote feelings of self-efficacy when faced with more challenging security threats. Thus, it may 
be that forcing users to engage in basic security practices, such as updating, rather than allowing 
users to be passive in the security process (Reeder et al., 2017), facilitates greater development of 
security behaviours, even if this is not particularly well received within the short-term.  
The final component of the coping appraisal is the relationship between security self-efficacy and 
security related stress. The relationship between these factors was incredibly strong with the 
negative direction of the relationship suggesting that those with high security self-efficacy have 
low levels of security related stress and consequently those with low levels of security self-
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efficacy have high levels of security related stress. These findings support those of existing 
literature in other domains (Benight & Bandura, 2004; Mudrak et al., 2016; Shoji et al., 2016) 
which demonstrate a link between stress and self-efficacy. Furthermore the findings demonstrate 
a strong relationship between self-efficacy and stress in older adults in relation to cyber security 
behaviours. Although understanding how the relationship between security self-efficacy and 
security stress might inform interventions aimed at reducing the stress associated with security, 
doing so is only useful if stress itself is associated with negative outcomes, something identified 
within the coping appraisal of the model presented here. 
9.5.4 | Coping Appraisal 
Within the coping appraisal section of the model, security related stress was associated with two 
of the three forms of coping outlined in TTSC. The model outlines a positive relationship between 
security related stress and dysfunctional coping, explaining 25% of the variance of dysfunctional 
coping behaviours. Furthermore the model suggests a negative relationship between security 
related stress and problem focussed coping, explaining 7% of the variance of problem focussed 
coping. No existing security literature has investigated the use of the TTSC alongside the original 
coping styles used within the oft-cited Brief COPE (Carver, 1997), thus comparisons with existing 
literature are difficult. It is however important to note that the findings presented here are in-line 
with the hypotheses derived from the original TTSC (Lazarus & Folkman, 1987), in that greater 
levels of stress were associated with greater levels of dysfunctional coping and lower levels of 
problem focussed coping. It is likely that by using a variety of scenarios of varying threat levels 
that other forms of coping styles would be elicited. I.e. providing a vignette which provided a 
medium threat level would more be less predictive of dysfunctional coping and might instead 
promote some forms of emotion focussed coping. Similarly, providing a vignette which provided 
a lower stress scenario would likely push people to overcoming this threat through engagement 
in problem focussed coping behaviours. Finally, providing a no threat scenario would likely lead 
to no coping behaviours given that the threat would not be considered stressful enough to promote 
a coping attempt. Future research should seek to validate these suggestions to ensure that the 
TTSC is indeed an appropriate model. 
9.5.5 | Final Proposed Model 
Despite the low loading and non-loading of some constructs, leading to their subsequent removal 
from the model, this study was successful in a number of ways. Predominantly, this study is the 
first, to date, to apply the transactional theory of stress and coping to explain security coping 
behaviours as the result of a stress response. Furthermore, the study provides insight into how 
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security related stress might promote poor cybersecurity behaviours in older adults. The final 
model produced in this study can be seen in Figure 21 below.  
9.6 | Conclusion 
This study applied the transactional model of stress and coping to cybersecurity behaviours in UK 
Baby Boomers to show how stress associated with cyber-security might influence coping 
behaviours as a possible antecedent to security vulnerability. Using structural equation modelling, 
a strong percentage variance of security related stress scores was explained as the product of 
primary and secondary appraisal constructs. The model provided here is the first to apply TTSC 
to a security setting to understand how coping behaviours derive from security related stress, 
something which in-turn is the result of primary and secondary appraisals. The proposed model 
(See Figure 21) provides a foundation for ongoing research seeking to understand how security 
coping behaviour results from security related stress. Furthermore the model can be applied in 
research which aims to reduce undesirable security behaviours through interventions designed to 
reduce security related stress. The transactional model of stress and coping is likely to be a useful 
model for explaining cyber-security behaviours and the study outlined here provides an initial 
model explaining such behaviours in UK Baby Boomers.
Figure 21 Proposed TTSC Model Explaining Older Adult Cybersecurity Coping Behaviours 
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Chapter 10: General Discussion 
10.1 | Chapter Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a general discussion of the theses. As such, this chapter is 
split into six key sections. Firstly, the key research questions and more specific research 
objectives, introduced in Chapter 1, are revisited. Following this, the second and third sections 
will outline the key findings of the five studies conducted within the thesis, discussing how these 
contribute to the literature underpinning the thesis (described in chapters 2, 3 and 7). The fourth 
section will highlight the implications of the findings of the thesis. Finally sections five and six 
will outline some limitations and suggest how this thesis might inform future research, policy and 
design. 
10.2 | Thesis Research Questions 
Initially the thesis had set out to understand three key research questions (see below). Through 
starting at the retirement transition, a time in life generally considered a gateway into older age 
(Kloep & Hendry, 2006), the thesis began by establishing how retirement as a major life transition 
might lead to cybersecurity vulnerability. This formed the first research question which was 
investigated throughout the first two studies of the thesis. The findings of these studies suggested 
that understanding how older adults felt about engaging in cybersecurity behaviours, and whether 
or not they engaged in such behaviours, was important for understanding their online 
vulnerability, something which formed the second research question. Finally, after identifying 
that cybersecurity is an emotive subject for older adults, the research moved towards the 
implementation of a stress-based model and the development of a model which predicts older 
adult’s security coping. As such, the third research question which arose related to how older 
adults were influenced by stress and how this stress relating to their cybersecurity coping 
mechanisms. This thesis therefore used a mixed methods approach to investigate the following 
research questions; 
RQ1: What factors cause older adults to become vulnerable to cybersecurity attacks? 
RQ2: How do older adults feel about engaging in cyber-protective behaviours, and 
what barriers hinder them from doing so? 
RQ3: How do older adults cope with cybersecurity challenges? 
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10.3 | RQ1: What Factors Cause Older Adults to Become Vulnerable to Cybersecurity 
Attacks? 
The first research question sought to understand how retirement, as a major life transition, might 
contribute to cybersecurity vulnerability in older adults. Although existing research focusses on 
establishing differences between “working age” and retired individuals, very little research has 
sought to understand the process of transitioning between these life stages, and how this transition 
might influence online vulnerability. The first two studies of this thesis sought to understand 
whether this major life transition might later promote older adult’s cybersecurity vulnerability. 
10.3.1 | Changing Technology Use in the Retirement Transition and the Implications for 
Cybersecurity Vulnerability 
Through applying a mixed methods approach, Chapters 4 (qualitative) and 5 (quantitative) 
contributed to the existing literature base in a number of ways. It was identified in Chapter 4 that 
very little research, particularly within security settings, had focussed on the retirement transition. 
As such, Chapters 4 and 5 bridged a gap between two extant literature bases; research focussed 
on the impact of the retirement transition and an emerging older adult cybersecurity literature. 
Chapter 4 (study 1) was a qualitative investigation into the various ways in which the retirement 
transition might influence technology use, and how these changes might lead to cybersecurity 
vulnerability. Overall, the study identified six key themes, or areas of change, that take place 
during the retirement transition which were subsequently seen to impact upon technology use: 
social interaction, finances, day-to-day routine, feelings of competence, sense of purpose, and 
technology support structures. Although a range of existing research outlined within Chapter 4 
had investigated technology use in the retirement transition (Mao et al., 2017; Salovaara et al., 
2010), one of the key contributions of Chapter 4 is that it is first study set within a cybersecurity 
context to explicitly investigate how technology use changes during the retirement transition, 
outlining how these changes may give rise to cybersecurity vulnerabilities.  
Chapter 5 was designed to further test the findings of Chapter 4 by applying a survey outlining 
the factors of change associated with the retirement transition and comparing these with a self-
report measure of engagement in risky cybersecurity behaviours. The study identified eight 
significant predictors of engagement in risky cybersecurity behaviours: social disconnectedness, 
impulsivity, time spent on social media, computer self-doubt, self-esteem, risk propensity, 
perceived cognitive decline and interest in technology. This study supported the notion that the 
factors identified as changing during the retirement transition, were also associated with a 
measure of cybersecurity vulnerability, supporting the findings of study 1 and suggesting that the 
retirement transition might provide avenues for cybersecurity vulnerability.  
Discussing these findings in relation to existing literature is difficult, namely due to the lack of 
extant literature relating to how retirement might influence cybersecurity vulnerability. However 
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the study was in line with some of the other findings identified within existing retirement 
adjustment literature and provided a number of avenues for ongoing research.  
Research by both Kloep and Hendry (2006) and Dorfman (1992) suggested that the loss of 
colleagues was seen as one of the most negative aspects of departure from the workplace. The 
findings of Chapter 4 extended this further by demonstrating that the loss of colleague interaction 
during the retirement transition tended to push older users towards technology to seek out new 
forms of social interaction with others. Existing literature has demonstrated that older adults are 
disproportionately affected by telemarketing fraud, something likely to extend to online settings 
(Whitty, 2015). In particular those who are lonely are likely to be more vulnerable to such attacks 
(Alves & Wilson, 2008). Chapter 4 demonstrated that the retirement transition may be a 
contributing factor to older adult loneliness, with workplace colleagues offering the only social 
interaction some older adults will have, especially for those who do not have contact with family 
or neighbours. Interestingly, Chapter 5 extended these findings. During factor analysis, items 
relating to loneliness, isolation and declines in feelings of a sense of purpose loaded together to 
represent a construct related to social disconnectedness. This newly created construct was then 
found to be a significant predictor of engagement in risky online cybersecurity behaviours. Social 
disconnectedness is a relatively under-studied concept (Cornwell & Waite, 2009), with factors 
such as loneliness and isolation far more frequently researched. However it may offer an 
interesting avenue for future cybersecurity research. The findings of chapters 4 and 5 together 
were able to identify that without appropriate support, the retirement transition may promote 
social disconnectedness, something which may subsequently promote cybersecurity 
vulnerability. 
Chapter 4 outlined that older adults reported feeling a loss of competence following the retirement 
transition. These findings aligned with a range of existing literature which demonstrated both age 
related declines in self-worth perceptions (Orth & Robins, 2014) as well as age related declines 
in actual cognitive and physical ability (Salthouse, 2009). Furthermore within an online context, 
the findings support existing literature that older adults under-estimate their computer knowledge 
(Marquié, Jourdan-Boddaert & Huet, 2002) and often have feelings of inadequacy when 
comparing their digital literacy to those of their younger peers (Vaportzis, Clausen, & Gow, 
2017). The findings of Chapter 4 build upon this existing literature by suggesting a relationship 
whereby departure from the workplace might exacerbate this relationship. Participants discussed 
how no longer having to stay mentally alert meant that they felt a decline in their cognitive 
faculties. They also attributed a range of emotions such as fear, anxiety and stress to these declines 
which impacted upon the way that they used technology, outlining how they often feared 
exploring technology due to feelings that they would do harm through their actions. Chapter 5 
sought to build on these findings by establishing how these feelings of declining competence 
might relate to engagement in risky online behaviours.  
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This study found that computer self-doubt, a construct created to reflect not self-efficacy, but the 
perception that one’s behaviour will have specific negative repercussions online, was by far the 
strongest predictor of engagement in risky online behaviours. It’s ability to explain variance was 
50% higher than the second-most predictor (time spent on social media) and three times more 
important than factors already in the extant literature identified as influencing engagement in risky 
online behaviours such as impulsivity (Aivazpour & Rao, 2018; Hadlington, 2017).  This finding 
provided a number of interesting avenues, but perhaps the most important was highlighting that 
engagement with technology and security is a highly emotive subject for older adults. The 
findings of study 5 suggest that those with declining feelings of competence i.e. those who believe 
that their actions will lead to harm, are also those who most frequently engage in risky 
cybersecurity behaviours, offering one potential explanation to cybersecurity victimisation in 
older adults. Further qualitative research is however required to understand why this relationship 
exists, how it is associated with actual victimisation and to how best to position interventions in 
this space.  
10.4 | RQ2: How Do Older Adults Feel About Engaging in Cyber-Protective Behaviours, 
And What Barriers Hinder Them from Doing So? 
Chapters 4 and 5 established that changes associated with the retirement transition are associated 
with increased engagement in risky cybersecurity behaviours, however little is known about how 
older adults feel about engaging in protective online behaviours. If the same feelings of self-doubt, 
stress and anxiety identified in the earlier studies extend into protective cybersecurity behaviours, 
then it is likely that older adults are engaging in risky behaviours whilst unprotected against 
threats, a further possible explanation for their online vulnerability.  
Although some existing literature had sought to understand protective behaviours in older adults, 
comparing them to younger adults in their knowledge of internet hazards (Grimes et al., 2010), 
very little research has focussed on how older adults feel about engaging in protective online 
behaviours, and how this might influence their cybersecurity vulnerability. Study 3 set out to 
understand how older adults feel about engaging in protective online behaviours, whether or not 
they protected themselves online, and what factors influenced their engagement with such 
behaviours. In doing so, Study 3 provided a number of contributions to the literature base, namely; 
providing a novel task for use in future cybersecurity elicitation work, providing a new 
understanding of older adult’s reasons for disengaging from protective cybersecurity behaviours, 
and providing a deeper understanding of older adult’s feelings towards engaging in protective 
online security behaviours. These contributions are discussed in the context of existing literature 
below. 
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10.4.1 | Development of a Novel Card-Sorting Task 
The study developed a new card-based sorting task which was effective at eliciting security 
information and stimulating discussion around these behaviours. Similar card sorting tasks based 
within occupational settings have proved effective at eliciting security knowledge from 
employees. For example, Nicholson, Coventry and Briggs (2018) developed the cybersurvival 
task, a simple card-sorting task based on the desert island survival (Lafferty, Eady, & Elmers, 
1974) and Moon Landing (Dembo & McAuliffe, 1987) card sorting tasks. The cybersurvival task 
was applied to understand the differences between security experts and employees within 
organisational settings. The findings of Chapter 6 demonstrate that such tasks are effective at 
eliciting security information from older adults outside of workplace settings, something further 
discussed in the thesis research implications section below. The task developed here differs from 
the existing cybersurvival task, it’s closest proxy, through the use of less complex security 
messages which were taken not only from the security prompts used in existing literature (Ion et 
al., 2015), but from up-to-date government guidance sites aimed at providing cybersecurity 
information for a lay readership. The task developed here also builds upon the cybersurvival task 
by introducing a second component following the initial ranking task. Through introducing a 
second axis (left to right), used in Chapter 6 to measure confidence that older adults have in 
engaging in each behaviour, the task was effective at making users consider the confidence that 
they had in each behaviour, whilst also considering the effectiveness ranking that they had 
previously outlined. Following the study, many participants outlined how they found the task 
enjoyable and insightful in helping them to reflect on their security behaviour, something which 
suggests initial feasibility and acceptability of this task. Thus, one contribution of this study is a 
task which can be used in future older adult research to promote elicitation of security knowledge 
and behaviours. 
10.4.2 | Understanding the Factors that Influence the Confidence that Older Adults have 
in relation to Engagement in Protective Online Security Behaviours 
In terms of factors which influence the confidence that older adults have in engaging in security 
behaviours, three key themes were identified: demand factors, support factors and personal 
factors.  
Demand factors were split into demand reducing i.e. those that reduced the demands of engaging 
in security such as devices having simple interfaces, or demand increasing i.e. those that made 
engaging in security more demanding such as a need to stay ‘up to date’. The findings support 
existing research which demonstrate that older adults have a preference for devices which are 
easy to use. Findlater, Froehlich, Fattal, Wobbrock and Dastyar (2013) for example demonstrated 
that older adults prefer touch screen interfaces such as tablet computers over mouse and keyboard 
inputs. However, existing literature has demonstrated that few devices are created with older 
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adults in mind (Czaja et al., 2006; Page, 2014). It is likely that the computer self-doubt that was 
identified in chapters 4 and 5, will be exacerbated by overly complex user interfaces which are 
likely to act as barriers to older adults’ engagement in security behaviours. The findings of this 
study therefore have immediate implications for developers who wish to promote older adults’ 
engagement in security behaviours by promoting simplicity through design. 
Support factors was identified as a theme and was split into two parts; dependence promoting 
support and independence promoting support. Dependence promoting support reflected a 
negative support style, such as devices being taken off the individual by younger members of the 
family and handed back with problems resolved. Independence promoting support on the other 
hand reflected a constructive support style where older adults were encouraged by friends or 
family members to learn how to interact with technology, rather than rely on them for help. The 
findings here support existing literature which demonstrates that inter-generational support can 
be helpful for older adults, promoting self-efficacy (Damodaran & Sandhu, 2016) however the 
method of delivery is important, as negative support styles, particularly from younger members 
of the family (Xie, 2007), can promote feelings of low digital literacy  and dependence on those 
who they receive support from (Barnard et al., 2013). These findings promote avenues for policy 
makers and those who design interventions by promoting constructive learning. Although 
scaffolded Vygotskian learning has been comprehensively studied in relation to the co-
construction of knowledge in younger groups (John-Steiner & Mahn, 1996), less attention has 
been focussed on how such constructive approaches might promote digital learning in older adult 
groups. We currently have an understanding of older adults learning preferences (Truluck & 
Courtenay, 1999), however future work should identify how best to embed security knowledge, 
whilst promoting computer self-efficacy, and promoting effective independence promoting 
support styles in those who wish to help older adults.  
‘Personal factors’ was a sub-theme which referred to individual level characteristics which 
influence the confidence an individual has when engaging in security. Factors such as computer 
self-efficacy, previous experience and perceived level of control contributed to older adults’ 
confidence when engaging in security behaviours. Although a wealth of existing research has 
sought to understand individual differences in cyber-security (Williams et al., 2017) there remains 
a gap in our understanding of how these differences impact upon security behaviours in older 
adult samples. Indeed, even studies which draw differences between younger and older adults 
when investigating individual differences do so with far smaller groups of older adults when 
compared to younger groups in the same studies (e.g. Gratian, Bandi, Cukier, Dykstra, & Ginther, 
2018). Effectively there is a relative paucity of data about this age group. 
The findings here do however support the finite emerging individual differences research based 
in older adult samples. Factors such as previous experience and security knowledge were seen to 
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be important in influencing the confidence older adults have in relation to engaging in security 
behaviours, these findings reflect those of Shillair et al. (2015) who identified previous experience 
and security knowledge as important factors in promoting security behaviours in older adults. 
Similarly, that computer self-efficacy was shown to be a factor in engagement in protective 
security behaviours mirrors existing research which demonstrates that computer self-efficacy is 
important for older adults technology adoption and ongoing use (Czaja et al., 2006; Mitzner et 
al., 2019; Sintonen & Immonen, 2013). Furthermore, these findings support recent research which 
suggests that targeting self-efficacy may be a fruitful avenue for promoting engagement in online 
security behaviours (van Bavel et al., 2019).  
10.4.3 | Understanding the Reasons for Older Adults’ Disengagement from Protective 
Online Security Behaviours 
With regard to older adults’ disengagement from security behaviours, three key themes were 
identified, relating to them; not wanting to engage in security behaviours, not needing to engage 
in such behaviours, or not being able to engage in security behaviours. 
Participants who reported not wanting to engage in security behaviours discussed the perceived 
costs associated with doing so (i.e. changes to user interfaces, time, effort and financial costs) and 
the possible negative repercussions of incorrectly engaging in such behaviours (causing further 
damage or harm). That engaging incorrectly in security behaviours was seen to be dangerous, 
reflects the findings of Chapters 4 and 5 i.e. that computer self-doubt is an important barrier to 
older adults’ engagement in cybersecurity behaviours. These findings also support existing 
research which demonstrate that changes to user interfaces are considered a key reason for older 
adults’ rejection of updates (Vaniea et al., 2014).  
Some participants who reported being unable to engage in security behaviours related this to their 
lack of digital and security literacy, i.e. not knowing how to protect themselves. Participants also 
reported that cognitive demands such as the inability to remember passwords impeded them from 
engaging in security practices. The findings extend previous literature from younger populations 
(Woods & Siponen, 2018) which demonstrate that users consider memorability as an paradoxical 
problem when creating passwords. These findings also support those of Chapter 4 and 5 and again 
highlight how the retirement transition, a period in which people are likely to experience feelings 
of declining competence, may promote disengagement from security behaviours.  
Perhaps a more important finding in relation to older adults’ inability to memorise passwords, 
was the finding that they engage in “security trade-offs”, i.e. many older adults are keen to engage 
in security behaviours, but due to cognitive difficulties feel unable to do so. In order to continue 
to act securely, they engage in practices such as writing down passwords. Although this has 
previously been considered poor password practice (Adams & Sasse, 1999; Duggan, Johnson, & 
Grawemeyer, 2012), the most recent government guidance allows for this behaviour, as doing so 
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generally promotes wider use of passwords and more complex passwords. Interestingly, this 
suggests that older adults may in fact be ‘leading the way’ in relation to some security behaviours. 
Indeed, existing literature has suggested that password security is considered more important by 
older adults that younger adults (Whitty, Doodson, Creese, & Hodges, 2015). Many participants 
within Chapter 6 felt the need to apologise for engaging in such trade-offs, however future policy 
should focus on removing negative stigma around engaging in security behaviours and instead 
promote more usable security.  
Finally, akin to the findings of Schreurs et al. (2017) this study found that modern day older adults 
are keen to engage in technology but at times are embarrassed by their limited knowledge. These 
findings also support the underlying theme of Chapters 4, 5 and 6: that security is an emotive 
subject for older adults. They are likely to feel stress in relation to engaging in security behaviours 
due to fear of the negative repercussions of doing so, shame when they do not know enough about 
security and embarrassment when seeking support from others. Further research relating to the 
emotional components of security in older adults is vital to further understanding how to promote 
security self-efficacy in this population, something discussed further below.  
The third component of security disengagement was a feeling of not needing to engage in security 
behaviours. Participants who discussed this outlined deferring this responsibility to others, such 
as the owner of the devices they used (where devices were shared) or reported unrealistic 
optimism that they were unlikely to be targeted due to their lack of resources. Detachment from 
security responsibility poses a dangerous issue for cybersecurity and can been seen in existing 
workplace-based literature (Nicholson et al., 2018). This detachment may stem from a number of 
causes. Howe, Ray, Roberts and Urbanska (2012) posit that home users take responsibility for 
security threats when they are aware of the threats and feel that they understand them. The sample 
interviewed, and in particular those who reported feeling as if security was not considered their 
responsibility, also tended to be those who reported having lower digital literacy. This opens an 
avenue for possible future research and policy in understanding how to promote personal 
responsibility for security across older adults’ users. Given the vast array of threats and the various 
ways in which these can cause harm, security must be considered the responsibility of every user.  
10.4.4 | Security as an Emotive Subject for Older Adults 
The findings of Chapter 6 supported those of Chapters 4 and 5 in outlining that security was often 
seen to be an emotive subject for older adults, fraught with: shame, stress, embarrassment and 
fear. This thesis supports emerging research which demonstrates differences in how varying age 
groups see cybersecurity. For example, Jones, Collins, Levordashka, Muir, and Joinson (2019) 
found that younger groups generally referred to social components such as social media, that 
‘working age’ adults (aged around 34 years old in their sample) described cybersecurity with 
reference to technical terms such as authentication and encryption, and that older adults referred 
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to terms such as “intrusion” and “control”.  Terms such as intrusion and control are likely to 
reflect older adult’s emotive state towards cybersecurity threats. The transactional theory of stress 
is based on the concept that low feelings of control are key to experiencing stress in relation to a 
threat. It is likely that feelings of intrusiveness are also emotionally challenging for those who 
lack digital literacy but still wish to benefit from the use of technology.  
Although this thesis could have chosen to focus on any one of these emotional components, the 
thesis focussed on stress. This was mainly due to the existence of a popular psychological theory 
not already applied in security settings (the transactional theory of stress and coping), but also 
because of the emerging security related stress literature in organisational settings (Ament & 
Haag, 2016a, 2016b). The findings support existing literature which demonstrate that older adults 
find engagement in technology to be a stressful experience (Yagil et al., 2016). However, the 
majority of behavioural models used in existing security research have ignored emotion as a 
contributing factor towards behaviour. It was decided that the transactional theory of stress and 
coping (Lazarus & Folkman, 1987) offered an interesting model that might be applied to explain 
security coping behaviours, however to date, no existing security literature had used this theory 
within its entirety, in non-organisational security settings. Furthermore, the application of this 
model required measures not currently available due to the lack of existing literature applying this 
theory. This led to the final two studies of the thesis. The first focussing on the development of a 
security related stress scale, the production of which would allow for a study which could apply 
the model to explain older adults coping behaviour as a result of a stress response. The second 
would apply this scale, alongside the findings of the earlier studies, to show how various factors 
identified within the thesis might contribute to explaining cybersecurity vulnerability as a product 
of stress.  
10.5 | RQ3: How Do Older Adults Cope with Cybersecurity Challenges? 
10.5.1 | Development of the General Security Related Stress Scale (GSRS) 
Study 4 aimed to develop a short scale designed at measure stress in relation to cybersecurity. 
Although some previous literature, namely D’Arcy (2014), had used components of coping theory 
in relation to security related stress, no literature had applied this theory in non-organisational 
settings. Given the scarcity of literature within this area, the study was also able to achieve other 
aims; as well as developing this scale, the study was able to test the key components of coping 
theory as an initial validation of the scale i.e. that security related stress was associated with either 
problem focussed, emotion focussed or dysfunctional coping. Furthermore, the study was able to 
use this scale to test the earlier suggestion that the retirement transition might exacerbate security 
vulnerabilities, through the promotion of security related stress. The first part of Chapter 8 
developed the general security related stress scale in a large-scale sample representative of the 
UK population, this is further discussed in this thesis implications for research section below. 
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Following development of the GSRS, Chapter 8 identified that higher security related stress was 
associated with higher levels of dysfunctional coping, a finding which was anticipated based on 
coping theory (Lazarus & Folkman, 1987) and something which would suggest that those who 
experience greater levels of stress are more likely to act in ways which promote vulnerability to 
attacks. Security related stress is a “neglected construct” in existing cybersecurity research 
(Ament & Haag, 2016b), but offers an interesting emerging area for security researchers. 
Although recent literature has begun to focus on security related stress (Hwang & Cha, 2018; 
Liang et al., 2019; Lundgren & Bergstron, 2019), the extant literature base contains samples only 
made up of employees, and has solely investigated security related stress in the context of 
information security compliance and policy violation. This is likely due to two key reasons; 
firstly, the seminal paper by D’Arcy (2014) was itself based within workplace settings, and the 
scale they developed stemmed from an existing organisational-based “technostress” literature 
(Tarafdar et al., 2010). Moreover, the scale they produced was developed for, and grounded 
within, organisational settings and as such was easily applied to other similar settings. The major 
contribution of Chapter 8 was therefore the adaptation of this scale to non-workplace settings, and 
through demonstrating an association with dysfunctional coping, this scale demonstrated initial 
face validity for measuring security related stress in more general settings.    
Chapter 8 was also able to identify that those still in the workplace experienced greater levels of 
security related stress than a matched retired sample. Although this was contrary to the given 
hypothesis; a range of interesting questions arise from this finding, something discussed further 
in the future research section below. Discussing this finding within the context of existing 
literature however is difficult, as no existing research has investigated security related stress 
outside of workplace settings. However a range of suggestions as to why these relationships might 
exist are provided in Chapter 8. 
10.5.2 | Applying the TTSC to Understand Security Coping Behaviours in Older Adults 
Study 5 used structural equation modelling in a large sample of baby boomer participants to model 
cybersecurity coping behaviours in relation to not only security related stress, but also other 
components identified within the first four studies of the thesis (such as security self-efficacy, 
threat perceptions, protection habits etc.). The study demonstrated associations between security 
related stress, problem focussed coping and dysfunctional coping in the hypothesised directions, 
whereby higher stress led to greater levels of dysfunctional coping and lower levels of problem 
focussed coping. These findings fell in line with the expected relationships outlined within coping 
theory (Lazarus & Folkman, 1987), and as such demonstrated the effectiveness of applying TTSC 
to understand security coping behaviours.  
The study was also able to identify a strong negative relationship between security self-efficacy 
and security related stress. These findings are the first to identify these relationships whilst 
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looking specifically at security measures in non-workplace settings. The limited existing research 
which has investigated security self-efficacy has identified a positive relationship between 
controllability and security related stress (Rhee et al., 2009). As coping theory (Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1987) suggests that the stress response reflects an individual’s feelings of controllability 
in relation to a stressor (following their appraisal of the threat against their resources), the findings 
here support the earlier findings of Rhee (2009). Very little existing work has focussed on the 
relationship between security self-efficacy as a specific construct, and the impact that it may have 
on actual behaviour, something which provides an avenue for future research. 
The model also found that security self-efficacy was strongly predicted by both security 
knowledge and protection habits. This finding supports existing literature which demonstrates 
associations between security knowledge and security self-efficacy (Hameed & Arachchilage, 
2018), and computer experience and security self-efficacy (Rhee et al., 2009) and contributes by 
extending these findings outside of workplace settings. Furthermore, the findings support existing 
literature which demonstrates that engaging in protective habits promotes self-efficacy in 
protective behaviours (Shillair & Meng, 2017; Vance et al., 2012), and demonstrates that these 
findings apply in older adult samples. 
Although a vast array of existing research, much of which is based within PMT, has applied self-
efficacy as a predictor of other variables (such as security intentions, security behaviour, 
violations etc.), much less research has sought to understand what factors promote security self-
efficacy itself. In explaining a large proportion of the variance of security self-efficacy (74%), the 
findings here suggest that both knowledge and habit are important contributors to an individual’s 
security self-efficacy. Thus, these findings of this study also contribute by providing two key 
avenues through which policy and interventions may aim to promote security self-efficacy in 
future. 
Finally the model demonstrated that being a victim of a cyber-attack in the past led to increased 
perceptions of both threat severity and threat vulnerability, both of which were found to be 
predictors of security related stress. A wealth of existing research has focussed on the implications 
of past victimisation and how it effects the perceptions of future events (Frieze, Hymer, & 
Greenberg, 1987; Perloff, 1983) however less research has sought to understand how past 
victimisation might impact security behaviours. Dodel and Mesch (2017) found that past 
experience of cyber-victimisation was not associated with future anti-virus preventative 
behaviours. Although they report being surprised by this finding, the study reported here helps to 
elucidate why these findings may have occurred. If past victimisation promotes security related 
stress, as suggested by this study, then the individual is more likely to move towards emotion 
focussed and dysfunctional coping styles, rather than engage in more proactive problem-focussed 
behaviours. Thus the findings presented here provide further insight into how victimisation might 
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influence future security behaviours in retire older adults. This is concerning given what we know 
about the proportion of older adults who have previously been victims of cyber-crime (Age-UK, 
2015a). 
The main contribution of this study was the production of a new model of cybersecurity coping 
behaviours based on the transactional model of stress and coping. Furthermore the identified 
model is effective at explaining a relatively large proportion of the variance of security coping 
behaviours. The model produced has a range of implications for policy makers and developers 
who seek to reduce security related stress and subsequent negative coping behaviours and 
provides a range of interesting avenues for future research, something discussed further in the 
further research section below.  
10.6 | Thesis Implications 
The thesis brought with it a range of implications for both applied settings and future research, 
although many of these are discussed within the thesis, the major implications of the thesis are 
discussed within this section.  
10.6.1 | Implications for Policy Makers and Applied Settings 
The findings generated in Chapters 4 and 5 relate to how the retirement transition, and the changes 
associated with this major life transition might influence technology use in older adults. Although 
Chapter 8 demonstrated that security related stress was higher in those within the workplace, these 
findings remain important for those charged with understanding and protecting older adults 
online. Chapters 4 and 5 identified areas of change that take place during the retirement transition, 
typically leading to increased use of technology. Given that the baby boomer generation represent 
a more technologically savvy group, and one that is keen to engage in technology well into 
retirement, it is important that policy makers are aware that the way in which this transition is 
handled may promote technological vulnerabilities in post-retirement life.  
One way that policy makers might start to promote older adult security is through working 
alongside organisations to provide support and assistance to those departing the workplace. In 
doing so they can assist in ensuring that older adults are protected during a time when they may 
be most vulnerable to such attacks. Such assistance could be in the form of technological support, 
i.e. access to IT support while setting up new home technologies, access to software such as
antivirus, or written guidance that can be used by those who feel unable to appropriately protect
themselves following departure from the workplace. Findings from this thesis suggest that older
adults desire such support, but currently feel as if no such help is available. Providing such
assistance, particularly to those who have less resources, either in terms of technical support or
financial strength, is likely to promote fairness and equality in the face of cyber-attacks.
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Through identifying the factors which influence engagement in cybersecurity behaviours, as well 
as the factors that influence the confidence older adults have when engaging in such behaviours, 
Chapter 6 was able to outline a direction for future advertising campaigns and policy aimed at 
promoting engagement in security behaviours. Ultimately, the study outlined key barriers that 
campaigns and policies can target to promote engagement with cybersecurity behaviours. 
Chapters 8 and 9 developed a model based around the transactional model of stress and coping. 
Previous literature has outlined reasons why current campaigns are unsuccessful, with one reason 
being an inappropriate level of fear (Bada et al., 2019). The model identified here supported these 
findings by suggesting that when security related stress is too high, people move towards 
dysfunctional coping styles, rather than attempting to actively overcome obstacles. The findings 
of these studies will better inform future campaigns which target security related stress. By 
developing campaigns which motivate problem focussed coping, i.e. medium and low levels of 
stress, such campaigns are more likely to promote behaviour which focusses on overcoming 
problems, rather than behaviour which promotes disengagement and denial around security 
behaviours.  
In April 2019, the UK government published a ‘white paper’ (DCMS, 2020) (updated in February 
2020), the second stage in developing a new law, with regards to “online harms”. This white paper 
sets out plans to promote online safety measures. The package seeks to develop legislation which 
promotes companies taking more responsibility for users’ safety online and the findings provided 
within this thesis can contribute in developing such guidance. Although this white paper outlines 
a need to protect “children and other vulnerable groups”, the paper fails to properly address the 
online harms experienced by older adult users. The paper discusses promoting digital literacy as 
well as promoting resilience in children, however older adults are also in desperate need of such 
help. Older adults are a rapidly growing population online and ignoring them as a population is 
no longer acceptable. Older adults are now technology users, and this is likely to become all the 
more prevalent over time. Policy makers, now more than ever, need to focus on promoting online 
safety in older adults and empowering them to protect themselves. 
Policy makers should also seek to ensure that older adults are included when developing guidance 
and information. Much of the online advice targeted at the general population, such as the 
CyberAware website (at the time of writing – June, 2020), includes jargon and is clearly not 
targeted at older adult populations. Furthermore, users depicted on such sites are typically very 
young, which further reinforces that the information provided is exclusive of those most likely to 
be searching for assistance.   
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10.6.2 | Implications for Future Research 
10.6.2.1 | Security Research in the Retirement Transition and Older Adult Samples 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the retirement transition has been widely researched in a number of 
areas (Barbosa et al., 2016) and more recently has even been viewed in the context of technology 
engagement and adoption (Mao et al., 2017; Salovaara et al., 2010), but there remains a scarcity 
of research which seeks to understand how retirement, as a major life transition, might influence 
older adults’ cybersecurity vulnerability. This thesis has outlined a number of areas of change 
associated with the retirement transition and demonstrated associations between these changes 
and engagement in risky online behaviours. There remains a need for more research to understand 
how the retirement influences cybersecurity vulnerability, something discussed further below in 
the recommendations for future research section, however the findings of this thesis might help 
to inform other research in this space in a number of ways.  
Firstly, this thesis re-affirms the importance of studying retirement as a major life transition. 
Although there are likely to be a wide array of outcomes and trajectories on an individual level 
following the transition into retirement, there are also likely to be a number of commonalities. 
Understanding the shared experiences that take place across retirees is likely to provide further 
insight into the vulnerability we see in older adult populations. Through using mixed methods 
research this thesis has demonstrated that a number of methods are suitable to older adult 
cybersecurity research. For example, qualitative methods such as interviews were effective at 
establishing the lived experience of the retirement transition and how technology use changed 
during this transition. Moreover, the use of the novel card sorting task developed and applied 
within Chapter 6 demonstrated that such tasks are not only seen as acceptable by older adults but 
are effective at promoting cybersecurity-based discussion. That participants reported enjoyment 
from partaking in this task, and enjoyed reflecting on their engagement with security practices, 
demonstrates that older adults are keen to engage with research in this area, but require greater 
attention from the wider security community.  
10.6.2.2 | Application of the Transactional Model of Stress and Coping 
This thesis has demonstrated that the transactional model of stress and coping (Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1978) is a viable model for understanding coping behaviours as a result of security 
related stress. Although this theory has been applied in other settings (as discussed in Chapter 7), 
far less research has sought to apply this theory to security settings. Furthermore, those which 
have sought to apply this theory, have done so within organisational settings, applying only 
components of the original theory to understanding behaviours such as policy disengagement and 
violation (D’Arcy et al., 2014; Weinert, 2018; Xue, 2009), this thesis demonstrates that this theory 
can be applied in the non-organisational settings to aid in understanding older adult coping 
behaviours. 
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As the security related stress scale developed within this thesis was developed within a sample 
representative of the UK population, its ongoing use and validation is appropriate in samples 
outside of the older adult focus of this thesis. Given the scarcity of scales currently in circulation 
within security settings, this thesis contributes to the literature base by providing a tool through 
which the transactional theory of stress and coping can be applied not only in older adult samples, 
but other groups who exist outside of workplace settings. The findings of Chapter 8, through 
conducting a rigorous scale development process consisting of both exploratory and confirmatory 
factor analysis, provide a strong starting point for those wishing to either apply this scale, or 
develop it further.  
10.6.2.3 | Older Adult Technology Use in a Post Covid-19 World 
The findings of this thesis help to provide insight into how a major change, namely retirement, 
can influence technology use, however they are also likely to extend to other significant life 
events. With the outbreak of the Covid-19 virus, and the resulting worldwide lockdown, a vast 
number of people have turned to the internet to facilitate interaction, leisure and to manage 
everyday activities such as banking.  
For some older adults the implications of forced isolation, especially for those with low digital 
literacy, are widespread and are likely to promote digital exclusion (Seifert, 2020) and 
cybersecurity vulnerability. In Chapter 4, the implications of declining social interaction are 
discussed in terms of how they might promote declining technical support for older adults post-
retirement, however the findings identified here are likely to be even more prevalent given the 
immediacy of the imposed lockdown restrictions and the sudden adoption and increased use of 
technology for older adults who wish to maintain social interaction.  
During lockdown, it is likely that many older adults have been at increased risk of cyber-attacks, 
and it is likely that many have become victims of cyber-attacks. Furthermore, it is likely that the 
implications of the worldwide pandemic will mean significant changes for future societal 
interaction. Already many companies are seeing the benefits of moving online and Covid-19 has 
provided an opportunity to test this. This move towards online settings is likely to promote digital 
exclusion for older adults unless the digital community promotes inclusivity (Seifert, 2020). 
Already some research is emerging which calls for more appropriate design and “age-friendly” 
technology (White et al., 2020). Although the implications of this are yet to be seen, the findings 
of this thesis are likely to contribute to a knowledge base which aims to protect older adults online. 
The findings of this thesis are particularly important moving forward, especially given that similar 
scenarios may occur again within the future. Understanding the factors behind cybersecurity 
vulnerability, either as a product of security related stress or major life transitions such as 
retirement, gives us a deeper understanding as to where we can position support for older adults 
who are relying on the internet in a post covid-19 world.  
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10.6.2.4 | Wider Implications of the Thesis 
Although the findings of this thesis provide new knowledge in relation to older adult cyber-
security, it is likely that the thesis findings will have implications for research in other age 
groups too. Chapters 4 and 5 provided insight into the retirement transition and how this major 
life transition influences technology use as a product of managing the transition period. It may 
be that this change in technology use is also prevalent in other major life transitions. For 
example, when students leave to go to university it is likely that many will purchase new 
devices, borrow others old devices and go onto interact with technology in new ways. Students 
may have to self-direct learning in online virtual learning environments, something particularly 
likely with the global changes to university education following the Covid-19 virus. Recent 
research by Dyer (2020) supports this by outlining the role that technology plays in shaping a 
student’s identity following their transition to university. They outline a number of ways in 
which technology is used by students before, during and following their transition into 
university life. This change in technology may provide similar issues i.e. an increase in risky 
cybersecurity behaviours and proffers an interesting avenue for future research. Other 
transitions such as the transition to motherhood, the transition into the workplace for the first 
time, and the transition to secondary school may also bring unique changes to technology use 
and as such the findings of this thesis provide a foundation for ongoing cybersecurity major life 
transition work.  
The coping theory components of the thesis i.e. the application of the transactional model of 
stress and coping, are also likely to provide insight into future cybersecurity research in other 
age groups. It was identified in Chapter 8 that those in the workplace were found to have higher 
levels of security related stress than those in the retired population. Although possible reasons 
for such are discussed within Chapter 8, this finding provides both interesting and concerning 
implications for research in “working age” individuals. If higher security related stress is indeed 
associated with poorer coping mechanisms then it follows that those in the workplace may in-
fact be more likely to engage is dysfunctional coping strategies, providing not only 
implications for themselves but also their workplaces. The original SRS scale (D’Arcy, 2014) 
already exists as a tool to help establish these relationships within occupational settings, 
however the generation of the GSRS within this thesis allows similar research to be conducted 
in other age groups regardless of whether or not the behaviours of interest are taking place 
specifically within the workplace. It is likely that there will be a great deal of variation in 
security related stress across not only age groups but other individual differences, something 
which the GSRS can also be applied to understanding. Undoubtedly future research is required 
to understand the implications of security related stress across all age groups and the instrument 
developed here provides the first steps to such work being undertaken.   
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The findings of this thesis, particularly in relation to online coping, also provide a number 
of possible pathways to impact through targeting older adult cybersecurity vulnerability and 
seeking to reduce the negative repercussions of targeted attacks. Although we know that older 
adults are at greater risk of cybersecurity vulnerability, we still know little about the specific 
mechanisms by which their behaviour in response to a threat ultimately leads to victimisation. 
The findings of Chapters 8 and 9, and the coping literature introduced here, suggest that coping 
mechanisms (as the result of an emotional response) might provide one such explanation as to 
how a threat and subsequent dysfunctional response behaviours might lead to cyber-security 
victimisation. This thesis therefore sets a clear path for follow up research, something discussed 
in section 10.6.2.5. Although set in a new, emerging research area, the findings of this thesis are 
able to inform policy and campaigns seeking to promote older adult cybersecurity 
vulnerability. Namely this is achieved through providing new knowledge of how the 
retirement transition influences technology use (Chapter 4), providing an increased 
understanding of reasons for disengagement from, and factors influence confidence in, 
cybersecurity behaviours in older adults (Chapter 6) and promoting a focus on coping 
behaviours as a means to promote cybersecurity protection. Other findings outside of the main 
aims of the thesis, such as the finding that security language is often incongruent in meaning 
between younger and older groups can be immediately applied to motivate better design and 
participant involvement in information security campaigns for organisations such as Age 
UK and the UK government when attempting to provide appropriate security advice. 
10.6.2.5 | Suggestions for Future Research 
As discussed above, it was identified within this thesis that security is considered an emotive 
subject by older adults. Within this thesis, a focus was aimed towards understanding stress, and 
how stress might influence coping behaviours. However, a range of questions relate to the 
emotional component of security outside of stress. Fear and anxiety were discussed by 
participants however to date very little research has sought to understand how these impact older 
adult’s cybersecurity behaviours. It is likely that fear and anxiety will relate to stress and as such 
the findings of this thesis are likely to inform such research. However, it is likely that these other 
forms of emotion will have nuanced differences which will influence security behaviours and 
their subsequent outcomes. Recent research has demonstrated that certain emotional responses 
are likely to have specific security related response behaviours I.e. those who experience fear are 
likely to engage in avoidance behaviours, whereas those who experience higher levels of anxiety 
are more likely to engage in higher levels of surveillance behaviours (Cheung-Blunden et al., 
2019). Understanding the intricacies of the emotional response to security threats is likely to 
provide greater insight into the coping strategies used by older adults, however this in itself is an 
avenue of necessary future research.  
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One avenue of research with clear real-world application comes from the application of 
interventions designed to promote more functional strategies of overcoming cyber-security 
threats. This presents an end-goal whereby an intervention might actively reduce cyber-security 
vulnerability through moving older adults away from emotion-focussed and dysfunctional coping 
strategies and towards problem focussed coping strategies. Given the modelling presented in 
Chapter 10, such interventions would likely benefit from promoting engagement in security 
behaviours and through promoting security knowledge. As a result of increasing security habits, 
it is likely that over time security self-efficacy would increase and security related stress would 
reduce leading to better coping strategies. However, numerous studies would be required before 
such an intervention could be performed.  
One such study for example would need to focus on understanding online coping mechanisms, or 
the coping mechanisms applied to deal with cyber-security issues. Within this thesis, associations 
between security related stress were found in relation to certain coping styles (such as behavioural 
disengagement) identified within an existing coping scale (Brief COPE, Carver, 1997). However, 
it was highlighted within Chapter 9 that many of the coping styles identified within this scale, 
such as substance abuse and religiosity were unlikely in online settings, something supported by 
the statistics of these studies. Although the COPE and its brief version have been used extensively 
across a range of fields, these almost exclusively take place in offline settings, however it is likely 
that some forms of coping are unique to online settings or at the very least vary dramatically from 
their real-world coping counterparts. A comprehensive mixed methods study is therefore required 
to first understand how people cope when faced with challenges online. These challenges may be 
specific to cybersecurity i.e. running anti-virus scans when faced with a slowing pc, or may 
benefit a wider HCI coping literature: such as avoiding technology after an instance of cyber-
bullying. As a result, such a study would not only be suited to older adults, but to a broad range 
of individuals from different age groups. Following a comprehensive qualitative investigation of 
online coping mechanisms, a quantitative, appropriately powered study would likely provide 
categories of coping akin to the emotion focussed, dysfunctional focussed and problem focussed 
coping styles identified in existing coping theory (Lazarus & Folkman, 1987). Given that the scale 
produced within this thesis was created in a sample representative of the UK population, this 
thesis can make a contribution to the research which stems from such a coping study.   
After establishing the specific mechanisms through which people cope in online environments, 
an important follow up to this research would be to establish how engagement in each of these 
coping behaviours is specifically associated with cybersecurity vulnerability. This may take the 
form of establishing whether certain coping strategies are associated with actual victimisation 
(such as financial loss or malware acquisition) or might instead demonstrate how certain coping 
behaviours themselves open up avenues of vulnerability through reducing protection or increasing 
ones attractiveness as a target. The UK Government Cyber-Security Strategy (2016-2021) 
220 
outlines “Individuals and organisations and organisations in the UK will have access to the 
information, education, and tools they need to protect themselves.” (HM Government, 2016). The 
research provided within this thesis, and that which would follow the suggested research outlined 
here, would undoubtedly contribute to achieving this goal, particularly in relation to tailoring such 
education to the under-researched older-adult population. If such a study could demonstrate links 
between certain coping behaviours and specific causes of cyber-security vulnerability, 
interventions would be far better placed to target specific vulnerabilities through promoting 
effective coping strategies. This thesis outlined how the retirement transition might be associated 
with cybersecurity vulnerability for retirees, however further research is required to test these 
associations longitudinally. Although the retirement transition is likely to have a range of different 
outcomes for different individuals, it is likely that there will be some shared experiences across 
retirees, such as those identified in Chapter 4 of this thesis. Future research can build upon these 
findings by tracking technology behaviour, security behaviour, and security knowledge on the 
approach to, during and following the retirement transition, to understand older adults online 
vulnerability during this time. A study such as this is likely to demonstrate how older adults 
become vulnerable as their sources of information shift away from expertise and towards 
availability as their workplace-gained legacy knowledge becomes outdated (Nicholson et al., 
2019).  
Chapter 6 also led to a range of interesting future research avenues. Although the card sorting 
elicitation task was useful in understanding the confidence that older adults have in relation to 
security behaviours, and the reasons behind why some older adults choose not to protect 
themselves, the task which was developed has a number of other possible uses. Using a ranking 
task such as the one used within the cybersurvival task (Nicholson et al., 2018) is something 
which is able to demonstrate how effective users see protective cybersecurity behaviours to be. 
More importantly however, using a ranking task in which users are forced to justify their 
decisions, is likely to elicit mental model information, i.e. the users understanding of how these 
behaviours work, something which is likely to be useful for security researchers. Although at 
times these models were alluded to by the older adults used within this thesis, this was not the 
aim of the study and thus provides an interesting avenue for future research which seeks to further 
delve into older adults’ understanding of protective security behaviours.  
10.7 | Limitations 
Until immediately prior to study 4, participants named within studies were generally sampled and 
referred to as ‘older adults’. Given the focus of the previous studies typically investigating the 
retirement transition, almost all participants had been members of the baby boomer generation, 
however some had fallen outside of the age range usually considered to be baby boomers. The 
use of arbitrary age groups and the problems associated with the use of such groups was discussed 
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in depth during Chapter 4. Within this thesis the focus of the earlier studies was on retirement as 
a transition, and not chronological age, clearly studies such as these predominantly focus on the 
impact of the transition and not the age at which this transition takes place. Indeed there is a wide 
variability in relation to the age at which people retire, something further widened by recent 
changes to age discrimination laws which means that mandatory retirement can no longer be 
enforced by organisations. However, given the focus of Chapters 8 and 9, and their contribution 
to the literature being based around model designed to explain behaviour, it was decided that a 
population be specifically outlined, with participants selectively sampled from within the baby 
boomer population. In doing so the thesis is able to provide a more appropriate contribution in 
the form of findings which better suit the extant literature base.  
Another limitation which can be seen within this thesis relates to the measures used in this study, 
from which two minor limitations can be seen to stem. The first relates to the use of self-report 
measures throughout this thesis, the second relates to the use of the constructs and items used 
within the scale survey studies. With regards to the issue of using self-report measures. Many of 
the items, especially when considering the coping appraisal in Chapter 9, asked participants to 
rate their self-efficacy in engaging in security practices, or asked participants to rate their 
engagement with protection habits. These questions in particular may be susceptible to social 
desirability biases. Previous research has demonstrated that older adults, and particularly those 
who have lower levels of digital literacy, are likely to be embarrassed when asking for help and 
support when using technology (Damodaran & Sandhu, 2016). It may be that some of the older 
adults in this study intentionally over-rated their behaviours in an attempt to seem more 
competent. This was likely somewhat reduced by the use of anonymous survey instruments but 
may be a factor which influences the results. Future research would better benefit from 
experimental designs which might instead administer surveys and follow up with measures which 
are designed to identify actual behaviour through objective measures.  
The second limitation relating to measurement relates to the use of constructs over scales. 
Typically using fully validated and developed psychometric instruments would be preferred when 
conducting behavioural research. Such instruments offer greater assurances of validity and 
reliability ultimately reinforcing the rigour of the study. However, at the date of writing this thesis, 
few validated security-based psychometric instruments exist in regular circulation, something 
which reflects an ongoing issue in security research. In an attempt to strive for rigour, where 
possible items and constructs were taken from validated scales, or from scales which were 
frequently used in existing research. Furthermore, where scales were infrequently used or not yet 
validated, analysis included these constructs within factor analyses to ensure that factors loaded 
within the context of that study, without making assumptions about the grouping of items. Future 
research should seek to re-use existing scales and develop these further, including the scale 
initially developed and validated within this thesis.  
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10.8 | Final Conclusion 
This thesis has demonstrated that although the retirement transition is under-researched in its 
relation to cybersecurity, the wealth of changes that take place during this transition are likely to 
have far reaching consequences for older adult cybersecurity vulnerability. Furthermore, this 
thesis has highlighted stress as an important component in the older adult cybersecurity 
experience and demonstrated how this stress is likely to negatively impact engagement in 
cybersecurity behaviours. Finally, this thesis has demonstrated that the transactional theory of 
stress and coping provides a promising avenue for future research, contributing to our 
understanding of how cybersecurity related stress subsequently leads to dysfunctional coping 
strategies and possible cybersecurity vulnerability in older adults. As older adults are continually 
targeted online, applying the findings of this thesis into future research and policy will support 
older adults to stay safe online and aid in promoting their cybersecurity.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Study 1 Interview Schedule 
   Interview Schedule 
1. Introduction to participant following consent (5 mins)
2. Question 1: Can you tell me about your experiences in the lead up to your retirement?
(approx. 10 minutes) – warm up
a. Age now
b. How long ago retired
c. Reason for retirement
d. Hard or soft transition? (tapered down or sudden exit)
e. Previous occupation / need for tech in previous job?
3. Question 2: What do you think were the biggest changes to your life during your
transition into retirement and why were they important? (Approx. 40 mins)
Prompts (covering investigative plan areas): 
1. Social situation: Family dynamic, Leisure activities, socialising, volunteering/work,
community engagement, online adoption for social purposes, living arrangements,
joining/changing group memberships?
2. Online/Technology Use/Interaction – tech adoption? Previous use of tech (perhaps
get out a device to look at to stimulate conversation) Change in the way that
technology is used? – speak to family/colleagues on tech more/less etc?
3. Identity (feel different) –has the way you see yourself changed? If so, how? Societal
role? Professional identity – retired identity?
4. Psychological wellbeing/personality change? – happier, less happy than at work?
Changed as a person – more outgoing, more introverted?
5. Support Structures – who helped with cyber security when at work? Is that the same
now? Is there more/less support and by whom?
6. Financial change, how they are finding this
4. Question 3: How did your online safety behaviour change over the course of your
retirement?  (approx. 5 mins)
Prompts: 
1. Help from colleagues/family?
2. Updates or discussing threats with other people
3. Perceived threat of cybersecurity issues
4. Targeted/victim of cybercrime during or after retirement? What kind of threat if so
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P5’s Task Results 
P9’s Task Results 
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Appendix C: Scale Items Used in Study and Original Sources Where Adapted 
Primary Appraisal Items 
Construct Original Source Survey Items Length 
Scale 
Extremes: 
Threat Severity Adapted fromMartens (2019) 















It is probably that I will become a victim of a cyber-attack 
The risk is high that I will become a victim of a cyber-attack 
Past 
Experience Newly Created 





I have suffered as a result of cyber-security attacks in the past 












I avoid updates on my devices or software, so that they continue to work in a way in which I am 
familiar 
Engaging in cyber-security practices is something which requires a lot of effort 
Secondary Appraisal Items 
Social Support 
Resources Newly Created 
When it comes to issues involving my digital devices: 





I know someone who I can turn to for help. 
I know someone that I can talk to for support. 





Taking the necessary security measures against cyber-attacks is easy 7 I feel comfortable taking security measures against cyber-attacks 
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(cyber-crime 














Using Strong Passwords and Keeping them safe 
Maintaining good online browsing behaviours (such as checking URL’s and hovering over links 
before clicking) 
Using public wi-fi safely 
Backing up data 
Antivirus Software 
Spotting and guarding against phishing emails 














using security protection has become natural to me 
online security is something I do automatically 
online protection is something I do without thinking 











I do not know enough about online security to protect myself 
I often find it difficult to understand how to keep myself safe online 
I struggle to understand cyber security advice and guidance 
Keeping myself safe online is too demanding 
Protecting myself online takes too much time 
Engaging in cyber-security practices takes too much effort 
Cyber-security advice is constantly changing 
I am always having to learn new procedures and processes to stay safe online 
There is always new online security guidance that I should follow 
Online security technology is constantly changing 
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Appendix D: Validity and Reliability Statistics (Study 5) 
CR AVE MSV MaxR(H) Dysf ProtHabit SocSupp ThreatSev ThreatVul PastExp SecKnow SecSEe GenSRS PFC 
Dysf 0.584 0.417 0.301 0.611 0.646 
ProtHabit 0.968 0.859 0.663 0.974 
-
0.300 0.927 
SocSupp 0.969 0.887 0.016 0.975 0.117 0.124 0.942 
ThreatSev 0.828 0.618 0.108 0.843 
-
0.052 0.208 0.127 0.786 
ThreatVul 0.890 0.730 0.136 0.915 0.241 -0.144 0.087 0.328 0.855 
PastExp 0.899 0.749 0.115 0.922 0.105 -0.022 0.066 0.128 0.339 0.866 
SecKnow 0.883 0.521 0.726 0.889 
-
0.391 0.760 0.073 0.091 -0.227 -0.026 0.722 
SecSEe 0.885 0.720 0.790 0.899 
-
0.401 0.753 0.072 0.007 -0.255 -0.112 0.772 0.848 
GenSRS 0.827 0.705 0.790 0.839 0.549 -0.814 -0.006 -0.060 0.369 0.136 -0.852 -0.889 0.840
PFC 0.775 0.635 0.097 0.804 
-
0.312 0.227 0.087 0.143 -0.007 0.039 0.215 0.282 -0.256 0.797 
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Paid IT Support, purchasing used devices 
Incorrect use of terminology - malware 
Loss of workplace technical support 
structures 
Purchasing new/different devices post-
retirement 
Reliance on new support structures and 
reinforced by positive experiences 
Family not available so relies on paid help 
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